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1.1 Introduction
Despite the exponential growth of total equity option volume traded in the U.S., from 676
million contracts in 2000 to over 3,727 million contracts in 2015 1, there is still consider-
able disagreement about the real eects of these instruments on the underlying rms. On
the one hand, options can act as a managerial discipline mechanism that increases stock
price informativeness, thus better reecting fundamentals. In a seminal paper, Holm-
strom and Tirole (1993) explore the active role of price informativeness in disciplining
managers and incentivizing them to engage in value-increasing activities that ultimately
benet shareholders and debtholders. On the other hand, we argue that an active options
market exacerbates the classic conict of interest between shareholders and debtholders
by providing the former with a powerful instrument to expropriate the latter. A more
liquid options market for the stock allows shareholders to extract high trading gains from
certain situations, altering shareholders risk-taking incentives in a way that should con-
sequently be priced by debtholders. Take, for instance, the case of Jana Partners LLC,
a multi-billion-dollar hedge fund, and CNet, the telecommunications company. By late
December 2007, Jana had accumulated a large economic interest in CNet via an 8% voting
interest (through common shares of the company) and an additional 8% of non-voting
rights through derivative markets. In January 2008, Jana partnered with Sandell Asset
Management (who had 5% economic interest in CNet through derivatives) to takeover
CNet's board and gain majority control. The telecommunications company fought back
this takeover attempt, leading to a controversial lawsuit between the parties that some
voices interpreted as Jana pulling a public relations stunt to put pressure on the board so
that a third party came in with a takeover 2. These concerns were proven right when in
May of the same year CBS Corporation bought CNet for $1.8 billion. The bid price was
$11.50 a share (Jana valued it at $11 short before), a premium of 44% relative to the last
market price ($7.95). Jana and its partners tendered their shares to the bidder, earning
a huge prot in both stock and derivative markets.
These conicting channels of inuence raise an interesting empirical question regarding
how bondholders, an important group of claimholders in the capital structure, view an
active option market. In this paper, we address this open empirical question. Specically,
we study whether the volume of equity options written on the underlying asset increases
or reduces rms' cost of debt. We nd that a one-standard-deviation increase in options
trading volume from its mean is associated with a 10-basis-point increase in the bond
at-issue yield spread.
1Data from Options Clearing Corporation: http://www.optionsclearing.com/webapps/historical-
volume-query.
2See, for example, 'What is Jana doing?' by Andrew Ross Sorkin, The New York Times, February
7th, 2008.
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We examine in detail the reasons for and mechanisms driving these results. Our start-
ing point is the recognition that active options markets alter the incentives for market
participants to gather private information and that trading on such information makes
stock prices more ecient (e.g., Cao, 1999; Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004; Pan
and Poteshman, 2006). However, the benet to informed traders from options markets
should depend on the volume of option trading activity because illiquid markets hamper
not only informed but also uniformed traders. Accordingly, the informational benet goes
beyond the eect of the mere existence of an options market on the rm's stock and should
be related to whether the market for the listed options has sucient volume, as informed
traders' incentives to trade are higher in high-volume markets (Pagano, 1989; Admati and
Peiderer, 1988). Taken together, these works provide strong support for the conjecture
that informational eciency may be greater in highly liquid options markets. Because
prices play an active role (i.e., managers learn from prices) when managerial decisions are
made (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Faure-Grimaud and Gromb, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and
Jiang, 2007), greater price eciency should serve as a more eective disciplining mecha-
nism, mitigating the classic moral hazard problem between management and shareholders.
Under this argument, stock prices reecting more information about rms' fundamentals
not only mitigate the agency problem between management and shareholders but also
reduce the information asymmetry between shareholders and debtholders, which should
ultimately facilitate rm nancing.
Opposite to the benecial eect stated above, there is also a more pessimistic view of
the eect of options from a bondholder perspective. Active options markets can exacerbate
the expropriation of bondholder wealth from shareholders. Specically, options allow
investors, including current shareholders 3, to extract high trading gains from certain
events, with especially detrimental eects on bondholders' welfare.
A particular concern arises when a shift in control from shareholders to creditors is
imminent as, for instance, in the event of nancial distress (Borisova, Fotak, Holland,
and Megginson, 2015). In the event of default, creditors become the new owners through
the distribution of stock in restructuring, thereby increasing the likelihood of bondholders
being expropiated by shareholders. An additional concern arises in the case of acquisi-
tions and disciplinary takeovers. Takeovers can benet target shareholders but also harm
the target bondholders by adding more debt to the rm, thereby reducing the value of
3Although several restrictions on free trading in derivative markets apply to a rm's shareholders, strict
requirements and prohibitions primarily aect corporate insiders, dened by the SEC as a company's
ocers and directors and any benecial owners of more than ten percent of a class of the company's
equity securities registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Any shareholder
not falling into these categories faces no constraints whatsoever on engaging in, for example, options
trading. The literature has documented widespread use of nancial derivatives such as options by large
institutional investors, including mutual funds (Koski and Ponti, 1999) and hedge funds (Aragon and
Martin, 2012).
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the outstanding bonds not only by increasing the probability and deadweight costs of a
possible future bankruptcy but also by reordering the priority of claims in bankruptcy
(Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007). The literature provides extensive theoretical and em-
pirical evidence supporting the use of options by shareholders in advance of banrupcy
llings and takeovers, to the detriment of bondholders. Back (1993) argues that informed
traders may prefer to trade options rather than stocks because of increased opportunities
for leverage. Cao (1999) concludes that agents with information about future contin-
gencies should be able to trade more eectively on their information in the presence of
options, and Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas (1998) provide theoretical evidence that in-
formed traders may choose the options market to capitalize on their private information,
beneting from the higher leverage and liquidity in the options market; therefore, in-
formed traders also may trade in the options market before extreme corporate events to
benet from option features. More recently, Ge, Hu, Humphery-Jenner, and Lin (2016)
empirically show how informed traders also exploit options markets before the event of
bankruptcy ling. They nd that the volume of options to stock ratio (O/S) measured
from Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2010), computed over the interval from two
days to four days before the bankruptcy ling, is signicantly and negatively related to
bankruptcy ling returns. In particular, they show how a one-standard-deviation increase
in O/S is associated with a 10.84-percentage-point decrease in bankruptcy announcement
returns. The last empirical result indicates a direct channel for shareholders to improve
their payo in the extreme case of bankruptcy. These works conclude that shareholders
can signicantly improve their expected payo in the event of default by directly lever-
aging options' features, which could even favor strategic default decisions. Shareholders
may default for solvency reasons, as well for strategic reasons (Favara, Schroth, and Valta,
2012). Thus, as a rm becomes seriously distressed, increasing shareholder control can
aect managerial decisions in a way that not only augments the shareholders' expected
payo in the event of default but also contributes to the ability to anticipate the timing of
default (Feldhutter, Hotchkiss, and Karakas, 2016). The other important corporate event
from a bondholder perspective is when a merger or acquisition take place. In this vein,
Chan, Ge, and Lin (2015) nd that the implied volatility spread and implied volatility
skew have signicant predictability for acquirer announcement returns in mergers and ac-
quisitions, and Cao, Chen, and Grin (2005) show that the call option volume imbalance
has a positive relationship with target rm announcement returns in takeovers. Both
empirical studies suggest that options are also used to take advantage before takeovers,
providing shareholders with an eective instrument to prot from these corporate events.
Although we have focused thus far on the direct use of options as potential expropia-
tion instruments, the mere fact of the existence of a liquid option market constitutes a
clear threat of being expropiated by shareholders that should be priced, accordingly, by
bondholders.
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Combining all of these considerations, it is apparent that the net impact of options
markets on the cost of debt is theoretically unclear and ultimately an empirical issue. To
resolve this ambiguity, we assemble a rich and original data set containing information on
bond issues, rm-specic characteristics and options trading data. To approximate the
total quarterly dollar options volume, we use the approach proposed by Roll, Schwartz,
and Subrahmanyam (2009). We run panel data regressions on a sample of 4,330 bond
issues by 808 dierent publicly traded U.S. rms during the period from 1996 to 2014.
Our baseline test reveals a detrimental eect of options trading volume on a rm's cost
of debt. In particular, a more liquid option market is related to higher yield spreads over
treasuries and lower bond credit ratings. These results are robust to using alternative
subsamples and alternative measures of the cost of debt, the inclusion of a wide range of
control variables and several econometric models.
While these ndings are consistent with options markets having a net detrimental
eect on bond yields and credit ratings, by augmenting the conict of interest between
shareholders and bondholders, we are concerned that our results could be explained by
an alternative interpretation. This is the case if our results are totally driven by options
investors trading in advance of bond issues to prot from companies with a more uncer-
tain short-term future and, hence, costlier debt nancing. Although the last argument
implicitly assumes weak expected company, or stock market price, short-term behavior,
options traders could benet from options even if short-term expectations are not neg-
ative. For instance, options are a mechanism for trading on information about future
equity volatility, which allows investors with information about short-term stock price
volatility to benet from options (Ni et al., 2008). Both stories support the interpretation
of options traders anticipating a company's short-term market behavior after bond issues,
thus, challenging our main argument suggesting an exacerbation of the classical conict
of interest between shareholders and bondholders.
To account for such selection issues, we extend our baseline specication in several
ways. First, we estimate two-stage least squares (2SLS) models using moneyness and open
interest as instrumental variables (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009; Blanco and
Wehrheim, 2017). Our identication strategies suggest that the detrimental association
between options trading and the cost of debt is not simply driven by self-selection. Second,
to avoid the possibility that our results are driven by investors more heavily trading
options on highly distressed rms, we include specic proxies for rm distress in our
regression specication, and we run our baseline regressions by rm distress quartiles and
perform quantile regressions. Overall, we show that the negative impact of options trading
on a rm's cost of debt is not totally explained by traders anticipating future rm distress,
nor is neither concentrated in highly distressed rms. Moreover, we explore the eect of
option trading volume on short-term rm value and stock price behavior after bond issues.
We show that the detrimental impact of options on the rm's cost of debt is not caused by
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traders anticipating short-term negative rm or stock price evolution. Finally, we show
how the inimical eect of options trading over the cost of debt remains economically and
statistically signicant after considering time-series yield spreads instead of bond issues.
The results are also robust to the inclusion of bond xed eects.
To address additional potential concerns about our ndings, we revisit these results
to provide a better understanding of the mechanisms driving them. Specically, we in-
vestigate the intensity of the eect in dierent scenarios in which our hypothesis predicts
option markets have a stronger detrimental eect on rms' cost of debt. First, we fo-
cus on the two previously mentioned corporate events, takeovers and rm defaults, that
the literature identies as detrimental to bondholders' welfare (Cremers, Nair, and Wei,
2007; Qiu and Yu, 2009) but are potentially protable for option traders (Cao, Chen, and
Grin, 2005; Chan, Ge, and Lin, 2015; Ge, Hu, Humphery-Jenner, and Lin, 2016). The
eect of options volume on rm cost of debt is more pronounced when the rm is more
nancially distressed, or closer to experiencing default, and more open to the market for
corporate control (more likely to experience a takeover). Second, we assess how the type of
shareholder inuences our results. Consistent with our main story, we nd that the eect
is amplied when the proportion of dedicated owners (Bushee, 1998), which have greater
incentives to be informed about rm fundamentals and to inuence managerial decisions,
is higher. Finally, we explore the case of debt renegotiation. When shareholders have ad-
vantages over debtholders in renegotiation, bondholders' expropriation risk increases as
the threat of strategic default intensies (Garlappi, Shu, and Yan, 2008; Favara, Schroth,
and Valta, 2012). Options are particularly damaging for bondholders when shareholders'
incentives for default and bargaining power are higher. In summary, these results provide
compelling evidence regarding the role of option markets inducing shareholders to act to
the detriment of bondholders' interests.
Our paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to the best of our
knowledge, it is the rst study to specically examine the real eect of nancial deriva-
tives on the rm's cost of debt. In this vein, there is a growing literature that empirically
explores the eects of nancial derivatives on the real economy. Roll, Schwartz, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2009) show that options trading is positively associated with rm value and
price informativeness, Blanco and Wehrheim (2017) nd a positive association between
options trading volume and rm innovation, and Naiker, Navissi, and Truong (2013) show
how high-volume options markets reduce the cost of equity.
Second, we contribute to the understanding of the determinants of the cost of debt.
While there is a vast literature studying the determinants of corporate bond spreads, such
an analysis of the relationship between options trading and the rm's cost of debt has
not previously been undertaken. Empirical studies have examined, for instance, the eect
of liquidity (Odders-White and Ready, 2006), competition (Valta, 2012), government
ownership (Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2015), an open market for corporate
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control (Qiu and Yu, 2009), political rights (Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010) or strategic
ownership (Aslan and Kumar, 2012).
Third, our paper builds on a recent empirical literature showing that options trading
contains information on several important upcoming corporate events, such as earnings
announcements (Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam,
2010; Johnson and So, 2012), takeovers (Cao, Chen, and Grin, 2005; Chan, Ge, and
Lin, 2015; Augustin, Brenner, and Subrahmanyam, 2015) and bankruptcy llings (Ge,
Lin, and Pearson, 2016). In addition, Poteshman (2006) investigates unusual put option
buying before the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, nding informed trading in
the options market for two airline companies prior to the attack. This study empirically
explores the direct economic consequencies of the potential use of options by shareholders
at the expense of bondholder interests.
Finally, we also enrich the debate on the regulation of nancial derivatives. Unlike
stock market listings, where rms apply, options listings are exogenous to rm decisions;
they are made within exchanges. These exchanges are self-regulating institutions that are
members of the Options Clearing Corporation (OCC), which operates under the juris-
diction of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (for exchange-listed options).
Because the SEC plays an important role in determining the eligibility criteria for securi-
ties in options trading (Mayhew and Mihov, 2004), this topic is of particular interest to
policy makers.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 describes the sample,
the measurement of variables and descriptive statistics. Section 1.3 presents our main
results. We perform a rich set of robustness tests in Section 1.4. In Section 1.5, we
discuss the underlying mechanism through which options trading may aect the cost of
debt. Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Data and methodology
We compile information on bond issues, rm-specic characteristics and options trading
data from a variety of sources. Detailed denitions of all variables and their sources are
provided in A.1. We begin by extracting bond-level data from the Thomson Reuters
SDC Platinum Global New Issues Database. Our main focus is on new issues, rather
than secondary market quotes, as they provide direct and more accurate measures of the
cost of debt (e.g., Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel, 1999; Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and
Mann, 2001; Maxwell and Stephens, 2003; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Francis, Hasan,
John, and Waisman, 2010). We limit our sample to U.S. companies and issues of xed-
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rate 4 corporate bonds dened in U.S. dollars over the period 1996-2014 5. In addition to
our measures of the cost of debt (bond rating and yield spread), we retrieve from the SDC
Global New Issues data on bond maturity and principal amount, and we construct two
dummy variables that indicate whether the bond is callable6 and public. These variables
have previously been successfully used as determinants of the cost of debt 7.
We measure a rm's cost of debt using the bond yield spread and bond rating. Both
metrics are standard in the literature and provide direct values of the real cost incurred
by rms to access debt nancing via bond markets. Our rst measure of the cost of debt
is the bond yield spread at the time of bond issue. Following Cremers, Nair, and Wei
(2007) and Qiu and Yu (2009), we calculate the yield spread as the dierence between the
bond's yield to maturity and the Treasury bond yield with the same maturity. We collect
constant maturity Treasury yields from the Federal Reserve H-15 Release for the six-
month, one-year, three-year, ve-year, seven-year, 10-year, 20-year and 30-year maturities.
In the few cases in which there is not a maturity-equivalent Treasury bond, we use linear
interpolation between the two closest maturities to calculate the yield of the risk-free bond
8.
Alternatively, we use bond ratings to capture the perceived risk of a bond. To measure
these ratings, we rely on the Standard and Poor's rating reported by SDC 9. We convert
the traditional bond rating by S&P into a numerical scale, where lower values correspond
to poorer ratings 10 and vice versa.
For data on options trading activity, we use Option Metrics. This database contains
information on daily put and call contracts traded for each individual stock along with
bid and ask closing prices from 1996 onward. To dene our measure of options volume,
we follow Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009). We rst multiply the total trade
in each option by the end-of-day quote midpoint for that option. Next, we aggregate this
4We retrieve bond issues for xed and oating rate bonds from SDC Global New Issues. After applying
all lters, oating bond issues represent less than 6.5% of all bonds. Given this small amount, the greater
diculty of properly assessing yields to maturity on oating bonds with dierent complex benchmarks,
and for the sake of homogeneity in our main sample, we decide to drop issues of oating rate bonds.
In any case, when we add this small sample, the results remain qualitatively intact. These results are
available from the authors upon request.
5Options Metrics data coverage starts in 1996.
6There are no putable bonds in the sample once we apply all lters.
7See, among others, Qiu and Yu (2009),Qi, Roth, and Wald (2010), Francis, Hasan, John, and Waisman
(2010) or Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson (2015).
8There are more complex methods for interpolating a piece-wise term structure. However, there is
no reason to believe that our approach poses a problem. Most of our bonds either match a maturity-
equivalent treasury or have maturities within one year of an existing Treasury.
9Whereas other agencies such Moody's also provide with individual bond ratings, Standard and Poor's
is the standard in recent literature (Qiu and Yu, 2009; Qi, Roth, and Wald, 2010; Borisova, Fotak, Holland,
and Megginson, 2015).
10The complete numerical scale is as follows: 1-CCC-, 2-CCC, 3-CCC+, 4-B-, 5-B, 6-B+, 7-BB-, 8-BB,
9-BB+, 10-BBB-, 11-BBB, 12-BBB+, 13-A-, 14-A, 15-A+, 16-AA-, 17-AA, 18-AA+, 19-AAA-, 20-AAA,
21-AAA+.
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number quarterly across all trading days and all options on the listed stock. We construct
this variable, which we call Options Volume, for the quarter prior to that of bond issuance
11.
Existing empirical research on structural credit risk modeling and market microstruc-
ture nds a signicant role of rm-specic characteristics in determining the cost of debt
(Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin, 2001; Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Odders-
White and Ready, 2006; Avramov, Jostova, and Philipov, 2007; Ericsson, Jacobs, Oviedo,
et al., 2009; Qiu and Yu, 2009). To control for these eects, we gather rm-specic data
from CRSP-Compustat Merged (CCM) on the quarter prior to bond issuance. Speci-
cally, we collect data to construct the following variables: Size (as the log of total assets),
return on assets or ROA (net income over total assets), Leverage (total debt divided by
total assets), growth opportunities as proxied by Tobin's Q (sum of the market capital-
ization of a rm's common equity, liquidation value of its preferred shares and the book
value of debt, divided by book value of assets), relative Bid-ask spread, and Firm risk (as
proxied by the standard deviation of a rm's quarterly cash-ow during previous year 12).
We drop rms that have missing observations for the quarter of interest in any of these
variables and require them to be reporting to the CRSP database for at least two years,
to mitigate back-lling bias. We remove from our sample rms that are not quoted in the
three major American markets (Amex, NYSE, or Nasdaq). Finally, we exclude nancial
rms (Standard Industry Classication (SIC) code 6000-6999)13, as their leverage may be
inuenced by their idiosyncrasy, and their debt-like liabilities are not strictly comparable
to those of non-nancial rms (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). In line with existing literature,
all variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to ensure that our results are
not driven by outliers.
Because, after applying all lters, our data sets do not perfectly overlap, we lose some
observations when merging data from these three sources. Our nal sample comprises
4,330 bond issues in the period 1996-2014 for 808 dierent rms 14. Table 1.1 provides
information on the number of issues per year and the number of issuers.
11We set the value of Options Volume equal to zero when the rm is not quoted in the options market.
Although rms not listed in options markets could be idiosyncratic and should be treated with caution
(Mayhew and Mihov, 2004), only two observations in our nal sample have options volume equal to zero.
The results remain completely unchanged when excluding these observations.
12For robustness, we also use stock return volatility instead of that of the cash-ows, which does not
change the results.
13We drop 222 nancial rms. The results remain economically and statistically signicant when we
include these rms.
14We aggregate bond issues at the 6-digit-CUSIP level, which is the identier provided by SDC Plat-
inum.
1.2. Data and methodology 18
Table 1.1: Number of Bond Issues per Year
Year Number of Issues Number of Firms
1996 77 53
1997 144 85
1998 188 111
1999 101 71
2000 118 76
2001 170 102
2002 131 65
2003 101 66
2004 31 26
2005 87 56
2006 159 101
2007 229 117
2008 253 125
2009 349 213
2010 400 253
2011 384 212
2012 470 257
2013 441 224
2014 497 259
Total 4330
1.2.1 Summary statistics
Table 1.2 reports the summary statistics for the main variables used in this study. The
average issue in our sample has a spread over treasuries of approximately 215 basis
points (bps) with a median of 157 bps, which is consistent with similar recent studies 15
in the literature (e.g., Borisova, Fotak, Holland, and Megginson, 2015). With respect
to bond ratings, the average (median) according to our numerical scale is 11.54 (12.00),
which corresponds to a Standard and Poor's rating between BBB and BBB+ (BBB+).
The average rm has a quarterly options trading volume of $165 million (median $ 22.46
million). This substantial number reects the dramatic, exponential growth in the use
of derivatives in recent years 16. For other variables, rms in our sample have a mean
(median) size of $33.48 ($13.58) billion with an average Tobin's Q of 1.80 (median 1.57).
The average bond in our sample has a principal equal to $558 million and maturity of
approximately 12 years. Finally, 99.5% of our bonds are public, and less than 5% include
a callable option. All these statistics fall within the standards in the literature. Due to
high skewness that may jeopardize our results, we use the natural logarithm of some of
the variables for the analysis. Specically, we calculate the natural logarithm of the yield
spread, options volume, total assets, rm risk, bid-ask spread and (one plus) maturity.
15Obviously, in existing studies with a sample ending before 2007, the average yield spread is much
lower (approximately 120 bps.). The average yield spread in our sample pre-2007 is 130 bps.
16Our number is considerably larger than those reported by previous articles using this variable.
Nonetheless, these studies (e.g., Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009; Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017)
focus on a period ending before 2005. The sample statistics prior to that date fall within those of the
literature.
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Table 1.2: Summary Statistics
Mean StdDev 25% Median 75% Observation
Yield Spread (bps) 215.582 170.244 96.000 157.300 280.800 4330
S&P Rating 11.545 3.322 10.000 12.000 14.000 4330
Option Volume ($ Millions) 165.016 414.441 3.450 22.465 111.857 4330
Open Interest 1006.922 1728.727 117.367 382.986 1164.368 4328
Moneyness 0.283 0.138 0.200 0.256 0.323 4328
Total Assets ($ Billions) 33.488 59.883 5.062 13.586 33.883 4330
Tobin's Q 1.804 0.792 1.231 1.573 2.151 4330
ROA 0.015 0.015 0.006 0.014 0.023 4330
Leverage 0.273 0.156 0.161 0.251 0.355 4330
Bid-Ask Spread 0.003 0.006 0.000 0.001 0.003 4330
Firm risk 0.073 0.099 0.022 0.041 0.079 4330
Callable Dummy 0.045 0.207 0.000 0.000 0.000 4330
Public Bond Dummy 0.995 0.071 1.000 1.000 1.000 4330
Maturity (in years) 11.353 8.296 5.353 10.014 10.077 4330
Principal Amount ($ Millions) 558.060 457.799 250.000 450.000 700.000 4330
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in this study. Denitions of all
variables are provided in A.1. The sample period is 1996-2014.
1.2.2 Specication
In our baseline specication, we analyze the eect of options trading volume on a rm's
cost of debt by estimating the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions, where
i indexes bond issues and t indexes time:
Yi =  + Ln(OptionV olume) + Zi + t + i +  (1.1)
The dependent variable, Yi, measures a rm's cost of debt under the two metrics previously
discussed. Thus, one type of econometric model in our analysis will take the natural
logarithm of the at-issue bond yield spread, Ln(Yield Spread), as the dependent variable;
another will use the bond's S&P Rating 17. Ln(Option Volume) is the natural logarithm
of the previously discussed options trading volume variable. The vector Zi contains a
set of bond- and rm-level controls 18. We control for rm size (log total assets), growth
opportunities (Tobin's Q), protability (ROA), leverage, rm risk, illiquidity (bid-ask
spread), bond maturity and callable option19 and include a dummy for public bonds. A
17We are aware of the potential problems of using OLS regression with a count variable such as S&P
Rating. To mitigate concerns regarding this issue, we t a Poisson model for S&P Rating, and we repeat
the analysis with a Negative Binomial and an Ordered Logit model. Moreover, we transform the rating
variable to the natural log of one plus the rating in a traditional OLS regression. All these tests are
reported in Table A2.5 in A.2 and conrm our initial results.
18In subsequent analyses in the robustness section, we add various additional controls in both of these
dimensions that leave our initial results unchanged.
19The callable dummy is typically not used in the literature as a control for Standard and Poor's bond
rating. For this reason, we leave the callable variable as a control only in the case with the bond yield
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complete denition of these variables is presented in A.1. In line with existing research,
we expect that a rm's size, growth potential and protability have positive impacts on
(by reducing) the cost of debt. Conversely, leverage and rm risk (cash-ow volatility)
will increase the return demanded by bondholders, which is contrary to the rm's interest.
Similarly, bonds including a callable option or having longer maturities reect, in principle,
higher perceived risk. The control variable on stock market liquidity (or illiquidity) is of
special relevance for this analysis. First, this is because exchanges are more prone to
quote options from rms with high stock trading volume (Mayhew and Mihov, 2004),
but second and more important, this is due to the asymmetric information embedded in
stock market liquidity measures 20. In particular, Odders-White and Ready (2006) nd a
negative relationship between a rm's credit rating and equity market liquidity. Moreover,
common microstructure measures of adverse selection such as the relative bid-ask spread
can be used to predict future changes in ratings. Following this rationale, we expect
the relationship between stock liquidity and debt cost to be negative. We treat stock
liquidity with caution by rst using the relative bid-ask spread (used more prominently in
the recent literature) as a proxy and then repeating the analysis with the Amihud (2002)
measure 21.
Although our focus is on bond issues (and hence a pooled OLS model) rather than
time-series (panel) data, there exist some time-varying features not related to bond or
rm characteristics that could undesirably inuence our analysis. For example, the eco-
nomic conditions surrounding a crisis (e.g., the dotcom bubble, recent nancial crisis)
can increase debt nancing costs in a manner unrelated to rm or bond fundamentals.
Similarly, the exponential growth of derivatives markets in recent years 22 demands a close
control of time eects. For these reasons, we include in our regression model the term
t, which accounts for time dummies. In a similar fashion, following past studies in the
literature, i controls for industry dummies (at the two-digit SIC code level
23). Finally,
we report robust standard errors clustered at the rm level, which is the most accurate
and conservative approach (Petersen, 2009).
spread as a dependent variable. The results (unreported) when including the callable dummy as a control
for bond rating remain substantially unchanged.
20See, among others, Roll (1984), Glosten and Harris (1988), Stoll (1989), Hasbrouck (1991), Easley,
Kiefer, O'hara, and Paperman (1996) or Huang and Stoll (1997) for seminal work on the issue.
21In fact, using the Amihud (2002) measure yields a higher economic signicance of the eect related
to options volume. As it is most commonly used to capture the adverse selection component, we adopt
a conservative approach and retain the traditional relative bid-ask spread in the main procedure. The
results when using the Amihud (2002) measure are reported in Table A2.8 in A.2.
22The growth is especially surprising in equity options markets, the volume of which increased from
200 million contracts in 1996 to almost 4,000 million in 2015 (see Options Clearing Corporation).
23Table A2.6 in the robustness section shows that our results are robust to the inclusion of four-digit
SIC dummies.
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1.3 Main results
We begin the analysis with the results from the regression specication in Eq. 1.1, which
we display in Table 1.3. In column 1 of Table 1.3, we start with a specication including
only rm-level controls and time and industry dummies for the natural logarithm of bond
yield spread as the dependent variable. The same specication for our second dependent
variable, S&P Rating, is reported in column 3. We extend this analysis to include bond-
level controls in columns 2 and 4 of Table 1.3. Column 5 reports the results of a Poisson
regression using S&P Rating.
The coecient on Ln(Option Volume) is of high statistical signicance (p-value <
0.01) across all specications in Table 1.3. Our baseline test reveals a detrimental eect
of options trading volume on a rm's cost of debt. In particular, a more liquid option
market is related to a higher yield spread over treasuries and a lower credit rating. In
sum, increasing options trading volume is associated with costlier debt nancing, after
controlling for rm and bond characteristics, as well as for industry and time eects.
The economic magnitude of the eect is strong. For example, taking the coecient of
0.037 specied in column 2, a one-standard-deviation increase in options volume from its
mean of $165.01 million is associated with an increase in the Yield Spread of nearly 10 bps.
The control variables in Table 1.3 take the expected estimated coecients for yield
spread and credit rating. While rm size, growth opportunities, protability and liquidity
relate negatively with the cost of debt, leverage, rm risk and the existence of a callable
option on the bond are positively associated with the cost of debt nancing. One special
case is maturity, which is associated with an increasing yield spread but a higher (better)
credit rating. The relationship between spreads and time to maturity is not surprising and
reects reduced uncertainty over coupon and par value payments as the bond's maturity
date approaches. The case of credit ratings can be explained by a tendency on the part of
larger, nancially stable, companies to issue debt with longer maturities, leading agencies
to evaluate these issues with better ratings.
1.3.1 Endogeneity
In this section, we address concerns related to endogeneity. Option markets are a partic-
ularly benecial trading venue for informed traders where trading and short-selling costs
are minimized. Moreover, they are particularly useful in situations of high uncertainty.
Given these particular features, it is fair to argue that our results can be explained by
reverse causality. Since option markets contain information regarding future stock prices
(e.g. Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew, 2004; Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2010;
Johnson and So, 2012; Ge, Lin, and Pearson, 2016), an increase in option trading volume
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Table 1.3: Options Volume and Cost of Debt
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
OLS OLS OLS OLS Poisson
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.038 0.037 -0.224 -0.222 -0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.045) (0.004)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.288 -0.280 1.530 1.526 0.130
(0.017) (0.017) (0.089) (0.089) (0.008)
Tobin's Q -0.310 -0.296 1.359 1.364 0.100
(0.024) (0.023) (0.104) (0.104) (0.009)
ROA -4.868 -5.313 24.192 23.629 2.345
(0.893) (0.896) (3.837) (3.810) (0.365)
Leverage 0.913 0.833 -6.018 -6.045 -0.611
(0.105) (0.101) (0.431) (0.429) (0.046)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.033 0.035 -0.076 -0.074 -0.010
(0.013) (0.012) (0.047) (0.047) (0.004)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.137 0.148 -0.231 -0.224 -0.032
(0.029) (0.030) (0.098) (0.097) (0.011)
Public Bond Dummy -0.220 0.674 0.066
(0.179) (0.623) (0.050)
Ln(Maturity) 0.230 0.193 0.020
(0.021) (0.050) (0.004)
Callable Dummy 0.311
(0.042)
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330 4330
R2 0.668 0.706 0.741 0.742
Notes: This table presents OLS and Poisson regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume
(Option volume) and a set of control variables. Detailed denitions of all variables are
provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses).
All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The
sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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may be driven by future market expectations of rm distress. For example, investors that
operate through option markets may bias their trades toward those companies facing a
more turbulent short-term future and, hence, costlier debt nancing. We address these
concerns by performing a wide range of tests that include instrumental variable regression
as well as analyses across rms with dierent levels of distress and the behavior of equity
returns following bond issuance.
Instrumental variable analysis
We rst address endogenous eects using an instrumental variable approach and two-
stage least squares (2SLS) regression. Instrumental variable regression will help not only
to assess the causal direction of the relationship between options volume and cost of
debt but also to mitigate the possible measurement error in the independent variable of
interest.
A good instrument for our setting is a variable that is highly correlated with options
trading (which we can test, for example, via the rst stage of the 2SLS procedure) but
uncorrelated with our measures of the cost of debt except through other independent (con-
trol) variables (i.e., the exclusion restriction holds). Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam
(2009) introduce two variables that serve as good instruments for our framework: (i)
open interest in the stock's listed options and (ii) moneyness (i.e., the average absolute
dierence between the stock's market price and the option's strike price). We devote this
section to the analysis of open interest as an instrument and show in A.2 that the results
are similar when, rst, using moneyness as an instrument and, then, both instruments
together 24. Open interest consists of the number of open options contracts on each day in
a listed stock. As Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) argue, this measure should
not be inherently related to rm value, as it includes the summation of both call and put
contracts 25. Extending this argument, open interest should not be associated either with
higher or lower bond yield spreads or credit ratings in any mechanical way. To construct
the variable open interest, we average open interest, from Options Metrics, across all op-
tions on a stock throughout the calendar quarter. The correlation between open interest
and options volume in our full sample is 0.4305, suggesting that open interest is indeed
related to options trading volume. As in the case of options volume, we measure open
interest in the quarter prior to bond issuance and use the natural log of this variable,
24Previous works, including Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) and Blanco and Wehrheim
(2017), use moneyness as their preferred instrument. However, we note that from 2007 onward, the
correlation of moneyness with options volume starts decreasing, and this is probably related to the
increased uncertainty related to the nancial crisis. Although our results hold when using moneyness in
the 2SLS, we retain open interest in the main analysis, as its correlation with options trading is strong
throughout the sample period.
25High or low levels of call or put interest could be associated with higher or lower rm values but not
the sum of the two.
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Ln(Open Interest), for the 2SLS analysis.
Table 1.4: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Open Interest as
Instrument
First stage Second stage
Ln(Option Volume) Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Open Interest) 0.910
(0.040)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.075 -0.407
(instrumented) (0.015) (0.065)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.565 -0.335 1.786
(0.050) (0.023) (0.105)
Tobin's Q 0.544 -0.328 1.512
(0.060) (0.026) (0.112)
ROA 3.640 -5.490 24.843
(2.142) (0.890) (3.739)
Leverage -0.750 0.863 -6.175
(0.240) (0.098) (0.420)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.082 0.026 -0.025
(0.030) (0.011) (0.044)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -0.221 0.149 -0.228
(0.072) (0.031) (0.102)
Public Bond Dummy -0.005 -0.201 0.581
(0.362) (0.195) (0.700)
Ln(Maturity) -0.034 0.231 0.189
(0.028) (0.021) (0.051)
Callable Dummy 0.129 0.292
(0.116) (0.039)
Observations 4328 4328 4328
R2 0.860 0.702 0.739
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the
cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option
volume) and a set of control variables with average quarterly open interest (Open
interest) as the instrumental variable. A detailed denition of all variables is pro-
vided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses).
All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies.
The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
We display the results from the 2SLS procedure in Table 1.4. Column 1 comprises
the results for the rst stage of the 2SLS analysis, in which we regress options volume,
Ln(Option Volume), on the set of independent variables from Eq. 1.1 plus open interest,
Ln(Open Interest), and a full set of time and industry dummies. The positive and highly
signicant coecient of 0.91 for open interest provides additional evidence of the strong
relationship between this variable and option volume. Additionally, instrument irrele-
vancy is rejected (p-value<0.01) using the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) statistic test. The
value of the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is above 10 (the standard rule of thumb) and
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higher than Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, rejecting the null that the instrument
is weak.
Columns 2 and 3 in Table 1.4 report the second stage from the 2SLS on our two
measures of the cost of debt. The coecients on the instrumented options volume variable
for the bond yield spread and bond rating of 0.075 and -0.407, respectively, are strongly
signicant (p-values < 0.01), thus advocating for a causal eect of options trading on
the cost of debt. These coecients are slightly larger in magnitude that those reported
via OLS (0.037 and -0.222, respectively). However, discrepancies between OLS and 2SLS
coecients are common and arise due to various factors primarily related to the mitigation
of errors-in-variables biases 26. Since the analysis with the other instrument (moneyness)
reveals similar qualitative results 27, this divergence is unlikely to jeopardize the validity
of our results but, rather, provides more accurate estimates that strengthen them.
In summary, the results from the 2SLS analysis are consistent with the notion of a
signicant causality running from more active option markets to a rm's cost of debt
nancing. Moreover, mitigating the bias due to the possible endogenous link between
options and debt costs amplies the main eect.
Options volume and rm distress
In the previous section, we show that the positive association between a rm's cost of debt
and its options trading volume is unlikely to be driven by investors more heavily trading
options on those rms that they predict will face a more adverse future. However, some
questions remain unsolved, namely, whether the eect occurs throughout the distribution
of rms or, rather, is concentrated among those rms that are highly distressed. In this
section, we perform an in-depth analysis to ensure that our results are not driven by
highly distressed rms.
We begin by including a direct measure that proxies for rm distress, the well-known
Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (K-Z Index ), in the regression specication 28. We
dene the K-Z Index as in the synthetic specication from Lamont, Polk, and Saaa-
Requejo (2001) and dened in A.1. A higher value of the K-Z Index indicates that a rm
relies more strongly on external nancing and, ultimately, has larger nancial constraints.
Table 1.5 presents the results from including the K-Z Index as a control in our baseline
regressions (columns 1 and 3) and then interacting it with options volume for our two
26Beaver, McAnally, and Stinson (1997) and Irwin and Tervio (2002) provide a comprehensive analysis
of the relevant econometric issues related to this process.
27For the sake of space, we report the estimates from the instrumental variable analysis with moneyness
as an instrument in A.2. Table A2.1 provides the results from the analysis using moneyness as an
instrument, whereas Table A2.2 displays the results from using both instruments in the 2SLS.
28The results remain unchanged (unreported) if we instead use the Altman (1968) Z-score to predict
corporate bankruptcy. These results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 1.5: Options and Financial Distress: K-Z Index
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.039 0.041 -0.245 -0.265
(0.011) (0.011) (0.048) (0.048)
K-Z Index 0.046 -0.040 -1.147 -0.491
(0.094) (0.096) (0.542) (0.646)
Ln(Option Volume)  K-Z Index 0.064 -0.489
(0.026) (0.177)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.281 -0.277 1.542 1.510
(0.018) (0.018) (0.092) (0.091)
Tobin's Q -0.316 -0.315 1.451 1.446
(0.025) (0.025) (0.113) (0.115)
ROA -4.866 -4.588 18.345 16.211
(0.920) (0.901) (3.748) (3.527)
Leverage 0.849 0.849 -6.166 -6.168
(0.110) (0.110) (0.474) (0.474)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.034 0.037 -0.061 -0.084
(0.013) (0.013) (0.049) (0.047)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.141 0.144 -0.196 -0.221
(0.032) (0.032) (0.103) (0.103)
Public Bond Dummy -0.223 -0.224 0.745 0.756
(0.173) (0.163) (0.574) (0.503)
Ln(Maturity) 0.224 0.226 0.195 0.186
(0.022) (0.022) (0.053) (0.052)
Callable Dummy 0.310 0.314
(0.043) (0.042)
Observations 3782 3782 3782 3782
R2 0.702 0.704 0.748 0.752
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost
of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume)
and a set of control variables, as well as the interaction of options volume with the K-Z
Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997) as a measure of nancial constraints. A detailed
denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code
dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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measures of rms cost of debt (columns 2 and 4). The coecients on Ln(Option Volume)
in columns 1 and 3 remain unaltered in signicance and magnitude after controlling for
rm distress. However, the interaction terms in columns 2 and 4 are signicant and
consistent with the eect of options on a rm's cost of debt being more pronounced
when rms are more distressed. These results are consistent with, rst, rm distress not
driving the results and, second, our main hypothesis that options exacerbate shareholder-
debtholder conicts, as the eect is more pronounced in those situations where owning
voting rights is more valuable. We revisit these results for further discussion in the
mechanisms section.
Next, we assess whether the eect of options on bond yield spread and rating occurs
homogeneously across rms with dierent levels of distress. We begin by running the
regression specication in Eq. 1.1 on the bond yield spread across four quartiles of rm
distress (as proxied by the K-Z Index ), where Q1 indexes the least distressed and Q4 the
most distressed rms. Table 1.6 shows the results. Whereas, as predicted, the eect is
economically larger for more distressed rms, it remains signicant across all quartiles,
even for rms with the lowest level of nancial constraints (0.043, p-value<0.05).
To take the analysis of the eect and rm quality to the extreme, we now include as
a control Standard and Poor's rating for the rm (which we convert to a numerical scale
with lower values indicating lower ratings). This specication is highly demanding for the
eect, as bond rating and yield spread are explained primarily by the rating of the rm.
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 1.7 show the results when introducing rm rating as a control
for bond yield spread and bond rating as dependent variables, respectively. Columns 2
and 4 contain the regression with bond yield spread and bond rating, respectively, for the
subsample of rms rated A or above according to the S&P rating scale. Even with this
demanding specication, the results are in line with the existence of an eect of options
volume on rm cost of debt beyond rm quality.
Finally, we perform a quantile regression to check whether the eect is limited to
issues of bonds with particularly high yield spreads or poor credit ratings. Table 1.8 con-
tains the results from a bootstrapped quantile regression with the specication in Eq. 1.1
for 10th and 90th percentiles of bond yield spread and bond credit rating, respectively.
Highly signicant coecients (p-value<0.01) for Ln(Option volume) across the dierent
specications in Table 1.8 reveal that the eect of options on the cost of debt is not driven
by highly distressed rms. Furthermore, the eect is stronger for bond issues of higher
quality (10th percentile).
Taken together, these results are consistent with the view that option markets have
a specic eect on a rm's cost of debt that is not driven by lower quality rms. In
addition to being consistent with our hypothesis, these results reinforce the thesis that
option markets lead the eect toward an increase in the cost of debt, and not vice versa.
If the eect we nd were to appear due to option traders anticipating rms' distress, we
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Table 1.6: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Firm
Distress Quartile
Ln(Yield Spread)
Firm distress quartile
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.043 0.040 0.061 0.053
(0.019) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.321 -0.282 -0.326 -0.204
(0.033) (0.039) (0.034) (0.036)
Tobin's Q -0.300 -0.339 -0.362 -0.318
(0.038) (0.043) (0.055) (0.063)
ROA -3.478 -2.585 -4.051 -3.672
(1.332) (1.574) (1.399) (1.610)
Leverage 0.487 0.809 0.695 0.971
(0.179) (0.205) (0.261) (0.232)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.017 0.055 -0.004 0.030
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.023)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.116 0.120 0.221 0.096
(0.043) (0.051) (0.048) (0.045)
Public Bond Dummy 1.336 0.000 -0.552 -0.032
(0.167) (.) (0.065) (0.142)
Callable Dummy 0.272 0.405 0.344 0.192
(0.157) (0.099) (0.085) (0.053)
Ln(Maturity) 0.307 0.222 0.270 0.065
(0.027) (0.028) (0.037) (0.056)
Observations 945 946 945 946
R2 0.771 0.708 0.714 0.698
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables on two subsamples
of data. Quartiles of rm distress are dened according to values of the K-Z
Index (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997). A detailed denition of all variables
is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level
(in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code
dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and
 denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.7: Options Volume and rm distress: Firm rating
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
All rms A-tranche All rms A-tranche
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.022 0.037 -0.174 -0.156
(0.010) (0.016) (0.047) (0.067)
Firm Rating -0.105 0.384
(0.013) (0.052)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.227 -0.308 1.357 1.446
(0.019) (0.030) (0.093) (0.156)
Tobin's Q -0.241 -0.237 1.185 0.948
(0.023) (0.036) (0.115) (0.143)
ROA -4.183 -5.535 18.351 31.053
(0.924) (1.340) (4.125) (5.770)
Leverage 0.796 0.744 -6.126 -5.135
(0.093) (0.153) (0.433) (0.668)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.019 0.007 0.008 -0.035
(0.012) (0.023) (0.047) (0.079)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.106 0.067 -0.054 0.088
(0.031) (0.049) (0.097) (0.137)
Public Bond Dummy -0.068 -0.741 0.111 2.348
(0.206) (0.096) (0.686) (0.413)
Ln(Maturity) 0.239 0.289 0.195 0.132
(0.020) (0.032) (0.054) (0.066)
Callable Dummy 0.280 0.327
(0.043) (0.147)
Observations 3891 1785 3891 1785
R2 0.727 0.721 0.757 0.787
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables. Firm rating is mea-
sured as Standard and Poor's rating. A detailed denition of all variables is
provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in
parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies
and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.8: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Quantile
Regression
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
10th perc. 90th perc. 10th perc. 90th perc.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.040 0.026 -0.216 -0.117
(0.011) (0.009) (0.063) (0.036)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.271 -0.266 1.819 1.256
(0.022) (0.016) (0.095) (0.068)
Tobin's Q -0.333 -0.270 1.420 1.272
(0.033) (0.023) (0.123) (0.088)
ROA -3.544 -4.988 23.158 19.443
(0.944) (0.937) (5.928) (3.086)
Leverage 1.000 0.849 -6.535 -6.008
(0.093) (0.096) (0.517) (0.341)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.004 0.057 -0.316 0.065
(0.013) (0.012) (0.067) (0.044)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.134 0.114 -0.229 0.001
(0.020) (0.021) (0.112) (0.070)
Public Bond Dummy -0.506 -0.012 0.458 -0.085
(0.572) (0.091) (0.461) (1.137)
Ln(Maturity) 0.303 0.082 0.002 0.140
(0.018) (0.023) (0.043) (0.068)
Callable Dummy 0.346 0.216
(0.063) (0.040)
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330
Pseudo R2 0.484 0.469 0.544 0.520
Notes: This table presents regression results of rm-level measures of the cost
of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option
volume) and a set of control variables from a bootstrapped quantile regression
at the 10th and 90th percentiles with 200 replications. A detailed denition
of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC
code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. , 
and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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should observe (i) no eect whatsoever in nancially stable rms and (ii) the absence of
statistical signicance for the options coecient after accounting for rm nancial quality.
Options volume and subsequent rm value and equity returns
Thus far we have mitigated concerns related to reverse causality by showing that (i)
the results from the instrumental variable analysis reinforce the thesis of option markets
leading the positive association between options and a rm's cost of debt, (ii) the eect
prevails after the inclusion of dierent proxies for rm distress, and (iii) the eect exists
even in those scenarios in which the reverse-causality thesis (rm distress being the main
driver behind and increasing in options trading volume) would predict its disappearance.
We turn now to investigate the eect on a rm's equity market bond issues preceded by
higher options trading volume.
This analysis contributes to the previous discussion on the leading factor in the rela-
tionship between options and the cost of debt. If option traders invest more intensively
in those rms that they expect to experience a more turbulent future (i.e., future rm
distress drives the relationship), bond issues preceeded by higher options trading volume
should be associated with lower equity returns and rm value. Conversely, if bond issues
from rms with more active option markets are followed by an increase in equity returns,
the hypothesis of a volume increase in option markets caused by traders discounting ex-
pectations of rm distress becomes groundless.
The previous literature nds a positive association between more active option markets
and rm value. Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) show that options trading
increases future rm value as proxied by Tobin's Q. In a similar vein, Naiker, Navissi,
and Truong (2013) investigate whether there is a causal eect of options by reducing
the a rm's cost of equity. While these studies seem to support the fact that higher
option trading is associated with larger equity returns, the reported results focus on the
'average' rm of a large sample and need not hold for our specic universe of rms.
Consequently, we investigate rms' equity returns after bond issues in our sample via
two dierent forward measures: rm value as proxied by Tobin's Q and buy and hold
abnormal returns (BHAR) post bond issuance.
Table 1.9 contains the results from an OLS regression of future rm value (Tobin's
Q) on options volume (Option Volume) and a series of control variables similar to the
specication in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009). These controls include size
(market capitalization), share turnover, return on assets (ROA), capex (capital expendi-
tures over sales), leverage (long-term debt over total assets) and a dividend dummy equal
to one if the rm pays dividends 29. Columns 1 to 4 in Table 1.9 use as their dependent
29Please refer to A.1 and/or Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) for a complete denition and
justication of these variables.
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Table 1.9: Options Volume and future rm value
Tobin's Q
Qt+1 Qt+2 Qt+3 Qt+4
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.059 0.062 0.064 0.062
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Market Cap 0.027 0.028 0.027 0.025
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Turnover -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA 7.653 7.354 7.158 6.638
(1.536) (1.537) (1.613) (1.523)
CapX 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.004
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Leverage 0.522 0.501 0.493 0.477
(0.179) (0.187) (0.200) (0.196)
Dividend dummy -0.066 -0.042 -0.038 -0.018
(0.051) (0.054) (0.060) (0.058)
Observations 4107 4101 4082 4062
R2 0.464 0.458 0.444 0.443
Notes: This table presents OLS panel regression estimates of future rm
value (as proxied by Tobin's Q) on options trading volume (Option vol-
ume) and a set of control variables following Roll, Schwartz, and Subrah-
manyam (2009) . The variables are constructed on a quarterly basis. The
time period reference is also quarterly, meaning that Qt+1 refers to rm
value one quarter ahead, Qt+2 to two quarters ahead, etc. A detailed def-
inition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. All regressions include a full set of time and industry dum-
mies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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variable rm value one quarter, two quarters, three quarters and four quarters (one year)
ahead, respectively. As shown by the positive and signicant coecients (p-value<0.01)
for Ln(Option Volume) across all four columns (with magnitudes ranging from 0.059 to
0.064), bond issues from rms with a more active options market are associated with
higher subsequent rm values as proxied by Tobin's Q.
Table 1.10: Options Volume and future equity
returns
Buy-Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs)
[ 1;+10] [+1;+30]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.001 0.038 0.064 0.076
(0.052) (0.055) (0.090) (0.102)
Tobin's Q -0.810 -1.037
(0.192) (0.359)
ROA 4.397 10.403
(10.149) (17.682)
Leverage -1.474 -2.914
(0.973) (1.692)
Ln(Firm risk) -0.036 -0.133
(0.136) (0.204)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.024 -0.057
(0.184) (0.334)
Observations 4170 4170 4170 4170
R2 0.043 0.052 0.046 0.052
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of Buy and
hold abnormal returns (BHARs) calculated using the market model
with an estimation window of 100 days ending 50 days prior to bond
issuance on options trading volume (Option Volume) and a set of
control variables. Time windows in all columns refer to days with
respect to bond issuance. A detailed denition of all variables is
provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm
level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit
SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-
2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
Because the adjustment in equity markets can occur as rapidly as within days from
bond issuance, we now turn to explore short-term abnormal returns in the stock following
the issue. Table 1.10 contains information regarding the eect of options trading volume
on buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) around bond issuance. We calculate BHAR
using the market model with an estimation window of a minimum of 100 days ending
50 days prior to bond issuance for two dierent windows: [-1,+10] (columns 1 and 2 in
Table 1.10) and [+1,+30] (columns 3 and 4) days surrounding the issue. Columns 1 and
3 contain the results from a pooled OLS regression of BHAR on options volume with
time and industry xed eects, whereas columns 2 and 4 add to the specication control
variables previously used that account for rm size and growth opportunities, return-
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on-assets, leverage, rm risk and liquidity. Coecients for Ln(Option Volume) are not
signicant, but positive, across all specications in Table 1.10, revealing no signicant
short-term reaction of equity markets to bond issues preceded by higher options trading
volume.
We show that the positive impact of options on the rm's cost of debt is not driven
by poorer rm quality or traders anticipating future rm distress. Overall, these results
suggest that options indeed have a causal eect on a rm's cost of debt. We discuss these
mechanisms in further detail in Section 1.5
1.4 Robustness
Having established that our results are not due to reverse causality, we turn to analyze
the robustness of our results along other dimensions. In this section, we consider various
issues that may jeopardize the validity of our results at dierent levels. Specically, we
begin by considering a time-series sample of bond prices, which enables us to extend our
baseline specication to consider a much more demanding one with bond xed eects. We
also expand the analysis to consider dierent measures of stock-return volatility and stock
market liquidity, two well-known determinants of option listing by exchanges (Mayhew
and Mihov, 2004). More important, we discuss the impact of price informativeness on our
results, which is an important eect associated with more active options markets. Finally,
we perform a set of other miscellaneous robustness checks that include dierent econo-
metric specications, the exploration of the monotonicity of the eect and the inclusion
of other additional controls.
Taken together, all these tests conrm the robustness of our main results and provide
a foundation for the discussion of the main mechanisms by which the eect is channeled,
which we perform in Section 1.5.
1.4.1 Bond xed eects and time series analysis
Although our regression models include a full set of rm and bond characteristics with
high explanatory power, time and industry dummies, and the considerably large r-squared
statistics we report (e.g., ranging from 0.668 to 0.742 in Table 1.3), some concerns remain
regarding biases related to omitted variables and time-series eects. We address these
issues, following most studies in the corporate nance literature, by including time and
bond xed eects in the regression specication. This approach allows us to control
for every possible unobservable, time-invariant bond and time characteristic that may
inuence the results.
To perform this analysis, however, the at-issue data employed for the baseline proce-
dure are of no use, as we need panel data that include time-bond observations. To this
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end, we retrieve from Thomson Reuters Eikon (Datastream) bond-quarter information on
bonds matching our initial criteria (i.e., bonds with xed coupons, issued by U.S. corpora-
tions). After applying the usual lters and merging these data with the CRSP-Compustat
variables described in Section 1.2, and dened in A.1, we are left with 2,028 bond-quarter
observations with non-missing yield to maturity for 292 bonds. We follow the previous
methodology to calculate the variable Yield spread (i.e., bond yield to maturity in excess
of a maturity-matched Treasury bond) for each bond and quarter. Because the Thomson
Reuters Eikon database only oers time-series data for active bonds, our sample covers
the period 2002-2015. Table 1.11 provides the main summary statistics, which conrm
that our time-series sample includes similar rms, on average, as our main sample. For
example, the average rm in our main sample has total assets equal to $33 billion vs.
$39 billion in the time-series sample; Tobin's Q of 1.8 vs. 2.2 in the time-series sample;
or Leverage equal 0.27 in the main sample vs. 0.35. However, the summary statistics
for our options volume variable are radically dierent across the two samples. This issue,
however, is far from posing a problem, as this divergence results from a signicant number
of quarter observations coming from rms with no options trading 30.
Table 1.11: Summary Statistics: Time-series Sample
Mean StdDev 25% Median 75% Observation
Yield spread 57.267 497.285 -147.465 111.003 236.604 2028
Option Volume ($ Millions) 30.910 195.222 0.000 0.000 0.329 2028
Total Assets ($ Billions) 39.974 50.324 8.180 23.484 47.392 2028
Tobins Q 2.202 2.356 0.976 1.213 2.200 2028
ROA -0.007 0.040 -0.012 0.004 0.009 2028
Leverage 0.355 0.165 0.260 0.323 0.405 2028
Bid-ask spread 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 2028
Firm risk 0.118 0.209 0.024 0.043 0.110 2028
Maturity 8.657 7.922 4.000 5.000 8.000 2028
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the time-series analysis.
A denition of all variables is provided in A.1 and Section 1.4.1. Observations with positive options
volume total 1,003. The sample period is 2002-2015.
Extending our core analysis to this data sample has a dual benet. The rst
advantage is in terms of mitigating concerns related to omitted variables. Second, it
allows us to investigate whether the main eect of options trading on yield spreads occurs
beyond the time of bond issuance. For this purpose, we use the following econometric
model, which is similar to that of Eq. 1.1:
Spreadi;t = i;t + Ln(OptionV olume)i;t + Xi;t + t + i +  (1.2)
30As before, we set options volume to zero when a rm has no options trading. Because of the time-
series nature of this particular data set, the number of observations with positive options volume is lower.
Specically, 1,003 out of 2,028 observations have positive (greater than zero) options trading volume.
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where t indexes time and i indexes a specic bond. Spreadi;t is the bond yield spread over
the maturity-equivalent Treasury at the end of quarter t. Ln(OptionV olume)i;t measures
option trading volume in quarter t. We include time and bond xed eects with the
variables t and i, respectively. Finally, the vector X contains the set of time-varying
controls used above, including size, Tobin's Q, return on assets, leverage, rm risk, bid-ask
spread and bond time to maturity 31.
Table 1.12: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Time-series
Analysis
Yield spread
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.112 0.112 0.098 0.098
(0.038) (0.047) (0.037) (0.049)
Ln(Total assets) -0.375 -0.375 -4.080 -4.080
(0.184) (0.341) (0.425) (1.014)
Tobin's Q -1.352 -1.352 -2.013 -2.013
(0.074) (0.153) (0.099) (0.249)
ROA -13.520 -13.520 -10.266 -10.266
(2.356) (4.511) (2.414) (4.622)
Leverage 6.733 6.733 7.621 7.621
(0.873) (1.696) (1.100) (1.962)
Ln(Firm risk) -0.482 -0.482 -0.506 -0.506
(0.088) (0.181) (0.090) (0.168)
Ln(Bid-Ask spread) 3.245 3.245 3.304 3.304
(0.180) (0.713) (0.192) (0.832)
Ln(Maturity) -0.224 -0.224 -1.570 -1.570
(0.346) (0.421) (0.536) (0.709)
Bond Fixed Eect No No Yes Yes
Time Fixed Eect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. No Bond level No Bond level
Observations 2028 2028 2028 2028
R2 0.458 0.458 0.843 0.843
Notes: This table presents OLS panel regression estimates of rm-level mea-
sures of bond yield spread over Treasuries on options trading volume (Option
volume) and a set of control variables. The variables are constructed on a
quarterly basis. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1 and
Section 1.4.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All regressions in-
clude a full set of time dummies, whereas columns 3 and 4 also include bond
xed eects. Observations with positive options volume total 1,003. The sam-
ple period is 2002-2015. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
The results from Eq. 1.2 are shown in Table 1.12. Columns 1 and 2 display the results
of the regression model without bond xed eects, which we include in columns 3 and
4. Additionally, columns 2 and 4 extend the analysis by clustering the standard errors
31Obviously, we exclude any bond-level invariant characteristics, as we already account for them using
bond xed eects. We include the time to maturity of a bond as control, as it is well recognized that
yields tend to decrease as maturity approaches.
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at the bond level, the most demanding specication. The coecients in Table 1.12 range
from 0.112 to 0.098 and exhibit high signicance across all four columns, with p-values
lower than 5% even in the most constrained specication. These results provide further
evidence regarding the nature of our main eect. First, the detrimental eect of active
options markets on a rm's cost of debt is not limited to the time of the issue but,
rather, seems to occur dynamically. Second, and more important, time-invariant omitted
variables related to bond characteristics are not the drivers of the eect.
Because time-invariant characteristics are not the only source of omitted variable bias,
we perform a battery of additional robustness tests in the next sections, which range from
the in-depth exploration of the monotonicity of the eect to the inclusion of additional
controls.
1.4.2 Stock return volatility
In our baseline regression model we follow existing literature and control for rms' volatil-
ity using cash-ow volatility (rm risk), as this should be the primary channel by which
debtholders perceive rm risk. However, it is another measure of risk, stock return volatil-
ity, that is considered one of the key determinants of options listing by exchanges (Mayhew
and Mihov, 2004). Furthermore, investors may trade out-of-the-money options to spec-
ulate in volatility (Ni et al., 2008) and, thus, may be particularly interested in highly
volatile rms.
To ensure that our results are not driven by rms with higher stock return volatility
that attract more option traders, we replace the control variable of cash-ow volatility
with that of stock returns 32. Specically, we include in Table 1.13 the volatility of daily
stock returns during the quarter prior to bond issuance (columns 1 and 3), as well as that
of the year (columns 2 and 4), in the main regression specication for our two measures
of the cost of debt. Although the estimates for Stock volatility are statistically relevant,
the coecients for options volume remain positive and highly signicant (p-value<0.01),
with a slight decrease in economic magnitude (e.g., the coecient with yield spread as
the dependent variable drops from 0.037 to 0.035 after including the quarterly volatility
of stock returns).
1.4.3 Information asymmetries and price informativeness
Prior literature nds a role of option markets in increasing price informativeness (e.g.,
Back, 1993; Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998; Cao, 1999) which ultimately decreases
information asymmetries. This informational enhancement has been shown to benet
32Including stock return volatility simultaneously with that of cash ows yields similar results.
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Table 1.13: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Stock return
volatility
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.035 0.030 -0.220 -0.189
(0.010) (0.010) (0.046) (0.046)
Stock volatility (quarter) 0.526 -0.877
(0.225) (0.591)
Stock volatility (year) 0.366 -1.437
(0.082) (0.408)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.280 -0.269 1.528 1.473
(0.018) (0.018) (0.090) (0.093)
Tobin's Q -0.286 -0.283 1.344 1.328
(0.023) (0.022) (0.103) (0.101)
ROA -5.730 -5.472 24.510 23.460
(0.926) (0.891) (3.763) (3.778)
Leverage 0.819 0.798 -6.019 -5.916
(0.100) (0.098) (0.429) (0.419)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.143 0.143 -0.217 -0.193
(0.029) (0.029) (0.097) (0.095)
Public Bond Dummy -0.181 -0.175 0.609 0.503
(0.180) (0.179) (0.626) (0.629)
Ln(Maturity) 0.234 0.233 0.187 0.181
(0.021) (0.021) (0.050) (0.049)
Callable Dummy 0.309 0.310
(0.040) (0.040)
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330
R2 0.711 0.711 0.743 0.748
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of
the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume
(Option volume) and a set of control variables, using stock return volatility
as a control. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions
include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample
period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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shareholders by increasing rm value (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009) or low-
ering the cost of equity capital (Naiker, Navissi, and Truong, 2013). Similarly, a reduction
of informational asymmetries can also have positive eects for debtholders. These results
highlight the importance of information in our setting.
Although it is nearly impossible to isolate the eect of options that is not directly
related to the rm's informational environment, we can perform some tests that ensure
our main results are not driven by dierent levels of information asymmetries across rms.
To this end, we introduce in our main regression specication control variables that proxy
for the degree of information asymmetries regarding a rm. First, we use analyst cov-
erage. Previous studies support an inverse relationship between the number of analysts
covering a stock and the severity of the information asymmetry problem (Brennan and
Subrahmanyam, 1995; Hong, Lim, and Stein, 2000). Second, we use the probability of
informed trading (PIN) as a proxy for stock price informativeness. The PIN measure
is based on a structural market microstructure model developped in a series of studies
(Easley, Kiefer, O'hara, and Paperman, 1996; Easley, Kiefer, and O'Hara, 1997; Easley,
O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998; Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O'hara, 2002) and measures the prob-
ability that a trade comes from an informed party. The strong theoretical foundations of
PIN have made it one of the preferred measures in the literature on the eects of private
information on other variables (e.g., Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007; Ferreira, Ferreira,
and Raposo, 2011).
We include these two variables that proxy for the information content of a stock as
controls in the main specication from Eq. 1.1 and display the results in Table 1.14.
Specically, we include the natural logarithm 33 of the number of analysts covering
the rm's stock as reported in I/B/E/S, Ln(Analyst coverage), in columns 1 and 3 of
Table 1.14 with bond yield spread and rating as dependent variables, respectively. Because
we lack information on analyst coverage for some rms in our sample, our initial number
of observations suers a slight decrease (from 4,330 to 4,184 obs.). Despite the high
statistical signicance of the coecients on analyst coverage for both dependent variables,
the coecients on option volume remain highly statistically signicant (p-value<0.01),
with a slight increase in economic magnitude.
Columns 2 and 4 in Table 1.14 include the PIN measure as a control for price infor-
mativeness.34. We follow Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) and use the logistic
transformation35 of this measure, which we call PINL, since PIN varies between zero
and one. As before, PIN estimates are not available for all stocks in our sample and
33Given the distribution of analyst coverage across our sample taking logarithms is a more accurate
specication, although the results remain intact when using the raw number of analysts.
34We are grateful to Professor Stephen Brown for kindly making the PIN estimates available through
his website: http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data
35This transformation does not aect the nature of our results, only the signicance of PIN estimates.
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Table 1.14: Options volume and information production
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.051 0.038 -0.289 -0.333
(0.010) (0.016) (0.046) (0.071)
Ln(Analyst Coverage) -0.157 0.631
(0.036) (0.166)
PINL 0.852 -4.083
(0.400) (1.728)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.270 -0.202 1.506 1.299
(0.018) (0.026) (0.095) (0.132)
Tobin's Q -0.271 -0.253 1.285 1.335
(0.024) (0.029) (0.105) (0.132)
ROA -5.374 -5.570 22.911 21.680
(0.843) (0.952) (3.680) (4.997)
Leverage 0.795 0.855 -5.966 -6.407
(0.101) (0.160) (0.435) (0.612)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.031 0.015 -0.066 -0.098
(0.012) (0.017) (0.046) (0.066)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.140 0.155 -0.165 -0.095
(0.029) (0.027) (0.089) (0.110)
Public Bond Dummy -0.497 0.000 1.880 0.000
(0.067) (.) (0.352) (.)
Ln(Maturity) 0.230 0.236 0.191 0.194
(0.022) (0.031) (0.052) (0.073)
Callable Dummy 0.303 0.479
(0.043) (0.065)
Observations 4184 1792 4184 1792
R2 0.713 0.707 0.750 0.698
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables, including analyst cov-
erage as a measure of rm adverse selection (Brennan and Subrahmanyam,
1995) and the logistic transformation of the probability of informed trading
(PINL) (Easley, O'Hara, and Srinivas, 1998) as a proxy for price informa-
tiveness. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regres-
sions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies.
The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
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the number of observations declines substantially (from 4,330 to 1,792 obs.). Even with
this reduced sample of bond issues, the PINL coecients exhibit statistical signicance
(p-value<0.05). Moreover, the coecientes for Ln(Option volume) remain statistically
and economically signicant after the inclusion of PINL as a control for both dependent
variables accounting for the rm's cost of debt.36.
Taken together, these results provide support for a relationship between information
asymmetries and a rm's cost of debt. When information asymmetries are higher (lower
analyst coverage and greater PIN), debtholders demand a higher return for their money.
Even after the inclusion of dierent proxies for a rm's information environment, the
regression coecients on Ln(Option volume) exhibit strong signicance and economic
magnitude for both measures of the cost of debt. In sum, price informativeness does
not explain the eect of option markets on debtholders. These results support the view
that options markets aect bondholders through a channel not directly related to price
informativeness. As we argue, option markets may facilitate bondholder expropriation
by providing shareholders with a nancial instrument that enables high trading prots in
situations that are especially harmful for bondholders. These potential prots result in a
shift in shareholders incentives that, in turn, increases the risk borne by bondholders. We
discuss the validity of this hypothesis in the mechanisms section and dedicate the next
section to a set of miscellaneous robustness checks.
1.4.4 Other robustness tests
We devote this section to performing an extensive battery of robustness checks. For the
sake of space, we report the empirical results of these analyses in A.2.
Our additional robustness tests begin with the investigation of the monotonicity of
options trading. That is, we are interested in determining whether the eect occurs
monotonically or is limited to extreme values of options volume. To do so, we include
in our main regression specication (from Eq. 1.1) two additional features, reported in
Table A2.3 in A.2. First, we add a squared term for Ln(Option volume), which is displayed
in columns 1 and 3 of Table A2.3 for bond yield spread and credit rating, respectively.
Second, we use the interaction of our main variable, Ln(Option volume), with a dummy
variable, High options volume, that takes value one if a rm's options' volume is above
the median for that year and zero otherwise. These results are reported in columns 2 and
4. The coecients for Ln(Options volume) in columns 1-4 of Table A2.3 remain of high
statistical signicance (p-value < 0.01) after accounting for the eect of extreme values
36The statistical signicance of options volume when using bond yield spread as the dependent variable
declines relative to the baseline results (p-value<0.05). However, we check that this reduction comes
from the use of a signicantly lower number of observations rather than the inclusion of PINL in the
specication.
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of options trading, thus supporting the notion that the eect is not limited to extreme
cases of options trading volume.
Next, we consider possible time-varying omitted variables. Specically, we augment
the main econometric specication with the Principal amount of the bond issue and
the level of Institutional ownership of the rm as controls. Firms demanding a larger
principal amount may be those in a more fragile situation and urgent need of nancing,
which would explain why debtholders demand a higher return on their money. Moreover,
Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007) nd a positive association between shareholder control and
yield spreads. Because institutions are the group most prone to exert active shareholder
control, we include total institutional ownership from the Thomson Reuters 13F ling
37 to rule out the possibility that our results are driven by correlations between active
option markets and a rm's level of institutional ownership. Table A2.4 in A.2 contains
the results from both additions. The coecient of Ln(Option Volume) remains highly
statistically signicant (p-value<0.01) with a small decrease in magnitude (0.032 from
0.037 for yield spread and -0.192 from -0.207 for bond rating) as a result of the inclusion
of both control variables. These results provide evidence of option markets having a direct
impact on a company's cost of debt, rather than being a secondary eect from preexisting
ndings.
To test the robustness of the eect on bond ratings and given the special construction
of this variable, we perform 2 dierent tests. First, we run the baseline OLS model on a
transformed variable equal to the natural log of one plus the bond rating, Ln( 1+Rating).
Second, we t ordered logit and negative binomial models to the specication in Eq. 1.1.
The results are reported in Table A2.5 in A.2 and conrm the validity of our initial results.
Because dierent industries may have special features that lead to mechanically higher
or lower costs of debt, we include two-digit SIC code xed eects in our regression analysis,
the most common specication in the literature. We expand this analysis by including
the more restrictive four-digit SIC code xed eects in columns 1 and 3 of Table A2.6 in
A.2. Furthermore, columns 2 and 4 in Table A2.6 include industry (SIC-4) by time xed
eects, to control for assymetric growth in option market volume across indsutries and
over time. All of these tests validate our initial results.
Given that our sample period includes the 2007-2008 nancial crisis, one concern
is that our results are driven by bond issues during this nancially turbulent period.
To investigate whether this is the case, we estimate the regression in Eq. 1.1 for two
subsamples of bond issues during and outside the nancial crisis period. We consider
the nancial crisis period to be those years between, and including, 2007 and 2010 38.
37As noted in Bushee (1998), not all institutions are interested in active governance. We explore this
issue in the mechanisms section.
38In untabulated tests, we also consider as the 'crisis' the years covering the tech bubble of the 2000s,
and the results are unchanged.
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Table A2.7 in A.2 contains the results, which do not support the thesis of unstable nancial
periods driving the results.
Previous literature highlights the importance of stock market liquidity in the decision
of exchanges to quote options on a rm's stock (Mayhew and Mihov, 2004). Although
we control for stock market liquidity in our baseline tests by including the natural log
of the bid-ask spread, we further investigate the eect of liquidity to ensure that it is
not the main driver of our results. We begin by replacing the bid-ask spread with a
dierent proxy for stock liquidity, the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. Table A2.8 in
A.2 contains the results of this analysis, which provide support for our initial results and
display an even larger economic magnitude of the options volume coecient. Second,
we divide the sample into rms with high and low stock market liquidity according to
the median bid-ask spread and run the regression in Eq. 1.1. Table A2.9 in A.2 displays
the results, which demonstrate that the eect occurs in both subsamples of stock market
liquidity. Overall, these tests show that our results are not driven by stock market liquidty
but, rather, by trading activity in the options market.
1.5 Possible mechanisms
Our evidence thus far is consistent with a detrimental eect of options trading volume
on a rm's cost of debt, even after accounting for potential endogeneity concerns and
performing a rich set of additional robustness tests that discard other variables such as
price informativeness, stock volatility, or poorer market expectations as the main drivers
of this eect. In this section, we turn to the last part of our analysis and discuss potential
underlying mechanisms through which this may occur. It is of course challenging to
provide denite proof, and hence, our tests are only suggestive.
In our main thesis, we argue that option markets produce a shift in shareholders'
attitudes toward certain events by enabling them to extract trading gains in situations
that may have especially harmful results for bondholders. This imbalance in incentives
contributes to the exacerbatation of shareholder-bondholder conicts and results in bond-
holders facing higher expropriation risk and, ultimately, increases a rm's cost of debt.
Consistent with this hypothesis, the eect of options on rm cost of debt should be larger
in certain scenarios, which we proceed to explore in detail.
First, the presence of an active options market that shareholders can exploit should
damage bondholders more intensively as the rm is closer to a shift in the control of the
company that damages bondholders' interests while being potentially benecial to share-
holders. In such cases, the expropriation trade-o must be a distinct concern. Second,
bondholders will suer more severely from the presence of a liquid options market when
the shareholder structure of the company is more prone to be actively informed about
rm fundamentals and likely to inuence managerial decisions. Third, the expropriation
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risk faced by bondholders will increase with the threat of shareholders forcing actions that
can directly reduce bondholder wealth, such as default.
1.5.1 Corporate events and shift in control
We consider two dierent events that can produce a change in ownership that is detri-
mental to bondholders: default and takeover. Firm default forces a change in control
whereby creditors become the new owners of a defaulted rm through the distribution
of stock during restructuring. As a rm becomes more seriously distressed, the probabil-
ity of a shift in control to bondholders increases, as does the likelihood of bondholders
being expropriated by shareholders. Ge, Hu, Humphery-Jenner, and Lin (2016) explore
how informed traders exploit the options market to increase their payo in the event
of bankruptcy, providing a direct channel through which shareholders can benet from
this event. Acquisitions are another important corporate event to bondholders. Cremers,
Nair, and Wei (2007) and Qiu and Yu (2009) document a negative eect of takeovers
on rm bondholders. Intense shareholder governance (facilitated by an open market for
corporate control) reduces bondholder wealth. Cao, Chen, and Grin (2005) and Chan,
Ge, and Lin (2015) study the use of option markets by traders prior to acquisition an-
nouncements. Both studies nd evidence consistent with investors using option markets
to extract trading gains before the event of a takeover. Combining all of these considera-
tions, our thesis predicts that the detrimental eect of option markets on a rm's cost of
debt nancing will be exacerbated when a rm is more nancially constrained (closer to
experiencing default) and more vulnerable to a takeover.
Firm distress
Table 1.5 contains information regarding the eect of options on the cost of debt and rm
distress. Columns 2 and 4 display the results from interacting the coecient of options
volume, Ln(Option volume), with the Kaplan and Zingales (1997) index (our measure
of rm distress). The coecients for the interaction term are positive (p-value<0.05)
with bond yield spread as the dependent variable and negative (p-value<0.01) for the
regression using bond ratings. These results are consistent with our main thesis. The
eect of options trading volume on a rm's cost of debt is more pronounced as the rm
becomes more nancially constrained.
Takeover vulnerability
To measure a rm's takeover vulnerability, we rely on the anti-takeover index (ATI) in
Cremers and Nair (2005) and Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007). The index is constructed
based on the presence in a rm of three anti-takeover provisions that the literature has
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recognized to be critical for takeovers. These provisions include the existence of blank
check preferred stock, classied boards, and restrictions on calling special meetings and
actions through written consent.39 ATI values vary from 1 to 4, substracting one point
from 4 if any of these provisions is in place. The larger the value of ATI, the more prone
a rm is to takeovers.
We classify companies with ATI values of 4 and 3 (2 and 1) as rms with high (low)
takeover vulnerability. Consequently, we run our baseline regression in Eq. 1.1 for two
subsamples, depending on the rm's level of takeover vulnerability (high and low).
Table 1.15: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Takeover
vulnerability
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.080 0.035 -0.354 -0.242
(0.024) (0.012) (0.096) (0.057)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.339 -0.255 1.607 1.471
(0.043) (0.022) (0.185) (0.117)
Tobin's Q -0.251 -0.298 1.293 1.414
(0.040) (0.026) (0.192) (0.119)
ROA -2.519 -6.000 7.614 25.394
(1.842) (1.031) (5.896) (4.826)
Leverage 0.910 0.757 -6.752 -5.567
(0.178) (0.143) (0.837) (0.585)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.015 0.015 0.007 0.045
(0.026) (0.015) (0.090) (0.057)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.216 0.156 -0.283 -0.295
(0.040) (0.025) (0.154) (0.102)
Public Bond Dummy 0.059 -0.444 -0.802 1.943
(0.148) (0.047) (0.666) (0.325)
Ln(Maturity) 0.245 0.247 0.144 0.142
(0.035) (0.024) (0.088) (0.058)
Callable Dummy 0.399 0.491
(0.101) (0.060)
Observations 929 3353 929 3353
R2 0.729 0.675 0.761 0.699
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and by subsamples of takeover vulnerability as
proxied by the anti-takeover index (ATI) developed in Cremers and Nair
(2005). A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust
standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regres-
sions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies.
The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
39For a detailed description and justication of the use of these provisions, please refer to Cremers and
Nair (2005).
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Table 1.15 contains the coecient estimates of these regressions. Columns 1 and 3 (2
and 4) display information for the subsample of High (Low) takeover vulnerability rms
for bond yield spread and credit rating, respectively. Consistent with data in Cremers
and Nair (2005) and Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007), the number of rms with one or
no anti-takeover provisions (high vulnerability) is lower as, therefore, is the number of
observations for this subsample. Despite this dierence in the number of observations in
the estimates, the coecients for Ln(Option volume) are signicant (p-value<0.01) across
all four regressions. More interestingly, the coecient estimates for the subsample of high
takeover vulnerability rms are considerably larger in economic magnitude than those for
the low vulnerability rms when bond yield spread is the dependent variable (0.080 vs.
0.035) and when bond rating is the dependent variable (-0.354 vs. -0.242).
These results demonstrate that the detrimental eect of liquid option markets on the
rm's cost of debt is larger when the company is more open to the market for corporate
control, as predicted by our theory of bondholder expropriation.
1.5.2 Shareholder control
To provide additional insights into the role of option markets in the bondholder-
shareholder conict, we explore the interaction of Ln(Option volume) with variables ac-
counting for the ownership level of institutions with dierent levels of commitment to
governance (control) practices. In particular, we make use of the Bushee (1998) institu-
tional investor classication 40. In this classication, institutional investors fall into three
dierent types, according to variables such as past performance, portfolio turnover or
diversication. Dedicated owners are those with low portfolio turnover and concentrated
stakes and, hence, those more prone to exert shareholder control. Transient institutions
are those with high turnover and diversied portfolios, which tend to exhibit momentum
returns. Quasi-index investors use indexing or buy-and-hold strategies that produce low
portfolio concentration and high diversication and are, therefore, the group least likely
to perform active control.
Bearing this classication in mind, in line with our prior of active option markets
exacerbating the agency cost of debt, we expect the adverse eect of options trading to
intensify in cases in which shareholders are more likely to engage in active governance
practices (Cremers, Nair, and Wei, 2007). Tables 1.16 and 1.17 show the results of inter-
acting, in our baseline specication, Ln(Option volume) with the percentage of ownership
in hands of Dedicated and Quasi-index owners, respectively 41.
40We are grateful to Brian Bushee for kindly providing these data on his website:
http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html
41For the sake of space, we report the results of the interaction with Transient owners, the least
interesting group for our analysis, in Table A2.10 in A.2.
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Table 1.16: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Dedicated Owners
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.035 0.028 -0.215 -0.176
(0.011) (0.011) (0.046) (0.046)
Own. Dedicated 0.134 -0.120 0.237 1.706
(0.239) (0.232) (0.945) (0.883)
Ln(Option Volume)  Own. Dedicated 0.164 -0.950
(0.067) (0.281)
Intitutional Ownership 0.050 0.046 -0.965 -0.945
(0.072) (0.072) (0.311) (0.309)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.277 -0.276 1.452 1.443
(0.019) (0.019) (0.092) (0.091)
Tobin's Q -0.302 -0.304 1.301 1.313
(0.025) (0.025) (0.112) (0.111)
ROA -5.881 -5.778 26.145 25.533
(0.881) (0.872) (3.957) (3.889)
Leverage 0.865 0.876 -6.236 -6.289
(0.108) (0.108) (0.434) (0.431)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.034 0.034 -0.096 -0.096
(0.013) (0.013) (0.050) (0.049)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.137 0.138 -0.193 -0.194
(0.033) (0.032) (0.102) (0.099)
Public Bond Dummy -0.547 -0.552 1.107 1.141
(0.051) (0.052) (0.468) (0.439)
Ln(Maturity) 0.209 0.210 0.194 0.188
(0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.053)
Callable Dummy 0.322 0.316
(0.045) (0.045)
Observations 3649 3649 3649 3649
R2 0.712 0.713 0.748 0.750
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost of debt
(bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume) and a set
of control variables, as well as the interaction of options volume with ownership by dedicated
institutions as dened in Bushee (1998). A detailed denition of all variables is provided in
A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions
include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is
1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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The coecient for the interaction term of options and ownership by dedicated investors
in column 2 (4) of Table 1.16 is positive (negative) and signicant at the 5% (1%) level for
the regression on yield spread (bond rating). However, the coecient for the interaction
of options and ownership by quasi-indexers in column 2 (4) of Table 1.17 is negative
(positive) and signicant at the 5% (1%) level for the dependent variable yield spread
(bond rating).
Table 1.17: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Quasi-index Owners
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.029 0.060 -0.183 -0.357
(0.011) (0.020) (0.046) (0.087)
Own. Quasi-Index -0.768 -0.625 4.111 3.292
(0.191) (0.207) (0.793) (0.837)
Ln(Option Volume)  Own. Quasi-Index -0.068 0.384
(0.030) (0.140)
Intitutional Ownership 0.583 0.593 -3.738 -3.788
(0.155) (0.154) (0.638) (0.629)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.258 -0.259 1.351 1.354
(0.019) (0.019) (0.092) (0.092)
Tobin's Q -0.287 -0.290 1.220 1.235
(0.025) (0.025) (0.110) (0.109)
ROA -6.063 -5.980 27.165 26.661
(0.878) (0.879) (3.906) (3.892)
Leverage 0.817 0.819 -5.941 -5.941
(0.104) (0.104) (0.422) (0.419)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.031 0.031 -0.079 -0.081
(0.012) (0.012) (0.048) (0.048)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.136 0.134 -0.185 -0.173
(0.032) (0.032) (0.097) (0.096)
Public Bond Dummy -0.537 -0.554 1.062 1.160
(0.056) (0.059) (0.582) (0.616)
Ln(Maturity) 0.209 0.210 0.196 0.190
(0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.054)
Callable Dummy 0.317 0.305
(0.043) (0.043)
Observations 3649 3649 3649 3649
R2 0.716 0.717 0.754 0.756
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost of debt
(bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume) and a set of
control variables, as well as the interaction of options volume with ownership by Quasi-index
institutions as dened in Bushee (1998). A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1.
Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include
a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014.
,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Overall, these results are consistent with the detrimental eect of options being exac-
erbated in cases in which shareholders have more control and, as a consequence, the risk
of unfavorable renegotiation/expropriation for bondholders increases.
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1.5.3 Threat of strategic default
We devote the last part of our analysis to investigating the specic situation in which
bondholders' concerns about expropriation might be heightened. Specically, we focus
on shareholders incentives for strategic default, which will fundamentally depend on their
potential losses and bargaining power in renegotiation. In rms in which shareholders have
an advantage over bondholders in renegotiation, the threat of strategic default becomes
more intense, thereby increasing bondholders' expropriation risk. Following this rationale,
under the bondholder expropriation hypothesis, we expect the eect of option volume to
be particularly large in cases in which shareholders' incentives for strategic default are
higher.
It is important to note that this mechanism does not require the actual occurrance of
rm default but, rather, depends on each claimholder's advantages in future renegotia-
tion. Garlappi et al. (2008) and Favara et al. (2012) nd a negative relationship between
shareholders' bargaining power relative to bondholders and equity risk and return in dis-
tressed rms, consistent with shareholders' ability and expectations to extract rents from
other claimholders when they have sucient advantage.
Following Garlappi et al. (2008) and Favara et al. (2012), we dene two variables that
proxy for shareholders' advantages. First, we consider liquidation costs, as proxied by the
degree of tangibility of the rms' assets. A higher value of intangible assets should make
liquidation costlier (as these assets are lost in the event of default) and, hence, strategic
default by shareholders less likely. We measure liquidation costs using the intangibles
measure introduced in Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) and displayed in Eq. 1.3.
Intangibles = 1  (Cash+ 0:715Receiv:+ 0:547 Invent:+ 0:535 PPE)
Assets
(1.3)
We report the interaction of Ln(Option volume) and Intangibles in Table 1.18.
The interaction coecients of -0.070 in column 2 for yield spread and of 0.602 in
column 4 for bond rating are statistically signicant at the 10% and 1% levels, consistent
with the idea of options trading activity being especially harmful for bondholders when
liquidation costs are low.
Our second proxy for shareholders' advantage in renegotiations over bondholders is
shareholders' bargaining power. As in previous literature, we dene bargaining power as
the ratio between total shares held by insiders (which we obtain from Worldscope) and
total shares outstanding. We name this variable Insider ownership and display the results
from its interaction with options volume in Table 1.19.
The interaction coecient with yield spread as the dependent variable in column
2 of Table 1.19 is positive and signicant at the 5% level. When using bond ratings,
the coecient from the interaction between insider ownership and options volume in
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Table 1.18: Options and Strategic Default: Liquidation Costs
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.037 0.084 -0.221 -0.622
(0.010) (0.026) (0.045) (0.161)
Intangibles 0.430 0.632 -2.314 -4.046
(0.171) (0.200) (0.789) (0.929)
Ln(Option Volume)  Intangibles -0.070 0.602
(0.038) (0.233)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.282 -0.279 1.534 1.509
(0.018) (0.018) (0.091) (0.089)
Tobin's Q -0.295 -0.294 1.373 1.370
(0.024) (0.024) (0.102) (0.103)
ROA -5.450 -5.364 23.716 22.971
(0.923) (0.921) (3.846) (3.728)
Leverage 0.881 0.868 -6.307 -6.196
(0.106) (0.107) (0.433) (0.426)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.034 0.036 -0.070 -0.083
(0.012) (0.012) (0.047) (0.045)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.149 0.152 -0.209 -0.239
(0.030) (0.031) (0.096) (0.098)
Public Bond Dummy -0.205 -0.198 0.625 0.569
(0.180) (0.178) (0.627) (0.603)
Ln(Maturity) 0.232 0.233 0.173 0.165
(0.021) (0.021) (0.049) (0.048)
Callable Dummy 0.329 0.331
(0.045) (0.045)
Observations 4228 4228 4228 4228
R2 0.705 0.706 0.742 0.745
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost
of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume)
and a set of control variables, as well as the interaction of options volume with liquidation
costs proxied by intangible assets as in Favara, Schroth, and Valta (2012). A detailed
denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code
dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 1.19: Options and Strategic Default: Insider Ownership
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.030 0.025 -0.192 -0.180
(0.012) (0.012) (0.051) (0.054)
Inside Own. 0.333 0.197 -1.084 -0.755
(0.088) (0.106) (0.378) (0.482)
Ln(Option Volume)  Inside Own. 0.069 -0.166
(0.031) (0.166)
Institutional Ownership 0.110 0.118 -1.008 -1.026
(0.063) (0.063) (0.281) (0.280)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.265 -0.265 1.397 1.398
(0.020) (0.019) (0.096) (0.096)
Tobin's Q -0.315 -0.318 1.345 1.350
(0.025) (0.025) (0.111) (0.112)
ROA -6.347 -6.271 26.997 26.808
(0.938) (0.939) (3.958) (3.964)
Leverage 0.883 0.893 -6.240 -6.262
(0.113) (0.113) (0.421) (0.422)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.036 0.036 -0.091 -0.090
(0.014) (0.014) (0.049) (0.049)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.098 0.098 -0.092 -0.093
(0.037) (0.037) (0.100) (0.100)
Public Bond Dummy -0.566 -0.560 1.175 1.162
(0.051) (0.052) (0.453) (0.456)
Ln(Maturity) 0.210 0.209 0.181 0.183
(0.024) (0.024) (0.056) (0.056)
Callable Dummy 0.308 0.303
(0.042) (0.041)
Observations 3852 3852 3852 3852
R2 0.705 0.705 0.748 0.749
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost
of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume)
and a set of control variables, as well as the interaction of options volume with insider
ownership as a measure of shareholders' bargaining power (Favara, Schroth, and Valta,
2012). A detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit
SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and 
denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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column 4 is negative, although not statistically signicant. These results conrm that
the relationship between options and the cost of debt is worsened when shareholders have
high bargaining power.
Overall, these analyses support the thesis of options markets increasing a rm's cost of
debt by exacerbating conicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders. Specif-
ically, options seem to induce a change in shareholders' incentives with respect to the
expropriation of bondholder wealth. Bondholders respond to this shift by demanding a
higher return for their money in rms with a more liquid options market, which share-
holders can exploit to their own advantage.
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we novelly investigate the extent to which an active options market relates
to a rm's cost of debt. The increasing importance of options markets in the contem-
porary nancial world contrasts with the relatively few papers studying the eects of
such growth in real variables. Whereas previous research nds that the positive informa-
tional enhancement owing from high-volume option markets translates into greater rm
value (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009), higher innovation quality (Blanco and
Wehrheim, 2017) or a lower cost of equity capital (Naiker, Navissi, and Truong, 2013),
our results show a perverse eect of these instruments for a group that is highly relevant
in the corporate structure: debtholders. We nd that a one-standard-deviation increase
in options volume from its mean is associated with an increase in the bond at-issue yield
spread of nearly 10 basis points.
Additionally, we explore the specic paths along which this eect is channeled. The
results from several analyses that include interaction terms suggest that the impact of op-
tion markets occurs via the exacerbation of the traditional debtholder-shareholder conict.
The eect of options volume is more pronounced in situations in which the expropriation
risk for bondholders is higher. Thus far, our results are consistent with the notion of
options markets inducing a shift in shareholders' incentives toward certain events, such
takeovers or rm default, which has detrimental results for bondholder wealth, thereby
revealing a hidden cost of these nancial derivatives for a rm's debtholders. However,
we do not conclude that there is not a positive informational impact from options for
bondholders, by reducing information asymmetries, but instead we empirically nd that,
at least, the net eect of options trading on bondholders is negative, thereby augmenting
rms' cost of debt. In other words, the bondholders' gains from information enhancement
seem to be outweighed by the threat of expropriation.
While our study draws on one particular "hidden cost" of nancial derivatives, we
are agnostic about how these instruments may aect other stakeholder groups in other
dimensions. Moreover, we do not provide evidence on how options modify rms' nancing
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decisions, for instance, whether a liquid option market makes bank loans ex ante more
attractive than bonds or vice versa. We leave a proper evaluation of the net eects on ex
ante rm nancing decisions for future research.
In this study, we empirically demonstrate that option markets have a net detrimental
eect on bondholders. Since rm nancing is vital for the real economy, further theoret-
ical and empirical research on the direct eects of derivatives markets on rm nancing
decisions is needed.
Chapter 2
The Role of Option Markets in
Shareholder Activism
54
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2.1 Introduction
Financial derivatives have become an intrinsic part of the modern nancial world. Option
markets, in particular, have experienced an exponential growth over the past decades,
with total equity option volume traded in the U.S. raising from 676 million contracts in
2000 to over 3,727 million contracts in 2015 1. Despite the undeniable importance of
these instruments, we remain unaware of their potential eects on several fronts. One
pivotal example is the case of shareholder activism. Many voices have raised against the
use of derivatives by large shareholders 2, as these instruments facilitate the decoupling
of economic and voting rights, which may incentivize individual shareholders not to act
in the best interest of a rm. On the other hand, derivative markets can be seen as a
good venue for trading on information, facilitating the protability of an intervention,
and, thus, increasing shareholders incentives to engage in active governance. In this
paper, I tackle this issue by exploring the eect of an active equity options market on
shareholder's incentives for activism. I nd that more liquid option markets promote
subsequent shareholder activism in various forms, including higher probability of a rm
receiving a proxy contest and a shareholder proposal, as well as a larger proportion of
dissent voting with management.
I start by acknowledging that any potential eect of option contracts on shareholder
incentives for activism should be related to whether the derivatives market is suciently
liquid. Not only because informed traders incentives to trade are higher in high-volume
markets, but also because illiquid markets hamper uninformed traders as well (Admati
and Peiderer, 1988; Pagano, 1989). More active option markets promote trading that
induces higher stock price informativeness (Cao, 1999; Chakravarty, Gulen, and Mayhew,
2004; Pan and Poteshman, 2006) which ultimately serves as a more eective managerial
discipline device (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1993; Dow and Gorton, 1997; Faure-Grimaud
and Gromb, 2004; Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang, 2007) and makes shareholders less prone
to exert direct activism (i.e. via 'voice') in favor of the 'exit' mechanism (Edmans, 2009;
Admati and Peiderer, 2009; Edmans and Manso, 2011; Edmans, Fang, and Zur, 2013).3
Additionally, more liquid option markets can have a detrimental eect on shareholders
incentives for activism by facilitating investors' trading. For example, a large shareholder
may abstain from initiating a value-enhancing intervention when the cost of selling a
1Data from Options Clearing Corporation: http://www.optionsclearing.com/webapps/historical-
volume-query.
2A clear example is the petition of the law-rm Watchell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz to the SEC on 2011, in
which they pointed out the problems arising from investors using nancial derivatives in their governance
practices. See the complete text for the petition here: https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-
624.pdf.
3Following the literature I will use the term 'voice' henceforth to refer to shareholder governance
exerted through direct activism, whereas the terms 'exit' or 'voting with their feet' will refer to investors
exerting governance through nancial markets (i.e. via the threat of selling a sizable stake in the market).
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sizable stake in the market is reduced (Coee, 1991; Bhide, 1993). To the extent that
trading in the options market can mitigate the costs associated with price impact, in-
vestors may view options as an instrument to reduce the costs of exit. Moreover, since
derivatives facilitate the decoupling of economic and voting rights, liquid option markets
may exacerbate perverse empty-voting behaviour (Hu and Black, 2006, 2007). Lastly,
the presence of a market for insurance may decrease investors' incentives for monitor-
ing. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show how, when debtholders obtain insurance against
default, their monitoring eorts can be reduced as they otherwise retain control rights
in and outside bankruptcy. Because option markets can also serve as insurance instru-
ments, the presence of a more liquid options market may result in shareholders decreasing
monitoring eorts.
Alternatively, an active options market can strengthen incentives for costly activism.
Shareholders have the power to aect the governance of a public company through their
voting rights. However, despite eective, is not often that we observe activism in practice,
mainly due to its considerable costs 4. Shareholders trade-o these costs against private
benets from intervention to decide whether to undertake an intervention. The litera-
ture identies dierent channels by which shareholders' incentives for activism may be
strengthen. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1986) argue that only shareholders with
large stakes have incentives to actively monitor management, as they will enjoy a higher
fraction of the gains in rm value derived from intervention. In Maug (1998) and Kahn
and Winton (1998) liquidity is the main mechanism that boosts shareholder intervention.
When a stock is liquid enough, a shareholder planning an intervention can purchase shares
at a price that does not fully reect the future increase in rm value. Consistent with
these theories, Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) nd a role of liquidity in encourag-
ing shareholder activism. Similarly, Edmans, Fang, and Zur (2013) nd an unconditional
eect of liquidity on governance via voice and exit. These works support the thesis that
shareholders' incentives for governance increase when they can access additional trading
gains from their governance activities. Consistent with this idea, option markets can serve
as an alternative venue for shareholders to gather trading prots from activism. To the
extent that liquidity eases investors trading also in the options market, more active option
markets should encourage shareholder activism by increasing the potential net benets
from intervention.
Combining all these arguments together, it is apparent that the net impact of op-
tions on shareholder activism is ultimately an empirical question. In order to undertake
such analysis, I conform an orginal and representative data set containing information
on shareholder activism, voting behaviour, as well as options trading data, and rm-level
4Activist shareholders running a campaign incur in substantial costs including research, hiring legal
expertise, or marketing a campaign. Gantchev (2013) estimates the average costs of a campaing ending
in a proxy ght in $10.71 million.
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characteristics for the period 2003-2014. To approximate the total annual dollar options
volume I follow Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009). I rely on several measures
proposed by the literature in order to account for the level of shareholder activism in a
rm, including the event of a proxy contest (Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele, 2015), a
shareholder proposal, or dissent voting with management (Iliev, Lins, Miller, and Roth,
2015).
In order to assess how options trading volume inuences the probability of subsequent
shareholder activism, I rely on a probit regression model similar to that in Norli, Oster-
gaard, and Schindele (2015). Specically, I regress the conditional probability of a rm
receiving a proxy contest or a shareholder proposal in year t on one and two-year lagged
options dollar trading volume and a set of known determinants of activism lagged one
year. The results reveal a positive association between more liquid option markets and
subsequent shareholder activism. For example, an increase from the 10th to the 90th
percentile in one-year lagged options volume corresponds to an increase of nearly 62%
relative to the sample probability of a rm receiving a proxy contest. I then investigate
the impact of an active options market on shareholder voting behavior in management-
sponsored elections. Results from ordinary least-squares regression shows that in rms
with a more liquid market of options for the stock, shareholders are less likely to follow
management recommendations.
Whereas these ndings are consistent with the thesis of option contracts stimulating
shareholder activism by increasing net benets from intervention, there are alternative
explanations that may jeopardize the robustness of my results. First, I ensure that my
results are robust to considering dierent econometric models, dierent measures of share-
holder activism, and do not respond to dierences between rms quoted and not quoted
in the options market. Then, I consider the more delicate case of reverse-causality eects
driving the results. This is the case if option traders are more prone to trade in those
rms which they predict are more likely to experience activism. Although higher share-
holder activism may associate with poor stock performance, option traders can benet
from negative expectations over rm value (e.g., by directly purchasing puts or selling call
options). Moreover, since volatility traders can exploit option markets to their advantage
(Ni, Pan, and Poteshman, 2008), the mere expectation of a turbulent short-term future
can be enough to induce investors to trade options more heavily in certain rms.
To mitigate concerns related to reverse-causality issues, I estimate an instrumental
variable analysis via a two-staged least squares (2SLS) model. I use open interest and
moneyness as instrumental variables (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009; Blanco
and Wehrheim, 2017; Blanco and Garca, 2017). The results from this identication
strategy provide support to the notion of a signicant causality running from more liquid
option markets to subsequent shareholder activism in the form of proxy contest, share-
holder proposal, and dissent voting with management. Overall, all these tests suggest
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that the positive association between trading volume in option markets and shareholder
governance activities is not simply driven by self-selection.
I continue by investigating the dierent mechanisms that channel these results. First,
I consider the role of option markets in promoting trading among shareholders. Specif-
ically, I focus on overvalued rms. Privately informed shareholders observing a rm is
highly overvalued may nd optimal to exit rather than to intervene (Coee, 1991; Bhide,
1993). Consistent with the view of options stimulating shareholders' stock market trading,
I nd that the eect on shareholder activism is lower for highly overvalued rms, where
the costs of intervention clearly outweigh those of exit. Second, I investigate if active
option markets aect shareholder voting behavior in a way that reects an increase in
their net benets from voting. Iliev and Lowry (2014) nd that shareholders with higher
net benets from voting are less likely to rely on Institutional Shareholders Services (ISS)
recommendations, and to follow the one-size-ts-all approach. Consistent with this evi-
dence, I nd that shareholders in rms with higher options trading volume are less likely
to follow ISS, specially where recommendations lack any value (blanket issues). Third, I
analyze the impact of options-motivated activism on rm value. Following Cu~nat, Gine,
and Guadalupe (2012) and Iliev and Lowry (2014), I analyze the eect of shareholder
proposals on the rm abnormal return on the meeting day. I focus on proposals that
pass or fail by a small margin to mitigate eects related with stock markets anticipating
the results and eects on rm value of a proposal. Contrary to predictions from empty
voting theories, I nd no negative eect (coecient is positive and lacks statistical signif-
icance) on stock abnormal returns for passed proposals forerun by larger options trading
volume. Moreover, in the more dubious case of a shareholder proposal passed that lacks
the 'for' recommendation by ISS, higher activity in option markets associates with larger
and signicant abnormal stock returns. Overall, these results are consistent with the
view of option markets stimulating shareholder governance by augmenting the net ben-
ets from activism. This activism does not have, on average, perverse eects on equity
value, contrary to traditional empty voting predictions.
This paper is, to the best of my knowledge, the rst to empirically explore the eect
of derivative markets on shareholders' incentives for activism. I contribute to several
fronts in the literature. First, I add to recent work on how trading activity in options
market aects corporate outcomes. The informational enhancement associated with more
active option markets has been shown to lead to greater rm values (Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam, 2009), lower cost of equity nancing (Naiker, Navissi, and Truong, 2013),
or higher innovation quality (Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017). Additionally, Blanco and
Garca (2017) nd that more active option markets encourage shareholder decisions that
are detrimental to bondholders' wealth, thus incresing the rm's cost of debt nancing.
Second, I extend the literature on shareholder activism. Early work on the subject
has focused on the activism of large individual shareholders (Smith, 1996; Carleton, Nel-
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son, and Weisbach, 1998; Strickland, Wiles, and Zenner, 1996) and institutional investors
(Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999; Gillan and Starks, 2000). More recent papers focus on
determinants of activism such country-specic regulation (Iliev, Lins, Miller, and Roth,
2015), or the eect to shareholder value (Cu~nat, Gine, and Guadalupe, 2012). A more
related branch of the literature explores the role of nancial markets in aecting share-
holder incentives to undertake governance activities. In this vein, stock market liquidity
has received the largest attention by researchers on the theoretical (e.g., Maug, 1998;
Kahn and Winton, 1998; Coee, 1991) as well as the empirical front (e.g., Edmans, Fang,
and Zur, 2013; Bharath, Jayaraman, and Nagar, 2013; Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele,
2015).
Third, I add to recent literature exploring the impact of nancial derivatives on share-
holder governance. Results from these studies are mixed. While Christoersen, Geczy,
Musto, and Reed (2007) and Kalay and Pant (2009) argue that derivative markets fa-
cilitate the trading of votes from uninformed to informed investors and lead to a more
ecient voting outcome, Brav and Mathews (2011) claim that these instruments may
induce perverse investor behavior and exacerbate empty voting practices.
Finally, the implications drawn by this study also enrich the regulatory debate on the
use of derivatives by activist shareholders. Large shareholders and activist hedge funds
have incorporated derivatives to their regular practices, calling for a close regulation on
the issue. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioner Daniel M. Gallagher
recently stated5 that 'derivatives and other and other synthetic forms of ownership can
mask the size of the stake. As a result the purpose of the rule [Section 13 reporting
obligations administered by the SEC] (...) is not being served'. Given that the decision
of option listing is made by the exchanges, which are members of the Options Clearing
Corporation (OCC) under the jurisdiction of the SEC, these results are specially relevant
for policy makers in general and the SEC in particular.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I describe the
research design and methodology, along with the main variables and source of data. Sec-
tion 2.3 analyzes the baseline results and robustness issues. In Section 2.4 I discuss the
main mechanisms that channel the eect. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Data and research design
The primary focus of my research is to assess whether liquid option markets encourage
shareholder activism. In other words, does higher options trading activity make share-
5June 23rd, 2015, Speech on Activism, Short-termism, and the SEC: Remarks at the 21st Annual
Stanford Director's College. See the complete text here: https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-
short-termism-and-the-sec.html
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holders more prone to exert activism?. I start by recognizing that any eect of option
markets on corporate governance practices must go beyond the mere existence of a market
and, rather, should be related to whether such market has sucient volume, as incentives
for informed agents to trade are higher in high-volume markets (Pagano, 1989; Admati
and Peiderer, 1988). Consequently, I follow previous literature (Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam, 2009; Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017; Blanco and Garca, 2017) to dene a
continuous variable for option trading volume. Specically, I construct the total annual
dollar options volume for a rm by multiplying the total trade in each option by the
end-of-day quote midpoint for that option and aggregate this number annually across all
trading days and all options listed on the stock.
In order to assess how a more liquid options market inuences the probability of
subsequent shareholder activism I rely on the following probit regression model in the
spirit of Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015):
Prob(ACTi;t = 1jOptV oli;t s; Xi;t 1) = (t + 1OptV oli;t s + 2Xi;t 1) (2.1)
where i and t index rm and year, respectively. The dependent variable, ACTi;t, equals
one if rm i experiences shareholder activism on year t and zero otherwise. () is the
normal cumulative distribution function, OptV oli;t s is the total annual dollar options
trading volume as in Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009) lagged s periods, t
accounts for time xed-eects, and Xi;t 1 is a vector of control variables lagged one year.
I also follow Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) to dene a complete set of controls.
These controls include rm size, institutional ownership level, past abnormal performance,
Tobins' Q, dividend yield, or analyst coverage, as well as a measure for a rm's stock
liquidity. A more detailed and accurate denition of all variables can be found on Section
2.2.1 and B.1.
I dene the probability of shareholder activism as the probability of a rm experiencing
a proxy contest in year t, as in Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015). Proxy contests
are situations in which a shareholder (or group of shareholders) disagrees with managerial
proposals/decisions and require the support from other shareholders to run a dissident
campaign. Although this metric is standard in the literature, proxy contests do not occur
very often. For this reason, I also consider the event of a shareholder-sponsored proposal as
an action of activism. Shareholder proposals are a costly means of activism through which
investors can express their disagreement with management (e.g. by proposing directors
or questioning director's pay) that have been the focus of a vast literature on shareholder
governance (Karpo, Malatesta, and Walkling, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999;
Gillan and Starks, 2000). Because the costs of issuing a proposal for an investor are
considerably lower than those of a proxy contest, these events ocur more regularly. Similar
to the proxy contest activism, I dene an activist event based on shareholder proposals
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as the probability of a rm experiencing a shareholder-sponsored proposal on year t.
As a complementary measure of shareholder involvement in rm governance, I in-
vestigate whether the presence of an active options market inuences shareholder voting
behaviour in management-sponsored elections. Even in cases where withheld votes in a
plurality voting election lack legal signicance, several arguments support their validity
as a channel through which shareholders can express their dissatisfaction with manage-
ment. Proxy advisors such Glass Lewis or Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) consider
withheld votes a meaningful disciplining device in uncontested elections. On the academic
front, Del Guercio, Seery, and Woidtke (2008) report that vote-no campaigns in director
elections are associated with higher CEO turnover and subsequent operating performance.
Director appointments in private oerings that lack shareholders' symbolic vote are asso-
ciated with poorer rm perfomance and a larger degree of managerial entrenchment, as
reported by Arena and Ferris (2007). Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) nd that fewer
votes in directors' elections lead to a higher probability of removing poisson pills, classied
boards and CEO turnover, as well as to lower CEO 'abnormal' compensation.
I follow Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) to dene a measure of shareholder support to
managerial proposals. Shareholders can opt among three basic choices during an election:
shares can be voted for, withheld, or not voted. The base of votes for an election, as ISS
and most companies dene it, consist on the sum of 'for + withhold' votes. Consequently,
the ratio of 'for' votes divided by 'for + withhold' constitutes a measure of shareholder
support to an election. In order to get a rm-year measure, the ratio of 'for' votes is
averaged across all election for rm i in year t, hence obtaining the Average percent of
"for" votes. Because, as noted in Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009), director elections
may be dierent from others, I rst calculate this measure for director elections and, then,
extend the analysis to other elections, in which the voting base is constructed as specied
by the company bylaws 6.
To assess how an active options market aects the way shareholders vote in elections
I use the following regression specication dened in Eq. 2.2.
Avg. percent 'for' votes i;t =  + 1OptV oli;t s + 2Xi;t + t + d (2.2)
where i and t index rm and year, respectively. The average percent of 'for' votes is
regressed on s-period lagged annual options trading volume, OptVol, and a set of control
variables as in Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) and dened in Section 2.2.1 and B.1.
t and d account for time and industry (4-digit Standard Industry Classication code)
6Although most companies also use as the base for other elections the number of for+withhold votes,
depending on the type of voting some conform the base as the sum of for+against votes, as well as
for+against+abstain. For those votings in which this information is available I dene the voting base
consequently.
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xed-eects, respectively.
2.2.1 Data and samples
The data required for this study comes from various sources. I gather information on
options trading volume from Option Metrics. This database provides with daily put and
call prices and volume, as well as option strikes and expiration dates. I use Option Metrics
data to construct three variables. First, I dene options trading volume (OptVol) as in
Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam (2009), as the total annual dollar options volume over
all options on a listed stock. Second, I construct two additional variables: Open interest
and Moneyness, which I will use as instrumental variables in a two-stage least squares
procedure to mitigate concerns related to endogeneity. I will dene these variables in depth
and discuss their validity as instruments in Section 2.3.2. Finally, due to high skewness, I
use the log-transformations of these variables (e.g. Ln(OptVol)) for the regression analysis.
Data on shareholder activism is from Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS, formerly
Risk Metrics). ISS provides detailed information on shareholder meetings and voting
results for U.S. companies from 2003. This information includes, for example, the type
on shareholder meeting (e.g. annual, special, etc.) which will allow me to identify those
rms in which a proxy contest takes place. ISS also discloses information of the spon-
sor of each proposal voted, which permits the dierentiation between management and
shareholder initiated proposals. Finally, voting information, as well as management and
ISS recommendation on each proposal is also provided by ISS.
As argumented before, my core analysis is based on two dierent regression models,
dened in Eq.2.1 and Eq.2.2 above, that require dierent control variables and, hence,
data samples. I proceed now to dene each of these samples, which are based on the
same data on shareholder activism, options market activity, and time period, but dier
in information available regarding dierent control variables.
Direct shareholder activism sample
I dene various control variables following Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) to
account for determinants of shareholder activism in the regression model specied in
Eq. 2.1. First, I gather data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to
construct rms stock market past performance, as bad performance is one of the main
triggers of activism. Specically, I compute Abnormal Performancei;t as the annual
stock return on rm i minus the return of a value-weighted market index (CRSP value
weighted) on year t. V olatilityi;t is the standard deviation of monthly returns during year
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t. I also use CRSP data to calculate Amihud (2002) measure of stock market illiquidity.7
The second source of data for dening my control variables is Thomson Reuters. I
gather information regarding institutional ownership holdings for rm i and year t. Using
this data I dene Institutional Ownershipi;t as the portion of shares in hands of institu-
tional investors over total shares outstanding (which I obtain from CRSP) and a institu-
tional ownership Herndahl concentration index. I also gather data on Analyst coveragei;t
from the I/B/E/S database. I construct this variable by aggregating the number of analyst
following a stock in year t.
Lastly, I make use of the Compustat database to obtain rm-level characteristics.
I dene Nasdaq as a dummy variable that equals one if the rm is listed on Nasdaq
market, Ln(MarketCap)i;t as the rm's end-of-December market capitalization, Tobin's
Qi;t as the sum of the market capitalization of a rm's common equity (stock price times
shares outstanding at the end of the quarter), liquidation value of its preferred shares and
the book value of debt, divided by book value of assets. Ln(Sale) is the natural log of
sales. Dividend yieldi;t is measured as the total dividend (common and preferred) over
market value of common equity plus book value of preferred equity. Cashi;t equals cash
and marketable securities divided by total assets. R&Di;t is research and development
expenses divided by total assets. I replace missing values in R&D expenses with zeros.
The nal sample comprises data from all these dierent sources, 33736 rm-year ob-
servations for the period 2003-2014. To be included in the nal sample, I require a rm
to have non-missing values on all the variables aforementioned, have at least one insti-
tutional shareholder reporting the 13F lling, and to actively report to CRSP database
for at least two years.8 Lastly, to ensure my results are not driven by outliers and in
line with standard practices in the literature, I winsorize all variables at upper and lower
0.005 percentiles. Additionally, I assign a value of zero in Option Volume to those rms
that do not have options trading activity.9
Table 2.1 contains information on the main summary statistics of this sample. Only
0.34% of the rm-year observations experience activism. Whereas this number may seem
low, it is in line with existing literature (e.g. Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) hand-
collected activism events add up to approximately 0.5% of the observations). The event
of a shareholder proposal is signicantly more frequent (8.5% of rm-year observations).
7Whereas Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) use also Hasbrouck (2009) liquidity measure, this
metric is only available until 2005. I use Amihud (2002) as it is widely available and standard in the
literature. The results remain unchanged when using the relative bid-ask spread as a measure of stock
market liquidity.
8I apply these lters in order to ensure my results are not driven by selection issues or subject to
back-lling biases.
9Firms listed in options markets are intrinsically dierent from those that are not (Mayhew and Mihov,
2004) and analyze them together may lead to some errors. In further analysis I deal with this problem
by focusing on the sample of rms with positive options volume as I argue the eect of options markets
should be related to option market activity.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics: Direct activism
Mean StdDev 25% Median 75% Observations
Proxy Contest 0.0034 0.059 0.000 0.000 0.000 33736
Shareholder Proposal 0.0855 0.280 0.000 0.000 0.000 33736
Options Volume(t 1) ($millions) 78.692 347.545 0.000 0.356 10.660 33736
Ln(Mkt Cap)(t 1) 6.462 2.093 4.959 6.321 7.864 33736
Tobin's Q(t 1) 1.777 1.358 1.035 1.312 1.970 33736
Ln(Sales)(t 1) 6.108 2.177 4.540 5.998 7.578 33736
Dividend yield(t 1) 0.017 0.027 0.000 0.004 0.024 33736
Cash(t 1) 0.117 0.143 0.020 0.061 0.162 33736
R&D(t 1) 0.035 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.030 33736
Nasdaq(t 1) 0.528 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 33736
Illiquidity(t 1) -0.103 4.530 0.001 0.006 0.065 33736
Volatility(t 1) 0.115 0.078 0.065 0.097 0.143 33736
Ab. Performance(t 1) 0.009 0.038 -0.010 0.006 0.025 33736
Ab. Performance(t 2) 0.012 0.044 -0.010 0.008 0.028 33736
Insitutional HHI(t 1) 0.130 0.155 0.044 0.071 0.146 33736
Institutional Ownership(t 1) 0.512 0.289 0.260 0.553 0.767 33736
Analyst Coverage(t 1) 6.085 6.741 1.000 3.750 8.750 33736
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables in the direct activism sample.
Denitions of all variables are provided in B.1. The sample period is 2003-2014.
The rest summary statistics fall within normal values in the literature. Options volume
for the average rm is $78.69 million, a large number taking into account that among the
33,736 rm-year observations, 13,945 correspond to observations with an asigned value
of zero for options volume (meaning the rm is not quoted in the option market in that
year). When considering only rms with positive options volume the mean (median) for
Options volume is $134.61 millions ($6.18). Firms in the sample are, on average, large.
The average rm exhibits a Tobin's Q of 1.77 (1.31 for the median), is followed by 6.08
analysts (3.75 for the median) and its ownership structure is composed by more than
50% of institutional owners (55.3% for the median). Additionally, more than half of the
rm-year observations refer to rms quoted in the Nasdaq.
Dissent shareholder voting sample
Cai, Garner, and Walkling (2009) explore the rm-level determinants of election results.
Following their baseline specication, I dene these determinants as the set of control
variables for my analysis formalized in Eq. 2.2. Some of these variables are common to
the shareholder direct activism sample and, thus, I construct them following exactly the
same procedure as described before. Common variables include Amihud (2002) illiquidity
measure, natural logarithm of a rm's market capitalization, Tobin's Q, lagged stock
market abnormal performance, percentage of institutional ownership, and institutional
owners Herndahl-Hirschman (H-H) concentration index.
Variables specic to the election sample focus on the governance structure of the rm.
I gather data from the ISS (Risk Metrics) Governance database to construct several vari-
ables. To account for managerial entrenchment I use Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009)
E-index. Unequal voting dummy is a dummy variable with value 1 if the rm has various
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classes of shares with unequal voting power, and 0 otherwise. Condential voting dummy
takes value 1 if the rm's policy prevents management from knowing how shareholders
vote with their proxy cards. From ISS Directors database I withdraw information relative
to Board size, the number of shares in hands of the board (Board shares held), and the
percentage of the the board who are independent directors (Independent directors).
Using the ISS voting data, I create a dummy variable with value 1 if, in an election,
ISS recommends voting 'for', and zero otherwise. Average ISS recommendation value
corresponds to the average value of this dummy across all election in that rm-year.
Lastly, I calculate total CEO compensation using data from Execucomp.
Table 2.2: Summary statistics: Voting sample
Mean StdDev 25% Median 75% Observations
Avg. vote for management (%)
Directors elections 95.309 6.934 94.834 97.424 98.893 10150
Other elections 92.819 8.679 89.876 95.860 98.322 4885
All elections 94.518 6.345 93.100 96.394 98.171 10206
Options Volume ($millions) 176.519 524.961 0.900 8.165 72.894 12173
Ln(Mkt Cap) 7.909 1.522 6.779 7.765 8.922 12173
Illiquidity -0.021 1.316 0.000 0.001 0.003 12173
Tobin's Q 1.845 1.130 1.118 1.481 2.146 12173
Ab. Performance 0.008 0.026 -0.007 0.006 0.021 12173
E-Index 2.859 1.286 2.000 3.000 4.000 12173
CEO compensation 0.570 0.719 0.161 0.347 0.732 12173
Board size 9.519 2.450 8.000 9.000 11.000 12173
Board shares held 74.656 141.054 9.624 25.529 80.591 12173
Independent directors(%) 0.761 0.128 0.667 0.778 0.875 12173
Avg. ISS recommendation 0.911 0.176 0.889 1.000 1.000 12173
Unequal voting dummy 0.031 0.173 0.000 0.000 0.000 12173
Condential voting dummy 0.131 0.337 0.000 0.000 0.000 12173
Institutional HHI 0.048 0.025 0.033 0.043 0.056 12173
Institutional Ownership 0.737 0.150 0.643 0.756 0.853 12173
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics for the variables in the shareholder voting sample.
Denitions of all variables are provided in B.1. The sample period is 2003-2014.
Table 2.2 summarizes the main descriptive statistics for this sample. A total of 10.206
rm-year observations correspond to data on all elections, from which 10.150 correspond
to 'director' elections, and only 4.885 correspond to 'other' elections. Although the per-
centage of votes 'for' management may seem somehow large (e.g. 94.5% of average support
to management in all elections), these values are close to those in the literature (e.g. Cai,
Garner, and Walkling (2009) report a 93.93% of shareholders support to management).
The statistics on the remaining variables are slightly dierent than those in the direct
activism sample, making evident that rms in this sample have a larger size, as a result of
the inclusion of additional control variables, for which data is not abundant. The average
rm in this sample has a slightly larger Tobin's Q (1.84 vs. 1.77) as well as larger market
capitalization (7.91 vs. 6.46 in natural logarithm terms). However, the greatest dierence
in the sample is in the level of institutional ownership (73.7% vs. 51.2%).
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2.3 Baseline results
Table 2.3 shows the results from the baseline regression specied in Eq. 2.1. Columns
1 and 3 display the results from regressing Ln(OptVol)(t 1) and the aforementioned con-
trol variables on the probability of a rm experiencing a proxy contest and a shareholder
proposal, respectively, on year t. Similarly, columns 2 and 4 perform the same anal-
ysis but using Ln(OptVol)(t 2) as an independent variable. As observed in Table 2.3,
the coecient of Ln(OptVol)(t j) is positive and highly signicant (p-value<0.05 for the
coecients on probability of a proxy contest and p-value<0.01 for the probability of
shareholder proposal) across all four specications. This evidence conrms that there is
a positive association between an active options market and subsequent shareholder ac-
tivism. Specically, an increase in one-year lagged options trading volume from the 10th
to the 90th percentile is associated with an increase in the probability of a proxy contest
(shareholder proposal) of 0.21% (3.42%). Although this number may seem low, a proxy
contest is a rare event. This change of 0.21% corresponds to a change of 61.76% relative to
the sample probability of activism (around 0.36%), which is in line with previous ndings
in the literature.10
The coecients on the dierent control variables take the value and direction expected
and are coherent with previous ndings in the literature. Whereas higher liquidity, in-
stitutional ownership, dividend yield or analyst coverage positively predict shareholder
activism, past performance, rm size, stock volatility or rm cash negatively associates
with the probability of investors exerting governance in the form of voice.
Table 2.4 contains the results from the regression specication in Eq. 2.2. Column 1
uses the average 'for' vote in director elections as dependent variable, whereas columns
2 and 3 explore the eect on shareholder voting on 'other' and 'all' elections, respec-
tively. The negative coecients on one-year lagged Ln(OptVol) reveal that shareholders
in rms more actively traded in the options market tend to dissent from management
more often. These coecients have strong statistical signicance in the three dimensions
of elections considered (p-value<0.05 for director elections, p-value<0.01 for other and
all elections.). Specically, an increase of one-standard deviation in one-year lagged op-
tions volume corresponds to a decrease of 0.73 percentage points in shareholder support
to management proposals. This eect is lower for director elections, but still signicant,
whereas is stronger for 'other' proposals, which include governance and director compen-
sation issues, where shareholders can typically have a more direct impact on the company
with their voting.
The coecient estimates on the remaining control variables have expected direction.
Shareholders are more prone to align their votes with management when the stock is more
10Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015) report an eect of liquidity relative to the sample probability
of activism of 71.2%.
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Table 2.3: Options Volume and Activism
Proxy Contestt Shareholder Proposalt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) 0.055 0.087
(0.021) (0.010)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) 0.050 0.089
(0.022) (0.009)
Ln(Illiquidity)(t 1) -0.075 -0.080 -0.131 -0.135
(0.041) (0.042) (0.019) (0.019)
Ab. Performance(t 1) -0.597 -0.414 0.267 0.730
(0.971) (0.982) (0.507) (0.506)
Ab. Performance(t 2) -2.204 -1.905 -3.216 -2.652
(0.852) (0.843) (0.450) (0.444)
Insitutional HHI(t 1) -0.453 -0.410 -0.032 -0.021
(0.318) (0.313) (0.208) (0.208)
Institutional Ownership(t 1) 0.730 0.715 0.488 0.486
(0.160) (0.161) (0.069) (0.069)
Analyst Coverage(t 1) -0.004 -0.003 0.015 0.014
(0.008) (0.008) (0.002) (0.002)
Volatility(t 1) -0.256 -0.213 -1.750 -1.685
(0.517) (0.496) (0.358) (0.340)
Nasdaq(t 1) 0.079 0.076 -0.012 -0.016
(0.078) (0.078) (0.034) (0.034)
Ln(Mkt Cap)(t 1) -0.243 -0.244 -0.092 -0.096
(0.057) (0.058) (0.024) (0.024)
Tobin's Q(t 1) -0.056 -0.051 -0.008 -0.005
(0.042) (0.042) (0.016) (0.016)
Ln(Sales)(t 1) 0.034 0.035 0.193 0.194
(0.032) (0.032) (0.018) (0.018)
Dividend yield(t 1) 0.967 1.025 2.672 2.858
(1.013) (1.016) (0.451) (0.451)
Cash(t 1) 0.182 0.162 -0.663 -0.698
(0.269) (0.269) (0.166) (0.167)
R&D(t 1) 0.053 0.073 0.193 0.169
(0.396) (0.395) (0.440) (0.443)
Observations 33736 33736 33736 33736
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.074 0.323 0.323
Change in probability of activism when OptVol
is increased from 10th to 90th perc. (marginal e. at means). 0.21% 0.18% 3.42% 3.38%
(p-value Wald di test) (0.03) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00)
Change relative to sample probability of activism 61.76% 52.94% 40.01% 39.51%
Notes: This table presents probit regression estimates of rm-level shareholder activism events (proxy contest and
shareholder proposal) on one and two-year lagged options volume and a set of determinants of shareholder activism.
A detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1. All regressions include year dummies. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. The sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table 2.4: Voting with management
Average Vote for Management (%)
Directors Other All
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.072 -0.242 -0.114
(0.035) (0.077) (0.034)
Illiquidity -0.053 -0.031 -0.042
(0.016) (0.022) (0.015)
Ln(Mkt Cap) 0.460 0.962 0.531
(0.068) (0.184) (0.073)
Tobin's Q 0.162 0.120 0.164
(0.060) (0.158) (0.064)
Ab. Performance(t 1) 6.206 -6.476 3.384
(2.058) (7.073) (3.032)
E-Index -0.394 -0.150 -0.543
(0.052) (0.137) (0.059)
CEO compensation -0.191 -1.345 -0.423
($ thousands) (0.078) (0.235) (0.077)
Board size 0.063 0.030 0.092
(0.031) (0.073) (0.032)
Board shares held 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Independent directors(%) 2.729 -0.852 1.701
(0.581) (1.266) (0.557)
Avg. ISS Recommen. 23.493 11.187 22.269
(0.614) (1.096) (0.636)
Unequal voting dummy 1.742 2.108 1.174
(0.390) (1.020) (0.605)
Condential voting dummy -0.080 -0.223 -0.167
(0.149) (0.350) (0.162)
Institutional HHI 8.520 25.608 10.867
(2.612) (6.888) (2.577)
Institutional Ownership -0.951 -0.594 -0.570
(0.464) (1.152) (0.455)
Observations 10150 4885 10206
Adjusted R2 0.585 0.119 0.408
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of the aver-
age shareholder vote for management-sponsored proposals on one-year
lagged options volume and a set of known determinants of shareholder
support to management. Column 1 contains the results for propos-
als on Directors, column 2 for Other proposals, and column 3 for All
proposals. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1.
All regressions include year and industry (four-digit sic code) dum-
mies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period
is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
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liquid, the rm is larger, past performance has been positive, governance quality of the
rm is stronger, and ISS recommends voting 'for'. On the other hand, shareholders tend
to withdraw their support to management when the CEO is heavily compensated, and
the rm has higher and less concentrated institutional ownership.
Taken together, these rst results point at options trading volume being related to
a stronger shareholder attitude towards activism. However, even I carefully introduce
control variables, and measure options trading one year before the activist event, I cannot,
so far, argue a causal eect of option markets on shareholder governance via voice or voting
behaviour. It may be that, for example, investors are more prone to trade options over
rms that have historically more active shareholder governance. I analyze this endogeneity
problem, as well as other issues related to the robustness of the results in the next sections.
2.3.1 Firms with positive options volume
So far I have explored the eect of option markets on shareholder governance over an
universe of rms that include both companies traded in the options market, as well as rms
not quoted on the options market. As Mayhew and Mihov (2004) point out, exchanges
use a dierent set of criteria to decide whether to quote a rm in the options market,
although the decision is ultimately discretionary. Consequently, even though I control
for a set of known determinants of access to options market such liquidity or rm size,
companies in my sample that do have options trading activity may be inherently dierent
from those that do not in some unobservable characteristic.
To mitigate concerns related to these potential omitted variable bias, I repeat the
probit and OLS regression specications in Eq. 2.1 and 2.2, respectively, for the subsample
of observations with positive options trading volume. The results from the direct activism
sample are in Table 2.5. Columns 1 and 2 use the probability of a proxy contest as a
dependent variable for one-year and two-year lagged options volume, respectively, whereas
columns 3 and 4 use the probability of a shareholder proposal as a signal of activism for one
and two-years lagged option trading activity as well. Overall, the results conrm previous
ndings. Furthermore, one-year lagged options volume has a signicant larger eect than
in the previous specication. Specically, an increase in options activity from the 10th to
the 90th percentiles now associates with a 82.63% change in the likelihood of receiving a
proxy contest relative to the sample probability. Surprisingly, the probability of a rm
receiving a shareholder proposal looses statistical signicance for the case of one-year
lagged options volume, although the coecient remains highly statistically signicant (p-
value<0.01) for the two-year-lagged options volume. I explore this nding in detail when
I investigate the endogeneity of the eect in a forward section.
Table 2.6 contains the results of the OLS specication for the shareholder voting
sample. Similarly to the previous case, despite loosing some observations corresponding
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Table 2.5: Options Volume and Activism: Firms with positive Options volume
Proxy Contestt Shareholder Proposalt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) 0.060 0.017
(0.025) (0.012)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) 0.044 0.032
(0.025) (0.011)
Ln(Illiquidity)(t 1) -0.027 -0.054 -0.266 -0.250
(0.053) (0.060) (0.038) (0.035)
Ab. Performance(t 1) -1.847 -1.567 0.339 0.285
(1.230) (1.347) (0.590) (0.607)
Ab. Performance(t 2) -3.663 -3.147 -3.261 -3.034
(1.146) (1.174) (0.555) (0.555)
Insitutional HHI(t 1) -1.245 -1.088 -0.978 -1.367
(0.853) (0.812) (0.435) (0.404)
Institutional Ownership(t 1) 0.845 0.809 0.754 0.799
(0.202) (0.214) (0.096) (0.098)
Analyst Coverage(t 1) -0.007 -0.007 0.009 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.003) (0.003)
Volatility(t 1) -0.162 0.007 0.011 -0.129
(0.768) (0.680) (0.411) (0.399)
Nasdaq(t 1) 0.077 0.102 -0.022 -0.037
(0.098) (0.099) (0.040) (0.040)
Ln(Mkt Cap)(t 1) -0.207 -0.224 -0.088 -0.088
(0.067) (0.073) (0.034) (0.034)
Tobin's Q(t 1) -0.037 -0.021 0.004 0.003
(0.048) (0.046) (0.018) (0.018)
Ln(Sales)(t 1) 0.057 0.065 0.229 0.231
(0.037) (0.039) (0.023) (0.023)
Dividend yield(t 1) 1.681 1.307 3.590 3.978
(1.014) (1.086) (0.546) (0.567)
Cash(t 1) 0.001 -0.015 -0.503 -0.498
(0.356) (0.357) (0.183) (0.183)
R&D(t 1) 0.280 0.213 0.523 0.557
(0.453) (0.463) (0.464) (0.460)
Observations 19791 18689 19791 18689
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.072 0.289 0.287
Change in probability of activism when OptVol
is increased from 10th to 90th perc. (marginal e. at means). 0.34% 0.28% 1.30% 3.18%
(p-value) (0.03) (0.07) (0.22) (0.00)
Change relative to sample probability of activism 82.63% 67.08% 9.55% 23.36%
Notes: This table presents probit regression estimates of rm-level shareholder activism events (proxy contest and
shareholder proposal) on one and two-year lagged options volume and a set of determinants of shareholder activism,
for the subsample of rms with positive options trading volume. A detailed denition of all variables is provided
in B.1. All regressions include year dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is
2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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to rms not quoted on the option market, coecients for options trading volume remain
strong statistically with slight increases in their economic magnitude. For example, the
coecient on Ln(Optvol)t 1 for all elections changes from -0.114 to -0.130. These results
are in line with the prior of a benecial eect of option markets on activism coming from
the liquidity of the market rather than solely from whether it exists.
Table 2.6: Voting with management: Firms
with positive OptVol
Average Vote for Management (%)
Directors Other All
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.082 -0.302 -0.130
(0.036) (0.079) (0.035)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9428 4598 9478
Adjusted R2 0.598 0.107 0.418
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of the
average shareholder vote for management-sponsored propos-
als on one-year lagged options volume and a set of known
determinants of shareholder support to management, for the
subsample of rms with positive options trading volume.
Column 1 contains the results for proposals on Directors,
column 2 for Other proposals, and column 3 for All propos-
als. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1.
All regressions include year and industry (four-digit sic code)
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
2.3.2 Endogeneity
Having established that more active options markets are associated with higher share-
holder activism and dissent voting, I turn now to explore possible biases in my results
due to endogeneity or reverse causality. I mitigate these concerns by using an instru-
mental variable (IV) approach with a two-staged least squares (2SLS) regression model.
The use of instrumental variables carries several benets for assessing validity to my re-
sults. It will not only help with reverse-causality concerns, but also mitigate biases due to
measurement error and omitted variables. Note that, because the construction of these
instruments is only possible for rms with positive options trading volume, the instru-
mental variable analysis is restricted to those rm-year observations with positive options
trading activity.11
11This restriction, however, should not pose a problem, since my hypothesis predicts the eect to be
related to the liquidity of the options market rather to its mere existence.
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A good instrument for my setting is a variable that is highly correlated with options
volume (relevance condition), but uncorrelated with the probability of shareholder ac-
tivism except through other independent variables (exclusion restriction). I make use of
two good instruments used before in the literature (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam,
2009; Blanco and Wehrheim, 2017; Blanco and Garca, 2017). The rst is open interest,
which consists on the total number of put and call contracts that remain open on a given
stock. I average this daily number (provided by Option Metrics) annually to construct
Open interestt. As shown by a correlation of 0.648, it is clear that this variable strongly
relates to option volume (I provide results from the rst stage regression on B.2). More-
over, as this number contains the sum of call and put contracts, it should not be linked to
higher or lower rm quality (Roll, Schwartz, and Subrahmanyam, 2009) or activism level
in any mechanical way.12
Table 2.7 displays the result of the 2SLS regression on the probability of a rm expe-
riencing a proxy contest or a shareholder proposal using the natural log of open interest,
Ln(Open Interest), as an instrument and the full set of time dummies and independent
variables from Eq 2.1. Coecients for the instrumented Ln(Opt Vol)(t 1) are highly signif-
icant (p-value<0.01) for both the probability of proxy contest and of shareholder proposal
(columns 1 and 3, respectively). For the case of instrumented Ln(Opt Vol)(t 2), statisti-
cal signicance remains high for the probability of shareholder proposal (column 4) but
p-values increase for the probability of proxy contest (column 2) although coecient re-
mains statistically signicant at 10% level. The economic magnitude of the coecients in
the 2SLS is larger than for the baseline probit results, indicating that the main eect of
options on the probability of activism suers from downward bias and therefore the true
coeecient is larger.13
Similarly, Table 2.8 shows the results of performing a 2SLS regression on the share-
holder voting sample. Coecients on instrumented one-year lagged options volume,
Ln(Opt Vol)(t 1), are strongly signicant (p-value<0.01) for the three specied elections.
Again, economic magnitudes of the eects are quite larger than in the baseline case, point-
ing at the downward bias of the OLS coecient also suggested by the probit regressions.
The second instrument I use is Moneyness. I calculate moneyness as in Roll, Schwartz,
and Subrahmanyam (2009) (i.e. the average absolute dierence between the stock's mar-
ket price and the option's strike price aggregated across all options on a stock and averaged
annually). Because dierent agents seek options with dierent strikes (e.g. volatility spec-
ulators would choose deep in-the-money options as their vega is close to zero, informed
12Higher or lower values of call or put contracts may correspond to better or poorer rm quality that
may trigger shareholder activism, but not the sum of both option contracts.
13Discrepancies between 2SLS and OLS coecients are normal and arise due to several factor related
primarily with the mitigation of errors-in-variables biases. A comprehensive analysis of the relevant
econometric issues on this topic can be found in Beaver, McAnally, and Stinson (1997) or Irwin and
Tervio (2002).
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Table 2.7: Options Volume and Activism: IV Open
interest
Proxy Contestt Shareholder Proposalt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) 0.098 0.102
(instrumented) (0.036) (0.014)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) 0.062 0.107
(instrumented) (0.034) (0.013)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19791 18689 19791 18689
Notes: This table presents instrumental variable (IV) probit re-
gression estimates for rm-level shareholder activism events (proxy
contest and shareholder proposal) on one and two-year lagged in-
strumented options volume and a set of control variables. Annual
Options volume is instrumented through the average annual Open
interest. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is
2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10%, respectively.
Table 2.8: Voting with management: IV Open
interest
Average Vote for Management (%)
Directors Other All
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.186 -0.457 -0.210
(instrumented) (0.044) (0.101) (0.043)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9428 4598 9478
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regression estimates of the
average shareholder vote for management-sponsored propos-
als on instrumented one-year lagged options volume and a
set of known determinants of shareholder support to man-
agement. Column 1 contains the results for proposals on Di-
rectors, column 2 for Other proposals, and column 3 for All
proposals. Annual options volume is instrumented trhough
average annual Open interest. A detailed denition of all
variables is provided in B.1. All regressions include year and
industry (four-digit sic code) dummies. Robust standard er-
rors are in parentheses. The sample period is 2003-2014.
,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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agents may trade out-of-the-money options that provide higher leverage, and uninformed
traders would select less risky positions through at-the money options) and exchanges
tend to list new options with strikes close to current stock price, there is no reason to
expect that (unsigned) moneyness is directly related to rm quality or the probability
of shareholder activism. However, the relevance condition is not as strong as with open
interest. While the correlation between this variable and options volume is suciently
strong prior to the nancial crisis of 2007 (around 0.2), it has decreased dramatically since
then. Throughout my whole sample period (2003-2014) the correlation of moneyness with
options volume is just 0.03, suggesting that this instrument may not be as strong as open
interest when I include more recent and nancially unstable years. Tables B2.1 and B2.2
in B.2 provide the results of the 2SLS model using moneyness and open interest together
as instruments for the direct activism and the shareholder voting samples, respectively.
Results conrm the direction and signicance of the eect for the baseline probit and OLS
models.
Taken together, these results are consistent with the notion of a signicant causal-
ity running from option markets to subsequent shareholder activism. Moreover, using
an instrumental variable regression to mitigate biases yields a larger magnitude of the
coecients, revealing a stronger economic signicance of the eect.
2.3.3 Number of activist events
So far I have dened the event of activism by a shareholder as the probability of rm
i experiencing either a proxy contest or a shareholder proposal in year t. This metric,
however, does not disentangle rms experiencing several activism events a year from those
that suer only one. Nonetheless, if active options markets truly encourage shareholder
governance in the form of voice, investors in stocks with more actively traded options
should be more prone to exert governance eorts resulting in a higher number of activist
events. In this section I deal with this issue by exploring the eect of option market
liquidity on the number of proxy contests and shareholder proposals experienced by a
rm in a given year. Using the same direct shareholder activism sample as before, I run
the regression specied in Eq. 2.3 under three dierent models: ordinary least squares,
Poisson, and negative binomial.
# Activism events = t + 1Ln(OptV ol)i;t 1 + 2Xi;t 1 (2.3)
where t accounts for time xed eects, Xi;t 1 contains the same vector of control
variables used in the baseline probit regressions, and Ln(OptV ol)i;t 1 measures option
market activity. Table 2.9 displays the results of this regression specication. Columns 1
to 3 use the number of proxy contests received by a rm in a given year as a dependent
variable, whereas columns 4 to 6 use the number of proposals registered by shareholders.
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Because of the nature of the data, I extend the classic OLS specication (in columns
1 and 4) to include Poisson (columns 2 and 5) and negative binomial (columns 3 and
6) regression estimation. Coecients for Ln(OptV ol)i;t 1 across all specications have
high statistical signicance (p-value<0.01, except for the OLS regression on the number
of proxy contests with p-value<0.05) and positive sign, supporting the notion of liquid
options market encouraging several shareholder activism events.
2.4 Possible mechanisms
Having explored the robustness of the eect on various dimensions, I turn now to dis-
entangle the possible mechanisms by which liquid option markets encourage shareholder
activism. My main hypothesis argues that active option markets make shareholders more
prone to activism by increasing the net benets from intervention and voting. This is, be-
cause options allow investors to access extra trading gains, while the costs associated with
activism (e.g., research) remain equal, shareholders' incentives to seek value-increasing
projects for the rm increase. Whereas observing this is impossible in practice, I can
analyze the eect of options in several situations in which my hypothesis has clear pre-
dictions. Providing denite proof is, of course, challenging and hence my tests are only
suggestive.
I start by considering the role of options in promoting trading among investors. Similar
to the eect of liquidity in theories like Kahn and Winton (1998) if options markets truly
facilitate investors trading14, their positive impact on shareholder activism should be lower
(even negative) in cases where investors' incentives to exit clearly outweigh potential gains
from intervention. One specic example of such a case are overvalued rms. When a rm
is highly overvalued, a privately informed investor observing the rm is overvalued may
nd optimal to exit the rm and abstain from initiating a value-enhancing (but costly)
intervention.
Next, I investigate the inuence of options toward shareholder voting behaviour.
Shareholders dedicate eort to research a proposal based on their net benets from voting
(Iliev and Lowry, 2014). This is, as shareholders have higher incentives to become pri-
vately informed about rm fundamentals, they will assess the eect of a proposal for rm
value with higher accuracy. Consistent with my hypothesis of options serving as a venue
for additional gains from private information, the presence of an active options market
should motivate more active shareholder voting behaviour.
Lastly, I focus on the stock market reaction to shareholders proposals forerun by larger
14Notice that by facilitating investor trading I refer to both initiating a new position, as well as exiting
an existing one. For example, investors may mitigate the harmful eect of price impact when selling a
large stake by trading on derivative markets.
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Table 2.9: Number of activist events
#Proxy Contestst #Shareholder Proposalst
OLS Poisson Neg.Binom. OLS Poisson Neg.Binom.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) 0.010 0.200 0.489 0.065 0.150 0.169
(0.004) (0.077) (0.082) (0.007) (0.028) (0.029)
Ln(Illiquidity)(t 1) -0.008 -0.209 -0.525 0.009 -0.245 -0.223
(0.005) (0.141) (0.124) (0.006) (0.065) (0.071)
Ab. Performance(t 1) -0.247 -4.228 4.772 -0.112 -3.459 -2.974
(0.171) (3.245) (4.205) (0.120) (1.043) (1.295)
Ab. Performance(t 2) -0.252 -6.507 -15.079 -0.489 -6.929 -7.206
(0.091) (2.518) (3.671) (0.093) (0.909) (1.112)
Insitutional HHI(t 1) -0.023 -1.566 -6.275 0.216 -0.479 -0.632
(0.025) (1.179) (1.304) (0.031) (0.610) (0.667)
Institutional Ownership(t 1) 0.083 2.085 4.944 -0.062 1.156 1.100
(0.025) (0.590) (0.781) (0.040) (0.199) (0.227)
Analyst Coverage(t 1) -0.000 -0.003 0.013 0.017 0.006 0.015
(0.002) (0.026) (0.027) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
Volatility(t 1) 0.038 -0.734 -1.942 -0.239 -1.232 -2.310
(0.086) (2.117) (2.182) (0.071) (0.846) (0.872)
Nasdaq(t 1) 0.025 0.462 0.374 0.009 0.042 0.071
(0.018) (0.322) (0.318) (0.016) (0.118) (0.117)
Ln(Mkt Cap)(t 1) -0.026 -0.649 -1.673 0.019 -0.070 -0.181
(0.009) (0.210) (0.207) (0.013) (0.070) (0.082)
Tobin's Q(t 1) -0.004 -0.129 -0.451 -0.022 -0.068 -0.041
(0.005) (0.164) (0.138) (0.006) (0.041) (0.043)
Ln(Sales)(t 1) 0.008 0.124 -0.128 0.055 0.363 0.355
(0.007) (0.121) (0.140) (0.009) (0.048) (0.057)
Dividend yield(t 1) 0.075 1.500 -2.764 0.817 4.339 4.361
(0.210) (3.237) (4.001) (0.216) (1.082) (1.358)
Cash(t 1) 0.016 0.141 1.468 0.018 -0.385 -0.781
(0.048) (0.916) (1.134) (0.037) (0.432) (0.446)
R&D(t 1) 0.031 0.552 -1.005 0.249 0.149 1.275
(0.079) (1.249) (1.731) (0.071) (1.372) (1.089)
Observations 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736 33736
Notes: This table presents the regression estimates of rm-level shareholder activism events (proxy contest
and shareholder proposal) on one-year lagged options volume and a set of determinants of shareholder activism.
Columns 1 and 4 present results from OLS model while columns 2 and 5 provide estimates from a Poisson model.
Finally, columns 3 and 6 provide results from Negative Binomial regression. A detailed denition of all variables
is provided in B.1. All regressions include year dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample
period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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options trading volume. So far, my results point at shareholders using option markets
as an alternative trading venue. However, trading in two markets that allow for taking
opposite positions in eachother facilitates the decoupling of voting and economic inter-
ests for shareholders. This, in turn, can promote empty voting behaviour that leads to
value-decreasing activities for the rm. I evaluate whether shareholder proposals moti-
vated by larger trading in option markets lead to higher or lower subsequent stock prices.
Specically, to mitigate concerns related to stock market anticipation of a pass of the
proposal, I focus on those proposals that pass or fail by a small margin (Cu~nat, Gine, and
Guadalupe, 2012).
2.4.1 Direct activism in overvalued rms
Firm overvaluation is impossible to observe with precision. However, extensive literature
supports the validity of proxies that build on the theories by Miller (1977) and Harrison
and Kreps (1978), which point to short-sale constraints and dierence of opinion as deter-
minants of rm overvaluation. As argued by Nagel (2005), stocks with low institutional
ownership tend to have more sparse loan supply. Similarly, I follow Baker and Wurgler
(2007) and use stock return volatility as a proxy for dierence of opinion. Consequently,
I dene two measures that proxy for rm overvaluation: Ln(1/Institutional Ownership)
and the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over one year (Volatility), as in Norli,
Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015). Table 2.10 contains the results of interacting these two
variables with options trading volume.
Columns 1 and 3 in Table 2.10 contain the results from the probit regression in Eq. 2.1
and the interaction term of options volume, Ln(OptVol)t 2, and the overvaluation proxy,
Ln(1/Inst.Own)t 1, for the probability of a rm experiencing a proxy contest and a share-
holder proposal, respectively. Columns 2 and 4 include the same analysis, but using
Volatilityt 1 as a proxy for rm overvaluation. As shown by the negative coecients re-
sulting from the interactions with rm overvaluation proxies, the eect of options trading
volume on shareholder activism is lower for highly overvalued stocks. Although when
computing the average interaction eect it is not statistically signicant for the event of
a proxy contest (although still negative), it remains highly signicant (p-value<0.01) for
the case of shareholder proposal.
In sum, these results are consistent with the notion of options trading volume easing
investors trading activities, which facilitates exit rather than intervention when a rm is
highly overvalued.
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Table 2.10: Options Volume and Activism in Overvalued
rms
Proxy Contestt Shareholder Proposalt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) -0.067 -0.118
Ln(1=Inst:Own:)(t 1) (0.023) (0.009)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) -0.126 -0.288
Volatility(t 1) (0.155) (0.100)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) 0.079 0.066 0.141 0.117
(0.027) (0.029) (0.010) (0.013)
Ln(1=Inst:Own:)(t 1) -0.473 -0.704
(0.183) (0.120)
Volatility(t 1) -0.213 -0.072 -1.180 -0.828
(0.504) (0.518) (0.329) (0.401)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Avg. interaction eect -0.001 -0.001 -0.019 -0.042
(average z-value) (-1.138) (-0.180) (-5.102) (-3.417)
Observations 33736 33736 33736 33736
Pseudo R2 0.080 0.074 0.342 0.324
Notes: This table presents probit regression estimates of rm-level share-
holder activism events (proxy contest and shareholder proposal) on one and
two-year lagged options volume and a set of determinants of shareholder ac-
tivism, as well as the interaction term of options volume with two overval-
uation proxies, Ln(1/Inst.Own)t 1 and Volatilityt 1. A detailed denition
of all variables is provided in B.1. All regressions include year dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is 2003-2014.
,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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2.4.2 Active shareholder voting
Shareholders do not always have the incentives to perform a deep assessment of all the
dierent proposals available for voting in meetings. Because the allocation of resources to
research the eects and consequences of each agenda item is limited, it is not surprising
that an industry has grown to service this requirement. Proxy advisory rms gather in-
formation about millions of companies and provide with voting recommendations for each
item on the voting agenda. The increasing use of this recommendations by shareholders
has motivated a depper study of the behaviour of proxy advisers, which have been widely
accused of issuing arbitrary guidance. Iliev and Lowry (2014) study the use of ISS (a
well-known proxy adviser) services by mutual fund shareholders. Their results link share-
holder voting behavior to their net benets from voting. Mutual funds with higher net
benets of voting are less likely to rely on ISS recommendations and follow one-size-ts-
all approach. Moreover, these funds that vote more actively earn a higher risk-adjusted
return from their investments. Additionally, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) and John-
son, Karpo, and Yi (2015) emphasize how the one-size-ts-all approach is unlikely to be
optimal for rm governance.
In order to investigate whether the presence of an active options market is related to
increasing benets from active governance, I study how likely are shareholders to vote in
line with ISS recommendations when the rm has larger options trading activity. With
this aim, and making use of the shareholder voting data used before, I construct a variable,
Average vote with ISS (%), that measures the degree in which shareholder votes align
with ISS recommendation. Specically, this variable accounts for the average percentage
of votes following ISS recommendation over the voting base, in a similar fashion to the
Average vote for management variable used before. Using this metric as a measure for
shareholder support to ISS guidance I run the following regression model, similar to that
of Eq. 2.2:
Avg. vote with ISS (%)i;t =  + 1Ln(OptV ol)i;t s + 2Xi;t + t + d (2.4)
where i and t index rm and year, respectively. The average percent of votes with ISS
is regressed on s-period lagged annual options trading volume, and a set of control vari-
ables, as well as time (t) and industry (d) xed-eects. The set of control variables
is exactly the same in Eq. 2.2 (and dened in B.1), with the exception of Average ISS
recommendation, which is now substituted by Average management recommendation.
Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.11 contain the result from this regression for contempora-
neous and one-year lagged options volume, respectively. As evidenced by the negative and
highly signicant (p-value<0.01) coecients of -0.270 and -0.291, shareholders in rms
with more active options markets are less likely to follow the passive approach from ISS.
Taken together, these results are in line with the conjecture of options increasing
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Table 2.11: Voting with ISS
Average Vote with ISS(%)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)t -0.270 -0.238
(0.097) (0.098)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.291 -0.263
(0.093) (0.094)
Ln(OptVol)t  Avg. ISS Blanket Rec -0.025
(0.011)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1)  Avg. ISS Blanket Rec -0.021
(0.011)
Avg. ISS Blanket Rec -0.054 -0.067
(0.050) (0.052)
Illiquidity 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.027
(0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
Ln(Mkt Cap) 1.554 1.581 1.543 1.572
(0.199) (0.195) (0.199) (0.195)
Tobin's Q 0.004 -0.012 0.006 -0.011
(0.168) (0.168) (0.168) (0.167)
Ab. Performance(t 1) 24.696 22.974 24.414 22.823
(6.247) (6.226) (6.248) (6.226)
E-Index -0.484 -0.486 -0.420 -0.423
(0.147) (0.146) (0.148) (0.148)
CEO compensation -1.929 -1.927 -1.870 -1.877
($ thousands) (0.306) (0.306) (0.311) (0.311)
Board size 0.235 0.234 0.233 0.232
(0.084) (0.084) (0.084) (0.084)
Board shares held -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Independent directors(%) 23.031 23.051 23.063 23.073
(1.550) (1.551) (1.549) (1.550)
Avg. Mgmt. Rec. 45.943 45.963 42.210 42.301
(2.037) (2.035) (2.206) (2.205)
Unequal voting dummy -6.752 -6.758 -6.807 -6.817
(1.194) (1.197) (1.195) (1.198)
Condential voting dummy 0.332 0.339 0.246 0.249
(0.395) (0.395) (0.395) (0.395)
Institutional HHI -26.196 -25.544 -26.341 -25.678
(6.576) (6.570) (6.563) (6.559)
Institutional Ownership 1.156 1.130 1.112 1.092
(1.244) (1.241) (1.243) (1.241)
Observations 12042 12042 12042 12042
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.192 0.193 0.193
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of the average shareholder vote with ISS
recommendations on contemporaneous and one-year lagged options volume and a set of known
determinants of shareholder voting behavior. Columns 3 and 4 extend the specication by including
the interaction term of options volume with the average proportion of blanket issues for voting on
that year. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1. All regressions include year and
industry (four-digit sic code) dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample
period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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shareholders net benets from active governance. When there exists a liquid option
market that shareholders can exploit to their own trading gains, they are more likely to
dedicate higher eorts to the assessment of proposals, which, ultimately, results in more
active governance.
Blanket recommendations
While voting patterns dierent to those of ISS evidence active eorts from shareholders
to assess the value of a proposal, there are specic issues in which voting against ISS is
specially relevant. ISS has been repeatedly accused of issuing empty recommendations
in an eort to minimize costs. In these so-called blanket recommendations, ISS always
recommends against certain issues without considering the specics of the company. If
options truly make shareholders more prone to active activism, shareholder support to
ISS recommendations should be specially low when the rm has a more active options
trading volume and the percentage of blanket recommendations in the agenda is higher.
In order to identify those blanket (or near-blanket) recommendations by ISS I follow
the approach in Iliev and Lowry (2014). Specically, I focus on the agenda items with
lowest historical support of ISS to management. I obtain ve dierent issues in which
ISS always (or nearly always) recommends voting against management. These issues
are proposals to declassify the board of directors, require majority vote for an election
of directors, stock retention, advisory vote to ratify executive's compensation and double
trigger on equity plans. The rst four issues are also considered as blanket in Iliev and
Lowry (2014) analysis15, consistent with ISS consistently issuing blanket recommendations
in the same items. Next, I calculate the average number of blanket recommendations, Avg.
ISS Blanket Rec, per rm and year. A larger value of this variable indicates that a higher
proportion of the issues voted on that year were aected by blanket recommendations
from ISS.
Columns 3 and 4 in Table 2.11 display the results of the regression in Eq. 2.4, but this
time including the results from incorporating an interaction term between the average
number of blanket recommendations and contemporaneous and one-year-lagged options
volume, respectively. Coecients for the interaction terms are negative (-0.025 and -
0.021) and statistically signicant (p-value<0.05 and p-value<0.1). The coecients on
options volume remain highly signicant and negative.
Overall, these results are consistent with the view of option markets enhancing share-
holder incentives for active governance by increasing net benets from activism.
15Excluding the last issue from the blanket classication does not change the nature of the results.
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2.4.3 Stock market reaction to proposals
Lastly, I investigate the stock market reaction to shareholder proposals preceded by larger
options trading volume. The intuition behind this analysis is the following. While option
markets seem to encourage shareholder proposals and activism, it is not clear that such
activism has always value-increasing goals. One specic concern is that more active option
markets promote empty voting behavior among investors. When shareholders are able to
separate economic from voting interests in a rm, as a more liquid options market enables,
their incentives to undertake value-increasing projects for the rm may be undermined.
For example, a large shareholder may tilt the result of a vote on a positive rm-value issue
towards 'No' because his economic interest is placed on lower future rm value (e.g., by
being long on put options).
Cu~nat, Gine, and Guadalupe (2012) study stock market reactions to governance pro-
posals that pass or fail by a small margin (5%). Because stock markets may discount
the eect of proposals that have high expectations of pass or fail by a large margin, this
identication allows for a cleaner causal estimate. They nd that passing a proposal
leads to positive abnormal returns, specially in rms with more anti-takeover provisions
and higher institutional ownership. Additionally, Iliev and Lowry (2014) investigate how
the presence of more active voting inuences the stock market reaction to a shareholder
proposal. Shareholder proposals that are supported by more active voting have larger
(lower) abnormal returns when they pass (fail).
In order to assess whether option markets promote empty voting behavior by share-
holders I analyze the eect of options trading volume, Ln(OptVol), on rm abnormal
returns for shareholder proposals that pass or fail by a close margin. I calculate options
trading volume for the quarter prior to that of the voting. I follow Cu~nat, Gine, and
Guadalupe (2012) and Iliev and Lowry (2014), and dene close votes on proposals as
those that pass or fail by a margin of ve percent or less. Overall, I identify 518 cases
in which a rm has a shareholder proposal that passes or fails by a small margin. Fol-
lowing the literature, I compute the abnormal return on the meeting day the proposal is
voted as the alpha from the Fama-French four-factor model. I also create two dummy
variables that equal one if the proposal is passed, Pass dummy, and if the ISS recommen-
dation is 'For', ISS rec. 'For', and zero otherwise. Using this set of variables, I proceed
to investigate the stock market reaction to proposals forerun by larger options trading
volume.
Table 2.12 contains the results from two dierent regression models. In column 1,
abnormal returns are regressed on options volume, Ln(OptVol), a Pass dummy, the in-
teraction of these two, and the ISS recommend 'For' dummy. The coecient on the
interaction term, Ln(OptVol)Pass dummy, is positive (0.052) but exhibits no statistical
signicance at conventional levels. While this result discards, on average, any harmful
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Table 2.12: Options volume and voting: Close votes
Ab.Return(%)
meeting day
(1) (2)
Ln(OptVol) 0.006 0.848
(0.039) (0.123)
Pass dummy -0.168 -5.707
(0.625) (1.789)
Ln(OptVol)  Pass dummy 0.052 0.567
(0.072) (0.243)
ISS rec. 'For' 0.309 4.570
(0.500) (1.066)
Ln(OptVol)  ISS rec. 'For' -0.856
(0.130)
Pass dummy  ISS rec. 'For' 5.644
(1.899)
Ln(OptVol)  Pass dummy  ISS rec. 'For' -0.520
(0.253)
Constant -0.412 -4.590
(0.519) (1.011)
Observations 518 518
R2 0.008 0.048
Notes: This table presents the results from regressing abnormal re-
turns on the meeting day on options trading volume, a passed proposal
dummy, and a dummy variable equal one if ISS recommends voting
'for' in that proposal and zero otherwise. Model in column 1 includes
options volume, a pass dummy, the interaction between these two, and
the dummy for ISS recommending 'for'. Model in column 2 includes
the triple interaction between these three variables. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. The sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and
 denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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eect on equity values from the pass of proposals preceded by larger options volume, it
deserves more attention.
Motivated by previous results that point to more active option markets inducing share-
holders to disagree more often with ISS, I extend the previous regression model by incor-
porating the triple interaction term of options volume, Ln(OptVol), Pass dummy, and ISS
recommend 'For' dummy. Intuitively, if options promote shareholder empty voting be-
havior, this should manifest strongly in those proposals where ISS does not recommend in
favor. These results are shown in column 2 in Table 2.12. Notice that now, the coecient
on Ln(OptVol)Pass dummy, corresponds to the eect of options volume on abnormal
returns when a proposal passed and ISS did not recommend 'For'.16 Alternatively, the
interaction term Ln(OptVol)Pass dummyISS rec.'For' corresponds to the eect of op-
tions trading on abnormal returns for proposals passed and recommended 'For' by ISS.
As evidenced by the positive and signicant (p-value<0.05) coecient of 0.567, higher
options trading volume prior to the meeting associates with larger abnormal returns on
the meeting day when ISS does not recommend in favor of the passed proposal. However,
this situation is reversed when ISS recommends 'For' a proposal. The coecient on the
triple interaction is negative and statistically signicant (p-value<0.05) with a smaller
magnitude (-0.520).
These results are not consistent with the view that more active option markets, on
average, promote empty voting behavior by investors. Options trading volume impacts
positively abnormal returns when a proposal in which ISS is not in favor is passed, which
provides compelling evidence against the empty voting argument. It is puzzling, though,
that when ISS recommends for a proposal and it is passed, more active options markets
associate with lower abnormal returns. One potential explanation for this negative asso-
ciation may lie in the higher ability of stock markets to predict the impact on rm value
of a proposal when it is recommended by ISS, and therefore investors expectations may
be already incorporated into prices.
Overall, larger trading activity in options market does not have a signicant eect (nei-
ther positive nor negative) on rm value when a shareholder proposal is passed. While
this (lack of) eect refers to the average shareholder proposal, unveiling the specic situ-
ations in which this eect takes one direction or the other constitutes an interesting and
important venue for future research.
16By construction, the ISS recommendation variable takes values zero or one. However, a value of zero
does not automatically mean that ISS recommended against the proposal.
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2.5 Discussion and conclusion
Derivative contracts have reached a substantial importance in the contemporary nancial
world. Despite their rst-order use among investors worldwide, their eects have been
hardly studied from a corporate perspective. With this paper, I contribute to ll this gap
in the literature by studying the real eects of option markets on shareholder activism.
I nd that higher trading volume in option markets leads to stronger subsequent share-
holder activism. This activism manifests in higher probability and larger number of proxy
constests and shareholder proposals in meetings, as well as in the form of dissent voting
with management.
These results challenge the view that higher price informativeness, conveyed by more
liquid option markets, always reduce shareholder incentives for governance in the form
of 'voice' in favor of the 'exit' mechanism. Liquid option markets encourage activism in
the form of 'voice' even after controlling for the degree of information asymmetries in
a rm, as proxied by analyst coverage. However, I do not argue that the informational
enhancement embedded in liquid option markets does not play a role. In particular,
the 'exit' mechanism may dominate in specic scenarios, such as in the case of highly
overvalued rms.
To the extent that the presence of an active market for options over the stock facilitates
investors trading, my results resemble those of Norli, Ostergaard, and Schindele (2015)
on the role of stock liquidity on shareholder activism. Nonetheless, I show that option
markets have an eect on activism beyond that of stock liquidity. I further discuss the
mechanisms behind these results and provide suggestive evidence that points to investors
using option markets to gather additional trading gains from their information, which,
ultimately, results in higher net benets from activism. The presence of a more liquid
options market induces shareholders to take a stronger attitude towards activism, which
manifests in lower reliance on ISS voting recommendations, specially in blanket issues
(Iliev and Lowry, 2014).
Lastly, motivated by growing concerns regarding the use of derivatives by investors
to decouple economic and control rights, I study the eects on rm value of proposals
forerun by larger activity in option markets. While empty voting theories predict that
when investors have the ability to separate voting and economic interests their proposals
may be detrimental to rm value, I do not nd any signicant eect on stocks abnormal
returns when a proposal preceded by larger options trading volume is passed. Moreover,
when a proposal in which the ISS is not in favor is passed, larger activity in option markets
associates with higher abnormal equity returns.
Overall, this paper provides novel insights for the ongoing debate on derivatives regula-
tion. Because, opposite to the case of stock market listing, exchanges make the exogenous
decision of option market listing, the conclusions drawn by this study are highly relevant
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not only on the academic front, but from a regulatory perspective. I show that, on
average, the positive impact (by stimulating) of option markets on shareholder activism
outweighs the perverse eect associated with providing increasing incentives to sharehold-
ers for speculative trading and empty voting. However, I do not conclude that investors
do not nd option markets as a good trading venue that promotes empty voting behavior
under certain conditions. Unveiling which are these conditions and how to prevent detri-
mental situations to rm value from happening are particularly important and interesting
venues for future research.
Chapter 3
Size Matters: The Case of Merger
Arbitrage Hedge Funds
87
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3.1 Introduction
'Over a ten-year period commencing on January 1, 2008, and ending on December 31,
2017, the S&P 500 will out perform a portfolio of funds of hedge funds, when performance
is measured on a basis net of fees, costs and expenses.'
Warren Buett,
During the 2006 Berkshire Hathaway shareholders annual meeting Warren Buett
oered any taker to bet $1 million that over a 10-year period, after fees, the S&P 500
would give a higher return than any 10 hedge funds anyone might choose. Not short
after, Protege Partners, LLC, a New York-based hedge fund rm accepted the challenge.
As of May, 2015, with less than 3 years to deadline, the hedge funds selected by Protege
were 63.5 to 19.6 percent behind S&P 500 index. Buett's main argument for the bet
lied not only in the colossal fees hedge funds charge (and specially funds of hedge funds,
who double-charge fees on a regular hedge fund), but also on the tremendous trading
costs and expenses investors suer from. It is important to note that the return hedge
fund investors perceive is already discounted for fund fees, as well as any internal costs the
fund has such as payments for electronic platforms, salaries, or even funding money raising
events. This papers is one of the rsts to explore the extent to which the magnitude of
these costs can aect not only fund performance but a manager's strategic decisions in
the fund's internal structure. Specically, I confront delivered performance by large and
small merger arbitrage hedge funds. I nd that large funds outperform in periods where
arbitrage opportunities in the market are larger (merger wave periods), whereas their
performance falls behind in periods of low merger frequency. These results suggest fund
managers from larger funds take advantage of their size to acquire superior resources that
entail an investment advantage but, in turn, drag their performance when the marginal
advantage of these resources is lower or negative.
For years, most active portfolio managers have been considered by academics as just
lucky-winners. From Jensen (1968) paper, who rst draw attention on the inability of
active mutual fund managers to outperform passive benchmarks, several other studies have
argued that mutual fund outperformance is merely attributable to luck (e.g., Malkiel,
1995; Stephen, Randolph, and Jerey, 2002). More recent empirical ndings however
raise serious doubts on the managerial inability hypothesis. Investors in mutual funds
chase past performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and Tufano, 1998), allocating
their money in recent winners, provoking that funds that have performed well over one
period experience a huge growth in size (as measured by assets under management) and
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subsequently under-perform in the next period1. Lack of long-term persistence and a
perverse eect of inows on performance has been documented by several studies in both
the mutual fund (Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1995; Carhart, 1997; Daniel, Grinblatt,
Titman, and Wermers, 1997; Bollen and Busse, 2005) and hedge fund indsutries (e.g.,
Brown, Goetzmann, and Ibbotson, 1999; Agarwal and Naik, 2000; Bares, Gibson, and
Gyger, 2003; Fung, Hsieh, Naik, and Ramadorai, 2008; Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009).
On the theoretical front, various studies have modeled the equilibrium of this industry
under dierent specications and assumptions. First models like Ippolito (1992) or Lynch
and Musto (2003) accounted for the endogeneity of inows, but produce as a result an
equilibrium in which managerial ability levels lead to persistent dierences in performance.
Other models as Nanda, Narayanan, and Warther (2000) just assume managerial ability
is known by investors. The conclusions drawn by these studies, however, are not in line
with empirical ndings. Berk and Green (2004) is one of the closest to explain empirical
ndings. In their model, managers have dierent skill, which is unknown to investors.
Investors will choose to allocate ows in the best performing fund each period therefore
increasing the size of it. Managers suer from decreasing returns to scale, so as the
fund's Assets Under Management (AuM) increase, their delivered performance is lower.
In equilibrium, all funds produce the same alpha (risk-adjusted return) before costs, and
larger funds will be managed by more skilled managers.
Debate surrounding the eect of scale in the active portfolio management industry
has been long also on the empirical front. Liang (1999) and Koh, Koh, and Teo (2003)
document a positive relationship between size and performance in the hedge fund industry.
However, using more accurate techniques, a number of studies conclude the presence of
strong diminishing returns to scale in both mutual and hedge fund industries. Chen,
Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004) document that mutual fund returns, both before and
after fees, decline with lagged fund size. More recently, Pastor and Stambaugh (2012)
and Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2015) provide evidence on the presence of industry
and mutual fund decreasing returns to scale. In the hedge fund side, Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik (2009) nd a negative relationship between lagged size and subsequent returns.
Consistent with the industry increased competition and performance, Jetley and Ji (2010)
nd a decline in the average merger arbitrage spread of more than 400 bps from 2002.
Getmansky (2012) also point at a concave relationship between fund size and performance.
These ndings are not limited to the academic scope. Larger funds have been traditionally
outperformed by smaller funds also when using more descriptive data, as shown by recent
industry reports 2.
1Some studies (Gruber, 1996; Carhart, 1997; Zheng, 1999; Bollen and Busse, 2005) pointed out that
funds that received higher inows subsequently outperform. This eect is however short-lived and con-
centrated in low-liquidity sectors.
2See for example the 2011 PerTrac report on the 'Impact of Fund Size and Age on Hedge Fund
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The present study will build up on the scale and performance literature by analyzing
the role of fund size in merger arbitrage hedge funds performance across the merger wave
cycle. Hedge funds are one of the most exible investment partnerships that exist. If man-
agers are aware of the harmful eect of scale on their performance, they should optimally
decide their size (e.g. by closing the fund to new subscriptions) to maximize their returns.
The potential perverse eect of oversize on performance is an special concern for hedge
funds managers, given their compensations structures. For instance, the main component
of a mutual fund manager compensation involves a xed management fee over the fund's
total AuM. Such an structure introduces perverse incentives in the managerial contract,
where the manager may nd oversizing as privately optimal. Whereas performance-based
compensation is a minor concern for most mutual funds managers, it is one of the main
sources of income in the hedge fund industry. Hedge fund managers typically get compen-
sated through the commonly-refer-to as '2 and 20' structure. Mangers salary is composed
by a 2% fee on AuM, and a 20% incentive or performance fee. To earn the 20% fee on
gains, a hedge fund manager may have to overperform either a predened benchmark (if
the fund has a hurdle rate) and/or the fund's previous highest net asset value or NAV (if
the fund has a high-water mark provision). Unlike mutual funds, hedge fund managers
have clear incentives to seek maximizing investors money by setting up an optimal scale.
According to existing research, funds face diminishing returns to scale as a conse-
quence of two dierent, and probably complementary, eects. First, at the industry level,
increasing competition for arbitrage opportunities makes it harder to engage in protable
trades. Second, at the fund level, trading large stakes may result in self-provoked price
movements that harm performance. Both stories have to do with the availability of ar-
bitrage opportunities (i.e. liquidity) in the market. As existing trading opportunities
increase, the expected penalty for scale a fund is subject to suer is lower. Hedge fund
managers are really specialized and qualied individuals researching the market looking
for protable trades. Generally, is hard to measure the trading opportunity set for any
fund manager. Fortunately, this is not the case with merger arbitrage funds, whose trad-
ing opportunities are subject to the well-established phenomena of merger waves (e.g.,
Brealey and Myers, 2003; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Andrade, Mitchell, and Staord,
2001). Consequently, the present framework constitutes a perfect opportunity for the
researcher to study the behavior of hedge fund performance across dierent levels of fund
size, as well as dierent degrees of severity of the scale problem.
Mergers and acquisitions continue to be a central topic in the corporate nance lit-
erature. There is however still no consensus on the determinants of merger waves. Neo-
classical theories (Coase, 1937; Maksimovic and Phillips, 2001; Harford, 2005) point at
economic disturbance (such as a technology shock). On the other hand, behavioral the-
Performance'.
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ories (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003; Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005) call
attention to the positive correlation between takeover activity and stocks valuation. De-
spite the debate surrounding the determinants of waves, merger arbitrage has been proven
a very protable activity for players in the market, specially for hedge funds. One of the
rst studies on the subject, Larcker and Lys (1987), concludes that there exists clear
incentives for traders to acquire costly information on mergers, as 'arbs earn substantial
positive returns on their equity positions'. Dukes, Frohlich, and Ma (1992) document
excess annual returns for cash tender oers as high as 117% for arbitrageurs. Also in
the case of cash deals, Jindra and Walkling (2004) report annualized returns of 46.5%.
Mitchell and Pulvino (2001) analyze 4,750 mergers in the period 1963 to 1998. They
nd that, after transaction costs, a typical risk arbitrageur (or merger arbitrageur) would
make an excess return of four percent per year. Baker and Savasoglu (2002) report an
average annualized excess return of 9.6% for a sample of stock and cash mergers in the
period 1981-1996. Most of these studies argue that arbitrageurs play a passive role, either
by using their superior skill to select deals (Larcker and Lys, 1987) 3, or, more generally,
by naively investing in deals that would generate a prot as a consequence of 'the limits
to arbitrage' (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Passive arbitrageurs do not alter merger out-
comes. Theoretical models by Gomes (2001) and Cornelli and Li (2002) rst introduced
an active role for arbitrageurs. One of the main features in both models is the ability of
arbitrageurs to help overcome the 'free-rider problem' described in Grossman and Hart
(1980). Hsieh and Walkling (2005) use a simultaneous equation framework to study the
extent to which passive and active theories are mutually exclusive. They found evidence
supporting the existence of both roles, as well as substantial positive returns earned by
arbitrageurs, and their key role in the market for corporate control.
In this framework, I study hedge fund size and performance interrelations within the
merger arbitrage investment style. Specically, I analyze the performance of dierent size
portfolios (as proxied by fund's AuM) in the context of the merger wave cycle. Given
the vast empirical evidence on the harmful eect of size on performance and the absolute
discretion of hedge fund managers in accepting new subscriptions, there must be a good
reason why large funds exist in practice. These potential benets of large funds must arise
more prominently when the harmful eect of scale is lower. This is, when the number
of arbitrage opportunities in the market is higher, namely, during merger waves. My
baseline empirical results are consistent with these idea. Large funds deliver higher raw
and risk-adjusted performance during waves, but perform poorly when corporate activity
becomes lower. The magnitude of this outperformance with respect to small funds is
around 2.2% to 3.3% annually for equal and value weighted portfolios, respectively, and
3Some studies, as Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011), document a certain degree of predictability
in merger outcomes, specially for bidder candidacy that may be explained by the superior information
arbitrageurs employ.
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of 1.5% to almost 3% with respect to a portfolio containing the universe of all hedge
funds, evaluated under the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model.
While the empirical observation of poor performance from large funds (relative to
small) when scale problems are aggravated is in line with the capacity constraints story,
the fact that these funds deliver exceptional performance during merger waves poses an
interesting question as to which are the benets or advantages of larger funds. Specically,
I discuss two potential explanations for this outperformance. First, consistent with theo-
ries in Berk and Green (2004), larger funds may be managed by more skilled managers.
Because merger arbitrage hedge fund returns closely follow the merger cycle, temporary
deviations from the equilibrium (where all funds deliver the same alpha) may arise. Un-
der this hypothesis, managerial incentives for oversizing come solely from the increase in
xed compensation (management fee) as a percentage of AuM. Second, larger funds may
be able to access higher skill in the form of superior resources (e.g., a complex quant
department, cutting edge research, etc.). By 'purchasing' skill managers enhance their
performance over their peers. The large and xed nature of these investments, however,
makes them only aordable to larger funds, thereby providing managers with incentives
for size growth. By growing large, hedge fund managers can boost their performance by
acquiring extra resources, but, in turn, underperform with respect to other funds when
the number of trading opportunities in the market is lower.
As with every other empirical work, the validity of the hypothesis is conditional on
the rejection of alternative explanations. Unfortunately, the present project presents an
undesirable characteristic towards the main variable of interest. We only observe a funds'
net performance. Therefore, the amount of investment in fund resources that each man-
ager uses is untraceable. The 'purchased skill' hypothesis explains the puzzling empirical
evidence but can only be strengthen by discarding alternative feasible explanations. Some
additional tests show that the hypothesis is robust to other mechanisms such as funds dy-
namically shifting in size (which could indicate some degree of superior managerial skill),
database biases in liquidated and not reporting funds or alternative performance models.
Additionally, Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009) highlighted the importance of fund and
manager characteristics and their impact in returns. In this setting, the main concern is
that the dierences in performance across large and small funds would be due to distinct
fund and manager characteristics. Robustness test shows that disparity in delivered alpha
to investors cannot be explained by these characteristics.
This paper contributes to dierent strands of the literature on size and performance.
First, to the best of my knowledge, I introduce a novel scenario where managerial incen-
tives to become oversize, even in the hedge fund industry, exist. When trades are highly
scalable, managerial strategic behavior may arise as consequence of new technology (extra
resources) only available to larger funds. Second, I show how these managerial incentives
have a direct eect on delivered performance. Investors should be aware of the dynamic
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equilibrium in the industry before allocating their funds, as the optimal allocation changes
along the trading opportunity set. Lastly, the results of this study are also relevant to
policy makers. Hedge funds have long been on the spotlight of a rough regulatory debate.
Regulators must be aware of these practices that, for example, may justify the existence
of large management companies.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the data
used in this study. Section 3.3 provides a description of the dierent methodologies to
assess performance and a summary of results. Section 3.4 describes the main hypothesis
and discuss the validity of each. Section 3.5 includes dierent robustness tests, and
Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Data
Data on hedge fund performance and characteristics is provided by Hedge Fund Research
Inc.(HFR). The HFR database is based on surveys to managers under voluntary disclo-
sure. As hedge funds are prohibited from public advertising, reporting to the database
becomes important for two main reasons. First, managers can disclose for marketing pur-
poses. Second, as a growing number of funds report, not doing it can be interpreted as
a bad signal (managers only reporting when good performance to attract ows). HFR
comprises information on fund performance, assets under management (AuM), fund fees
or age. Unfortunately, it does not include the Net Assets Value (NAV) gure for all
funds. I will follow the procedure used by the TASS database 4 to backll NAVs. Fund
performance information is covered from 1992, keeping track of dead funds from 1994
onwards. By May 17, 2010, HFR covered 10,931 hedge funds 5, 4,427 of them active,
6,504 dead. I impose a number of lters in this sample. First, I only keep funds that
report performance net of all fees (99.79%), report returns in US Dollars (96.36%), report
assets under management for all periods and report on a monthly basis.
I further restrict the sample by dropping the years 1992 and 1993, when HFR did not
keep track of dead funds. Additionally, HFR Inc. warns that "the trailing four months
of performance are subject to revision as HFR revises updates from lagged funds". For
this reason I also drop the year 2010. Given the 1994-2009 period, I demand each fund
to have 3 lags of annual variables to stay in the sample. This last requirement introduces
a multi-period sampling bias that is, however, a need for researchers(Agarwal and Naik,
2005). Fung and Hsieh (2000) results show that this bias is smaller when using the 3 year
4TASS assigns some hypothetical initial NAV (most often 1000, which is the one I use) to backll
missing information. A detailed study on the dierent databases is provided in Liang (2000).
5Not included in this gure are 4,102 Funds of funds present in HFR.
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requirement.
The nal sample of hedge funds in the period 1994 to 2009 include 3,543 funds, with
1,645 active funds, 879 not reporting and 1,019 liquidated6. Out of these funds, only 81 (30
active, 39 liquidated and 12 not reporting) classify themselves into the merger arbitrage
strategy. Table 3.1 summarizes information on fund performance.
Table 3.1: Summary statistics: Hedge Fund returns
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Sharpe
HFR (Equal weigths) 0.75 1.92 0.40
HFR (Value weights) 0.63 1.68 0.38
Equally Weighted portfolio 0.59 1.83 0.32
Value Weighted portfolio 0.53 1.76 0.30
Big (pctile 80) Equally weighted 0.50 1.71 0.29
Small (pctile 20) Equally weighted 0.69 1.98 0.35
Big (pctile 80) Value weighted 0.52 1.78 0.29
Small (pctile 20) Value weighted 0.68 1.99 0.34
Big (>$500m) Equally weighted 0.54 1.88 0.29
Small (<$100m) Equally weighted 0.62 1.89 0.33
Big (>$500m) Value weighted 0.57 2.05 0.28
Small (<$100m) Value weighted 0.55 1.84 0.30
Number of observations 192
Notes: This table summarizes the main statistics for Hedge Funds returns
under the merger arbitrage style. HFR corresponds to a portfolio formed
with all funds (see data section) in the HFR Database. The rest are all
funds under the merger arbitrage strategy. Disentangle between big and
small is done according to the overall distribution of merger arbitrage AuM
(percentiles 20 and 80) and according to the industry standard values for
this denitions (less than $100m and more than $500m). Time period is
1994-2009.
To proxy for the number of trading opportunities available in the market, I use a
variable based on mergers and acquisitions frequency. Unlike in the case of hedge fund
performance, ltering is not a major concern for this sample. As I am only interested in
the peaks and valleys of the merger wave, this is, the merger and acquisition frequency by
month, I withdraw from Thompson Reuters SDC Platinum every worldwide transaction
in the period 1994-2009. The monthly variable accounting for merger frequency will
be dened as the sumation of all deals occurring eectively each month 7. Table 3.2
summarizes the main information for merger and acquisitions data by year, and Fig.3.1
provides graphical evidence of the wave phenomena.
6HFR makes a distinction between dead funds: liquidated and not reporting. Those may be equivalent
in many cases
7For robustness purposes, I run the analysis with two other variables capturing trading opportunities:
announced deals and deal dollar value. Neither of them lead to a qualitative nor quantitative change of
results.
3.3. Measuring performance 95
Table 3.2: Summary statistics: M&A deals
year Mean 25th Median 75th Maximum Minimum
1994 632.58 604.5 619 663.5 882 448
1995 728.08 675.5 736 751 909 619
1996 841.08 762.5 846.5 871 996 718
1997 961.75 841 928.5 1047.5 1346 759
1998 1055.33 975 1071 1158 1228 797
1999 1084.17 977.5 1068 1168.5 1406 901
2000 1176.67 1108 1149.5 1213.5 1479 982
2001 941.42 859.5 975 992.5 1069 805
2002 827.92 750.5 853 889.5 1000 683
2003 892.08 792 863.5 949 1283 716
2004 1003.83 875.5 968 1043 1373 843
2005 1089.75 1017.5 1118 1144.5 1335 868
2006 1183.33 1104.5 1194 1233.5 1378 1006
2007 1332.92 1245.5 1307 1444.5 1589 1062
2008 1267.5 1143.5 1253.5 1368 1598 1055
2009 1017 892 974.5 1105 1436 810
All 1002.21 843.5 993 1148.5 1598 448
Notes: This table shows the summary statistics for the variable of monthly
number of deals. This is, the number of deals aggregated at the month level.
3.3 Measuring performance
To accurately asses hedge fund performance, I rely on the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor
model.8 In this seven-factor model, excess returns are regressed over seven dierent
factors that are considered to have large explanatory power of hedge fund returns. From
its publication, the dierent factors used have been subject to modications. One of the
main critics to the original model is in Sadka (2010), mainly due to the untradability
of some factors. Following Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010) I replace the
non-tradable factors for tradable ones.
The nal seven factors used in this analysis are the excess return of the S&P 500
index (SnP); a Size factor as the dierence in returns between the Wilshire Small Cap
1750 Index and the Wilshire Large Cap 750 Index; the returns of a portfolio of lookback
straddles on currencies futures (PTFSFX ), on commodities futures (PTFSCOM ) and
on bond futures (PTFSBD); the excess return of the Fama Treasury Bond portfolio
with maturities higher than 10 years (Bd10yr); and a Credit Spread factor, calculated as
the dierence between the returns of the CitiGroup BBB 10+ year Index and the Fama
Treasury portfolio. The main measure of performance therefore will be the alpha of the
following model in Eq. 3.1:
Ri;t = i + i;1SnPt + i;2Sizet + i;3PTFSFXt + i;4PTFSComt
+i;5PTFSBdt + i;610yrTBt + i;7CreditSpreadt + i;t
(3.1)
8In the robustness section, I drop from this model the trend following factors, as argued in Jetley and
Ji (2010), with no signicant change in results. These trend-following factors consist on the return of
three portfolios of lookback straddles on foreign exchange futures, commodities futures and bond futures,
respectively.
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Table 3.3 shows the risk-adjusted performance of merger arbitrage funds, as well as
the HFR portfolio, over the period 1994-2009. First thing to notice is how the merger ar-
bitrage strategy does not outperform the portfolio containing all of the strategies (HFR).
The equally weighted portfolio of merger arbitrage funds (MA henceforth) produces a
monthly risk-adjusted return in the period 1994-2009 of 0.43%, the HFR portfolio gener-
ates 0.65%. When we compare the value weighted portfolios however the abnormal return
is similar and close to 0.53%. Interestingly, the value-weighted MA portfolio outperforms
the equally-weighted by 0.1% a month, suggesting large funds (by AuM) perform slightly
better in the overall period.
To further assess the size-performance relationship I conform two portfolios of big
and small funds. This performance is also reported in Table 3.3. Specically, I study the
performance of equal and value weighted portfolios of big funds (dened as those above the
80th percentile of the distribution by AuM) in columns 3 and 5 of Table 3.3, respectively.
Similarly, I show the results from performance evaluation of equal and value weighted
portfolios of small funds (those within the 20th percentile of the distribution of AuM)
in columns 4 and 6, respectively. All portfolios are re-balanced monthly. Similar to the
results from raw returns in Table 3.1, there are no signicant dierences in performance
for the whole sample period between big and small funds when looking at equally weighted
portfolios. In the case of value-weights, big funds exhibit an overperformance over small
funds in terms of alpha (0.54% vs. 0.46%). Combining all these preliminary results, it
seems that, contrary to the classic result, MA hedge funds suer less than funds under
other investment styles from diseconomies of scale. I will explore this nding in detail in
forward sections.
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3.3.1 Merger Wave and Performance
Recent literature (see Pastor and Stambaugh, 2012; Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor, 2015)
on active management funds' size argues two complementary hypothesis characterizing
scale and performance links: fund-level and industry-level decreasing returns to scale.
Both hypothesis are explained by liquidity issues. The trading performed by a larger fund
can result in the fund self-eroding its performance due to the size of the stakes traded.
At the industry level, more money chasing investment opportunities (more competition)
results in a greater diculty to engage in protable trades. The liquidity story explains
how a big fund can be less protable when trades are not easy to execute optimally
(because a lot of players move prices faster, or because selling a larger stake quickly drops
the price at which to execute the next trade). There is however no consideration for an
outperformance by larger funds. The way in which decreasing returns to scale damage
fund performance is a question closely related to the existence of arbitrage opportunities
potentially exploited. The more restricted allocation for investments, the more harmful
the size eect on fund performance is. The main diculty for the average fund is how to
measure the availability of trading opportunities, as it is largely unobservable.
Fortunately this is not the case with merger arbitrage funds. The main goal of these
funds is to prot from the so-called merger arbitrage spread. Their trades typically
consists on a long position in a target rm and a short position on a bidder rm during
a takeover process. There is no reason to think these funds are proting (at least not as
a major source of their gains) from other type of investments. First, funds self-select into
this category, which is homogeneous to other investment styles in all kind of observable
variables 9. Second, most of the funds under this style are part of larger asset management
companies, each one with a number of funds in other strategies.
The fact that merger and acquisitions occur in waves (see Figure 3.1) provides a
perfect setting for evaluating the performance of these funds controlling for the available
investment opportunities in the market. Given the distribution of mergers and acquisitions
in the period 1994-2009 (see Table 3.2), I dene periods of high merger frequency as those
months with more than 1148.5 deals (75th percentile) taking place. Similarly, months
with less than 843.5 deals (25th percentile) occurring are dened as low merger frequency
periods. To explore the extent to which fund size aects performance in a setting with
variable number of arbitrage opportunities I construct four portfolios containing big and
small (by AuM) funds respectively. I classify funds into the big and small categories
by rst considering the top and bottom quintiles of the size distribution. I extend this
classication, following industry standards 10, by considering big funds as those who
9By self-selecting into the merger arbitrage strategy funds do not have any advantage (tax treatment,
capital requirements, ...) whatsoever.
10See the PerTrac report on 'Impact of Fund Size and Age on Hedge Fund Performance'.
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manage more than $500 million in assets and small those with investment discretion
below $100 million. For each of these methods I construct a value and an equally-weighted
portfolio that are re-balanced monthly.
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Figure 3.1: The Merger Wave Cycle 1994-2009
If a funds' performance truly depends on the available trading opportunities, expect-
edly, the performance of big funds will improve from low M&A periods to high. Small
funds should also react to changes in arbitrage opportunities, but the eect is expected to
be insignicant if its size is suciently small. As it requires a lower number of investment
opportunities to constrain a small fund investments, the marginal benet of an increase in
the size of the investment opportunity set should be smaller. To evaluate this hypothesis I
perform a performance analysis for the low and high M&A subperiods. Table 3.4 contains
the results from portfolio analysis on raw returns for in and out-wave periods.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics: Raw returns and merger wave
Portfolio Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Big (5th Quintile) In-Wave 1.05% 2.54 -10.03% 24.32% 462
Small (1st Quintile) In-Wave 0,69% 1.73 -10.16% 15.49% 462
Big (5th Quintile) Out-Wave 0.40% 1.37 -5.68% 6.87% 265
Small (1st Quintile) Out-Wave 0.45% 2.03 -8.5% 14.00% 265
Big (>$500 million) In-Wave 0.94% 3.00 -10.03% 23.62% 216
Small (<$100 million) In-Wave 0.72% 1.71 -10.16% 15.49% 1617
Big (>$500 million) Out-Wave 0.48% 1.52 -2.14% 5.02% 20
Small (<$100 million) Out-Wave 0.47% 1.71 -9.4% 14.00% 1091
Notes: This table shows the raw performance of size-sorted portfolios for dierent levels
of corporate activity. See section on performance and portfolio construction for details
on portfolio description.
Results on Table 3.4 for raw returns are in line with the notion of large funds suering
from decreasing returns to scale out-wave. In addition, large funds appear to outperform
during in-wave periods. However, to the extent that these results can be driven by higher
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risk-taking or market conditions, conclusions must be taken carefully. In order to assess
whether this dierences are reduced (or amplied) by dierences in exposure to known
risk factors, I proceed to analyze risk-adjusted performance in the next sections.
Out-wave performance
Consistent with decreasing returns to scale, I expect small funds to outperform in times
where the existence of arbitrage opportunities is limited (lower m&a frequency). Big
funds should underperform in these times, as their larger size erodes their performance.
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the performance of the dierent portfolios of funds for those
periods of low merger activity for dierent classications of funds into the small and big
portfolios.
Table 3.5: Portfolio performance MA funds and HFR portfolio. Out-wave periods.
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
S&P 0.117 0.142 0.211 0.208 0.179 0.175 0.222
(2.44) (1.92) (1.94) (1.87) (1.40) (1.45) (4.38)
Size 0.0816 0.119 0.248 0.240 0.0452 0.0347 0.249
(1.64) (1.55) (2.20) (2.08) (0.34) (0.28) (4.74)
PTFSBD -0.00645 -0.0173 -0.0345 -0.0333 -0.00513 -0.00144 0.00261
(-0.81) (-1.41) (-1.91) (-1.80) (-0.24) (-0.07) (0.31)
PTFSFX -0.00604 -0.00137 -0.00923 -0.00801 -0.0368 -0.0365 0.00809
(-1.06) (-0.16) (-0.72) (-0.61) (-2.44) (-2.56) (1.34)
PTFSCOM -0.0123 -0.00989 -0.0181 -0.0165 0.0142 0.0179 0.0385
(-1.19) (-0.62) (-0.77) (-0.69) (0.52) (0.69) (3.53)
Bd10Yr 0.0507 0.0815 0.0828 0.0811 0.00172 0.0210 0.130
(0.83) (0.87) (0.60) (0.58) (0.01) (0.14) (2.03)
CreditSpread -0.00398 0.000493 -0.131 -0.101 -0.0246 -0.00822 0.236
(-0.04) (0.00) (-0.60) (-0.45) (-0.10) (-0.03) (2.31)
 0.379 0.352 0.252 0.272 0.550 0.481 0.697
(2.85) (1.72) (0.84) (0.88) (1.56) (1.45) (4.96)
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.359 0.271 0.305 0.285 0.200 0.211 0.724
Notes: This table shows the excess return of dierent portfolios of hedge funds regressed over the 7 factors in Fung and
Hsieh (2004), for out-wave periods. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage Funds.
The Small and Big portfolios are build using the top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance. See the
Data section for an accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t
statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
As shown in columns 3 and 4 in Table 3.5, big funds do not deliver a signicant risk-
adjusted performance in periods of low corporate activity. Small funds abnormal return
during this period is also not signicant, but really close to the signicance threshold of
10% (t-stat of 1.56), and doubling the performance by big (0.55 vs. 0.25 on monthly
percentage points). As periods of low merger activity can most likely coincide with pe-
riods where there are less hedge funds operating, quintile selection may include a lot of
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median size funds (as dene by industry standards 11) into the small and big portfo-
lios. Alternatively, I classify small and big funds attending to the absolute value of their
AuM. Consequently, small (big) funds will be those with AuM below (above) $100 ($500)
million. The results from the portfolio analysis under this classication are provided in
Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Portfolio performance MA funds and HFR portfolio. Out-wave periods.
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
S&P 0.117 0.142 0.0162 0.0160 0.116 0.140 0.222
(2.44) (1.92) (0.41) (0.39) (2.39) (1.97) (4.38)
Size 0.0816 0.119 0.0861 0.0854 0.0835 0.129 0.249
(1.64) (1.55) (2.09) (2.03) (1.67) (1.76) (4.74)
PTFSBD -0.00645 -0.0173 0.00680 0.00690 -0.00689 -0.0203 0.00261
(-0.81) (-1.41) (1.03) (1.02) (-0.86) (-1.73) (0.31)
PTFSFX -0.00604 -0.00137 -0.000864 -0.000731 -0.00667 -0.00417 0.00809
(-1.06) (-0.16) (-0.18) (-0.15) (-1.16) (-0.50) (1.34)
PTFSCOM -0.0123 -0.00989 0.0140 0.0143 -0.0126 -0.0113 0.0385
(-1.19) (-0.62) (1.64) (1.64) (-1.21) (-0.74) (3.53)
Bd10Yr 0.0507 0.0815 0.0631 0.0629 0.0578 0.0947 0.130
(0.83) (0.87) (1.25) (1.23) (0.94) (1.05) (2.03)
CreditSpread -0.00398 0.000493 0.260 0.263 -0.00666 -0.0589 0.236
(-0.04) (0.00) (3.24) (3.23) (-0.07) (-0.41) (2.31)
 0.379 0.352 -0.322 -0.319 0.379 0.336 0.697
(2.85) (1.72) (-2.92) (-2.84) (2.83) (1.71) (4.96)
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.359 0.271 0.422 0.419 0.363 0.300 0.724
Notes: This table shows the excess return of dierent portfolios of hedge funds regressed over the 7 factors in Fung and
Hsieh (2004), for out-wave periods. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage Funds.
The Small and Big portfolios are build with funds below $100 and above $500 million in AuM, respectively, with monthly
rebalance. See the Data section for an accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. Sample
period is 1994-2009. t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
The classication according to absolute value of AuM also has its drawbacks. Lack of
representativeness and an unbalanced panel are the most important ones. Nonetheless,
selecting funds according to standalone values for their AuM does a more accurate job in
terms of disentangling median funds from extremes. When using this methodology the
overperformance exhibit by small funds is more clear (see columns 5 and 6 in Table 3.6).
12. During periods when trading opportunities are more restricted, small funds deliver
a positive and highly signicant risk-adjusted return. Lastly, in line with returns to
scale evidence, equal weighted portfolio performs better than value weighted (0.379% vs
11Henceforth, by using the expression 'industry standards' to refer to size denition I mean the classi-
cation by PerTrac in their report 'Impact of Fund Size and Age on Hedge Fund Performance'.
12In this case, only the performance by the small portfolios can be taken as robust enough. Given the
time period analyzed there are some months in which only one or none big funds exist/report. For this
reason the performance under this methodology for big funds may not be representative enough.
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0.336%).
In-wave performance
As available opportunities for prot increase so should the performance delivered by hedge
funds. During periods of high corporate activity both large and small funds should in-
crease their performance relative to low merger frequency periods. Once scale is not a
major concern (relative to investment opportunities) managers from big and small funds
can deliver their true alpha in terms of the Berk and Green (2004) model. Similarly to
the out-wave case, Table 3.7 contain the results from performance analysis of equal and
value-weighted portfolios of small and big funds according to the distribution of AuM.13
Table 3.7: Portfolio performance MA funds and HFR portfolio. In-wave periods.
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
S&P 0.0791 0.000711 0.0240 -0.0147 0.108 0.0940 0.285
(2.18) (0.01) (0.31) (-0.17) (2.96) (2.64) (3.91)
Size -0.0108 -0.0306 -0.0274 -0.0333 -0.0158 -0.00923 0.106
(-0.31) (-0.45) (-0.38) (-0.42) (-0.46) (-0.28) (1.55)
PTFSBD -0.000514 -0.00465 -0.0149 -0.00719 0.00904 0.0116 0.00743
(-0.04) (-0.19) (-0.58) (-0.25) (0.74) (0.97) (0.30)
PTFSFX 0.00782 0.0135 0.0122 0.0154 0.0130 0.0110 -0.0189
(1.00) (0.87) (0.74) (0.84) (1.66) (1.44) (-1.21)
PTFSCOM 0.00154 0.00646 0.00492 0.00697 -0.00863 -0.00891 0.00841
(0.18) (0.39) (0.27) (0.35) (-1.02) (-1.08) (0.50)
Bd10Yr -0.0331 0.0288 0.0143 0.0443 -0.0339 -0.0456 -0.168
(-0.63) (0.28) (0.13) (0.36) (-0.65) (-0.89) (-1.59)
CreditSpread 0.244 0.188 0.143 0.159 0.235 0.218 0.187
(3.40) (1.32) (0.94) (0.95) (3.27) (3.10) (1.30)
 0.585 0.796 0.737 0.838 0.555 0.562 0.611
(5.07) (3.48) (3.01) (3.11) (4.81) (4.98) (2.64)
N 48 48 48 48 48 48 48
R2 0.588 0.074 0.062 0.043 0.637 0.609 0.668
Notes: This table shows the excess return of dierent portfolios of hedge funds regressed over the 7 factors in Fung and
Hsieh (2004), for in-wave periods. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage Funds.
The Small and Big portfolios are build using the top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance. See the
Data section for an accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t
statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
As predicted, all portfolios increase their risk-adjusted performance relative to out-
wave periods (except the HFR portfolio, which reports similar performance across all
periods). More specically, the equally (value) weighted portfolio of big funds delivers
13For the sake of space, and given that the results are really similar, I do not include the performance
analysis of portfolios classied under the absolute values of AuM. These results are available upon request.
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a highly signicant monthly alpha of 0.74% (0.84%). This number entails a sizable out-
performance with respect to the portfolios containing small funds. The magnitude of
this overperformance ranges from 0.2% to 0.28% monthly for equally and value weighted
portfolios, respectively. Large funds also outperform the HFR portfolio by 0.13 and 0.23
monthly percentage points, as well as portfolios containing all merger arbitrage funds.
These results are, rst, consistent with the predictions of decreasing returns to scale
theory. Managers do a better job allocating funds when they are not constrained by
limited availability of opportunities in the market. While this evidence reinforces the
view on the concave relationship between fund size and performance, a more interest-
ing result emerges from the outperformance of big funds in times where their size does
not pose a problem to performance. There are two main stories that may explain this
overperformance over other funds. I discuss them in the next section.
3.4 Hypotheses Development
In this section I discuss potential sources from the observed over-performance of large
funds in times when their size does not drag their performance. Specically, I will con-
sider two possible explanations. First, managers from larger funds may simply be, as in
Berk and Green (2004) model, more skilled. Whereas, on average, the negative association
between scale and performance impedes that superior skill leads to superior performance,
in times when the harmful eect of scale is mitigated, managers are able to reveal their
exceptional abilities. Alternatively, I argue that managers with higher investment dis-
cretion as measured by AuM are able to bear higher internal xed costs, which enables
them to 'purchase' skill in the form of superior resources. As before, superior performance
manifests when scale problems are not an issue, as trading opportunities in the market
are suciently high.
3.4.1 Are managers from larger funds more skilled?
In their model Berk and Green (2004) predict that larger mutual funds are managed by
more skilled managers who earn higher fees. Large funds however suer from diseconomies
of scale so that investors returns chasing behavior produce an equilibrium in which all
managers have the same expected return 14. Although this explanation is in line with
my empirical results, there are some key aspects in which my setting diers from Berk
and Green (2004). These dierences basically lie in the distinction between mutual fund
14Investors will allocate ows to the best performing fund until its size reaches a point in which
diseconomies of scale make expected return from best manager equal to the second best manager's
return. Consequently, ows will be allocated equally in best and second best funds so that their expected
return equals the one from the third best fund. The result of this continuous process will end up with all
funds delivering same expected return. For details check Berk and Green (2004)
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and hedge funds. Berk and Green (2004) use mutual funds as their benchmark for active
management in their model. Therefore, there are two key features from the hedge fund
world that gain prime importance in my setting: managerial discretion over incoming
ows (the manager can close the fund to new subscriptions with full discretion) and
compensation structure.
One of the key dierences between mutual fund and hedge funds lie in the managerial
compensation structure. Mutual fund managers have smaller (or even no fee at all)
performance-based fee. This translates into a primary concern to deliver good performance
to their investors just in order to attract ows and maximize their dollar compensation
amount through the xed management fee over AuM. Instead, hedge fund managers are
typically rewarded through the well-known 2 (as percentage of AuM, i.e. management
fee) and 20 (percentage over gains, i.e. incentive fee) structure fee. An incentive fee of
20% seems enough for the hedge fund manager to not so willingly sacrice return for size
(AuM), and therefore optimally deciding to close new subscriptions once a certain fund
size is reached. In this sense, hedge fund managers' incentives to overreach the fund's
optimal size, and consequently suer severely decreasing returns to scale, are diminished
when the manager is truly skilled. To this extent, talented managers appear to be better
o in a medium size fund, where they can still collect large amounts in xed fees over
AuM, while mitigating the harmful eect of size on delivered performance.
Ideally, skilled managers would like to shift from a small fund in times of low corporate
activity to a larger fund during a merger wave, managing investors ows to maximize
expected return. The occurrence of this optimal shifting however is unlikely. First, for
gaining size, managers need the ability to collect millions of dollars in a relatively short
time span. Second, once the merger wave is over, reducing the fund size in a drastic
manner is also problematic due to allocation issues, as well as investors redemption and
lockup periods. One possible way that would facilitate this shifting is the existence of
a 'parent' fund that optimally allocates ows among the dierent funds it owns. As
most of these MA funds belong to larger investment companies, size shifting could occur
in practice. I check for the presence of such size shifting in the robustness section (see
Section 3.5.1 and results in Table 3.8). Overall, optimal size-shifting does not occur very
often, pointing at alternative explanations for managerial overperformance.
A second prediction to investigate from Berk and Green (2004) is that managers from
larger funds charge higher fees. In practice, managerial compensation in the hedge fund
framework is the result of a bargaining between managers and investors, based on, among
others, past performance (see Agarwal and Ray, 2012; Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach, 2016).
The result of this process should lead to more skilled managers charging higher fees,
as they have higher bargaining power. I investigate whether managerial compensation
structure (i.e., fees), as well as other fund characteristics, diverge between large and small
funds, as well as its impact on delivered performance. These results are developed in
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depth in Section 3.5.2 and Table 3.9. In my sample, managerial compensation structure
in large funds exhibits no signicant dierence with respect to that of smaller funds.
Taking all these considerations into account, evidence presented on merger arbitrage
hedge funds is not explained by the sole assertion of higher managerial skill.
3.4.2 The 'purchased skill' hypothesis
If good managers seem to be better o in a medium-size fund, the question that remains
is why large funds, who suer from important diseconomies of scale, exist is practice. In
this section, I propose an alternative explanation that is not only in line with empirical
observations, but also incorporates managerial incentives for growing into a larger fund.
This hypothesis provides a simple answer, large funds 'purchase skill'. Managers from
large funds may optimally decide to undertake some within fund investments that help
them in their investment decision process. To put this in simple terms think of a large
fund with an important, state-of-the-art, research department. Managers will prot from
better information quality (e.g. in terms of assessing deal completion risk, or merger
anticipation) 15 with a direct positive impact on the protability of their trades. In turn,
these resources imply high xed costs 16.
Managers charge management and incentive fees over gross returns of the fund. Man-
agement fees serve to cover a funds' costs (in terms of employees, brokerage fees, etc.) as
well as managers' salary. As these fees are collected over AuM, the larger the fund is, the
more the manager collects in dollar amount, and therefore the more is able to dedicate to
purchase skill without sacricing her own salary. Unfortunately, net returns reported are
already discounted for fund every expense (including brokerage or accounting fees, among
others). Although we do have information regarding the fees each fund charges, this data
is percentage terms (over AuM) rather than in total money value. This implies that (1)
we are unable to trace the amount of these costs, but (2) constitutes a direct incentive
for managers to grow in size, creating a direct impact in fund returns.
Although investing in such resources can be highly protable for funds, it also in-
volves some pitfalls. First, these resources are extremely costly. Hiring a bunch of experts
in the area to do quality research requires a high compensation for these individuals.
Acquiring cutting-edge technology that entails a real advantage is similarly expensive.
Independently of these resources being technological or human capital advantages, the
investment made on them will have an important eect on funds protability. Second,
15Several studies have shown how merger and acquisition processes are subject to be anticipated. This
is the most straight-forward way to think of the advantages for the manager. See for example Harford
(2005), Cornett, Tanyeri, and Tehranian (2011) or Duchin and Schmidt (2013) for recent studies on
predicting merger outcomes.
16These costs could, for example, be related to technological capabilities, as well as higher salaries for
more specialized employees.
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these costs are xed (or have a sizable xed component) across time periods so the man-
ager cannot dynamically change the investment on them. Human resources will demand
job stability through relatively long-term contracts, whereas technological advantages are
xed by denition. Despite these drawbacks, investing in superior resources can be spe-
cially protable in the merger arbitrage industry, where trades are highly scalable. Given
these features, the acquisition of these resources is an investment limited to the pool of
large funds as the high costs make them unaordable for small funds.
Managers decide on the fund strategic investments according not only to the return
they can generate, but on their private benets. By increasing the benets from the
xed fee (via higher AuM), they jeopardize the collection of their incentive fee. These
trade-o will determine whether an individual manager decides to grow in size (AuM),
or, rather, close to new investments. Managers maximize their discounted expected gains
from both management and incentive fees across time. The maximization problem is
mathematically dene in Eq. 3.2, where ManagFee is a function of AuM, and IncFee is a
function of current and past performance (that depends on AuM as well).
argmax
AuM
E0 (
nX
t=0
ManagFeet) + E0 (
nX
t=0
IncFeet) (3.2)
In equilibrium, by maximizing private benets, managers will simultaneously decide
on size and, to some extent, future performance 17. In order for the manager to 'purchase
skill', Eq. 3.3 must meet. This is, the expected private gains for the manager must be
higher by investing in these resources (I=1 ) than without them (I=0 ).
E0 (
nX
t=0
ManagFeeit j I = 0) + E0 (
nX
t=0
IncFeeit j I = 0) 6
E0 (
nX
t=0
ManagFeeit j I = 1) + E0 (
nX
t=0
IncFeeit j I = 1)
(3.3)
For an equilibrium where large funds choose to exist, Eq. 3.4 must meet. The expected
value of private benets for the manager if she chooses small size (i 2 S) must be lower
17Notice that another equilibrium can meet if managers bargain on the level of fees, as pointed out
in Agarwal and Ray (2012) and Lim, Sensoy, and Weisbach (2016). However, in this specic setting,
may not be viable. Adjusting size through negotiation on fees takes time, as you depend on investors
decisions to allocate ows. On top of that, many investors will face lockup or restriction periods that
may invalidate this mechanism. Also, there is no evidence of variation in fees in the current sample.
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or equal than the expected value of private benets when funds grow large (i 2 L) and
decide to undertake internal investments. Notice that funds being small or large (and
purchasing skill) are just the two extreme cases. Empirically, medium size funds will not
match neither of these cases. However, they will be better o in either of them. Medium
size funds suer from less scale issues than larger funds (still outperformed by small
in out-wave periods), but they will not be able to undertake internal investments and
therefore will not be able to outperform in-wave.
E0 (
nX
t=0
ManagFeei2St j I = 0) + E0 (
nX
t=0
IncFeei2St j I = 0) 6
E0 (
nX
t=0
ManagFeei2Lt j I = 1) + E0 (
nX
t=0
IncFeei2Lt j I = 1)
(3.4)
These two discussed hypotheses explain the observed overperformance of large funds
when scale problems are mitigated. However, the existence of superior managerial tal-
ent in larger funds does not easily explain why managers fail to close the fund to new
subscriptions once a certain optimal size is reached. On the other hand, the 'purchased
skill' hypothesis derives predictions in line with managers' increasing incentives for higher
investment discretion, as larger size permits the acquisition of extra resources which, ulti-
mately, lead to outperformance. One main drawback in this analysis is the impossibility
to actually trace these costs in order to take a more denite stand towards one hypothesis
or the other. However, in the next section I analyze the robustness of the results, and
investigate whether the empirical observations suggest in favor of any of the hypotheses.
3.5 Robustness
In this section I perform dierent robustness tests to ensure that the results are not pro-
duced by alternative drivers of the eect. Specically, I start by considering the possibility
that funds change their size dynamically along the merger wave cycle. The presence of
this size-shifting would be consistent with managers from larger funds being more skilled,
hence deciding optimally the size of the fund given market conditions. Second, I inves-
tigate whether dierences in fund characteristics such fees, age, ows, or leverage can
explain the observed heterogeneity in returns from small and big funds. Third, I extend
the performance evaluation analysis by considering dierent models, including CAPM, as
well as Fama-French models with three, four, and 5 factors. Finally, I check whether fund
liquidation aect my results in any manner.
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Overall, the results from these robustness tests conrm my initial results, and suggest
that dierences in managerial skill or fund characteristics are not enough to explain the
empirical evidence.
3.5.1 Size Shifting
Best hedge fund managers may be able to squeeze merger arbitrage returns in every
point of the merger wave cycle by dynamically changing fund size. Although in practice
this shifting seems dicult to achieve (unless a parent investment company is allocating
ows discretionary among the family of funds), it is a potential counter-argument for the
'purchased skill' hypothesis and deserves some attention.
This alternative hypothesis predicts that managers have the discretionary power over
ows so as to achieve a time-varying optimal fund size. Managerial decisions seeking
optimal size will result in funds falling into the large category when high corporate activity,
while remaining small in times of low merger and acquisition frequency. If my results
were driven by more skilled managers that adapt their size to market conditions, I should
observe this size-shifting as funds successfully taking the 'right side'.
In order to account for the possible change in size I dene 2 dierent measures of
fund success when determining their size:
Success In-Wavei =
Number of Periods 'Big'i
Number of In-Wave periodsi
(3.5)
Where the in-wave success is just the ratio of the number of periods (months) fund i is
classied as Big during a merger wave, over the number of in-wave periods during which
fund i if alive. Similarly, success in the valley will be dened as the number of months
fund i falls into the Small category during valleys of the wave, over the number of valley
periods in fund's i lifetime.
Success Valleyi =
Number of Periods 'Small'i
Number of 'Valley' periodsi
(3.6)
In the sample, only 13 funds shift their size at some point in time. As this is a relatively
small amount of data (1,664 observations) I individually check for the level of success.
Table 3.8 shows the results from success measures of the 13 funds. Only 5 of these funds
exhibit positive success rate for both sides of the market. Among these, only fund with
code #0010 shows a high enough success rate so as to considered it driven by managerial
skill. For this fund I specically check the dates for changes in size. It turns out that this
fund only changed size once, November 2003, when the fund started growing and become
large enough to enter into the Big sample.
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Table 3.8: Success rate for funds that shift size.
Fund # Success Wave Obs.Wave Success Valley Obs. Valley
#0001 22.91% 48 27.08% 48
#0002 0.00% 46 4.00% 25
#0003 72.91% 48 12.5% 24
#0004 68.75% 48 38.01% 42
#0005 0.00% 14 0.00% 22
#0006 11.90% 42 0.00% 36
#0007 0.00% 45 4.76% 21
#0008 38.46% 13 0.00% 16
#0009 0.00% 11 40.00% 15
#0010 100.00% 34 56.25% 16
#0011 25.00% 48 3.84% 26
#0012 65.91% 44 0.00% 16
#0013 28.57% 21 0.00% 1
Mean 36.79% 48 16.23% 48
Notes: This table shows the rate of 'Success' for each of the funds that change size
in the sample period. 'Success' is measured as being small in size during out-wave
periods and large in-wave. For a more accurate description of the variables and
further analysis see the text. Time period spans 1994-2009.
Overall, even though most of my funds are part of larger investment companies, which
can act in favor of the size-shifting hypothesis, empirical ndings do not back the existence
of such strategic changes in sizer.
3.5.2 Fund Characteristics: Fees, Age, Flows, Leverage, ...
Next, I investigate whether dierences in fund characteristics can explain the dierences
in performance. Fund characteristics such as fees, age, ows or leverage have been shown
to signicantly impact performance (see Liang, 2000; Getmansky, 2012; Agarwal, Daniel,
and Naik, 2009). Regarding this matter, I check that both samples (big and small) do not
content critical dierences in characteristics that may explain the distinct performance.
The main concern relies not on the impact of characteristics, but on how dierent char-
acteristics across fund size levels can lead to dierent raw and risk-adjusted returns. To
address this potential problem, I perform two dierent robustness tests. First, I regress
fund performance on the set of dierent characteristics to analyze the extent to which
these dierences aect performance, and the direction of the eect. Second, I perform a
t-test for dierences in means between large and small funds on those characteristics that
signicantly impact performance.
Table 3.9 contains the results from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) regression analysis
and the dierence in means test. The observable variables linked to fund characteristics
are fund Age (measure from fund inception), Size (measure as AuM), Monthly Flow
18, Restriction and Lock-up periods, Hurdle rate, High-water mark (binary variable),
Management and Incentive fees, and Leverage (binary).
18Following Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2009), monthly ow is dened as the net dollar ow into the
3.5. Robustness 110
Table 3.9: Regression Analysis and t-test.
Fama-MacBeth (1973) T-test Dierences in means
Returnt (Small - Large)
(1) (2)
Aget 1 0.0000999 
(1.28) (-8.51)
Returnt 1 0.137 
(3.88) (-2.18)
Assetst 1 -0.00429 
(-2.04) (-32.27)
Monthly Flow -0.0465 -
(-2.54) (-0.43)
Restrict 0.00113 
(0.58) (-3.32)
Lockup Period 0.0154 
(2.04) (6.01)
Hurdle Rate 0.0415 
(0.46) (-9.22)
High-water Mark 0.0935 
(1.11) (-6.82)
Management Fee 0.125 -
(1.81) (1.25)
Incentive Fee 0.0114 -
(1.83) (0.84)
Leverage 0.103 
(1.93) (7.23)
Intercept -0.113
(-0.40)
No. obs. 8084 8084
Notes: This table shows the results from regressing fund return on a set
of observable characteristics under the Fama and MacBeth (1973) procedure.
Aget 1 accounts for time since fund's inception; Returnt 1 controls for serial
correlation of 1 month; Assetst 1 refer to fund size last month; Monthly
Flow is the ow the fund received last month (see the robustness section
for an accurate calculation of ow); Restrict and Lock-up accounts for days
the restriction and lockup periods of each fund lasts; Hurdle Rate, High-
water Mark and Leverage are variables with value 1 if a fund has each of the
mention characteristic and 0 otherwise; and Management and Incentive fees
are variables containing the value of these fees. Sample period is 1994-2009.
t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5%
and 10%, respectively.
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Column1inTable3.9reportstheresultsoftheFamaandMacBeth(1973)regression.
Column2showstheresultsofat-testfordiﬀerenceinmeansbetweengroupsoflargeand
smalfunds.Apositive(negative)andsigniﬁcantt-statisticinthiscolumnwilimplythat
themeanvalueforvariableXforsmalfundsissigniﬁcantlyhigher(lower)thanthemean
valueforvariableXforbigfunds. Asexpected,variablesMonthlyFlow,Management
FeeandIncentiveFeearerelevantinexplainingfundperformance,butthereexistno
signiﬁcantdiﬀerencebetweenthemeanvaluesofthosevariablesforlargeandsmalfunds,
thereforenotsupportingthealternativehypothesisforthisspeciﬁccharacteristics. Mean
valuesforRestrictionperiodandHurdleRatearesigniﬁcantlyhigherforBigfunds(as
denotedbyanegativet-stat),howevernoneofthemimpactreturnssigniﬁcantlyenough
sotogivesupporttoalternativehypotheses.Lock-upperiodandLeverageareboth
importantdeterminantsofperformancethataresigniﬁcantlydiﬀerentinsmalandbig
funds.Nonetheless,theybothhavepositiveregressioncoeﬃcientsandpositivevaluesfor
thet-statsinthet-test,meaningsmalfundsshouldinanycasebeneﬁtfromthesetwo.
AgeandHigh-waterMarkarebothsigniﬁcantlyhigherinbigthansmalfunds(t-stat
of-8.58and-6.82respectively). Thetwoofthemarehowevernotsigniﬁcantenough
toexplaindiﬀerencesinperformanceforoursubsampleofmergerarbitragefunds.The
remainingvariables,laggedAssetsundermanagementandlaggedReturns,accountfor
sizeandserialcorrelation.
Takentogether,theseresultssuggestthatheterogeneousperformancebetweenlarge
andsmalfundsisnotsolelyexplainedbydiﬀerencesinobservablefundcharacteristics.
3.5.3 Alternative modelsforassessingrisk-adjusted perfor-
mance
EventhoughFungandHsieh(2004)7-factormodelisstandardintheliterature,returns
producedbymergerarbitrageursmaydiﬀerconsiderablyfromtraditionalinvestmentsof
hedgefunds.Inordertoaccountforanypossiblebiasemergingfromtheusageofan
speciﬁcperformancemodel,Icheckhowthediﬀerentportfoliosofhedgefundsperform
underdiﬀerentperformanceevaluationmodels.
Table3.10containstheresultsforthecompleteperiodunderfourdiﬀerentmodels.
ThesespeciﬁcationsincludeaCAPMmodelwiththeS&P500indexasthemeasurefor
marketreturn;afour-factormodel(4-factors)equivalenttotheFungandHsieh7-factor
modelwithoutthe3factorsoflookbackstraddlesonbonds,commoditiesandforeign
fundatmontht,scaledbyAuMofthefundattheendofmontht-1,
Flowi,t=AUMi,t−AUMi,t1(1+Returni,t)AUMi,t1 (3.7)
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exchange (PTFS factors); the traditional Fama-French 3-factor model (F-F 3); a Fama-
French-Momentum 4-factor model (F-F 4); and the recent Fama-French 5-factor model
(F-F 5)19. Results in Table 3.10 show no signicant dierence than those produced when
evaluated returns under the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model (see Table 3.3).
Table 3.10: Performance MA funds and HFR portfolio for dierent performance models
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAPM 0.459 0.565 0.528 0.583 0.487 0.474 0.683
(7.49) (6.35) (4.99) (5.15) (4.61) (4.60) (6.68)
4-Factors 0.447 0.548 0.511 0.563 0.491 0.478 0.648
(no PTFS) (7.42) (6.11) (4.79) (4.93) (4.62) (4.60) (7.46)
F-F 3 0.426 0.551 0.512 0.573 0.455 0.446 0.597
(7.07) (6.18) (4.83) (5.05) (4.27) (4.29) (7.27)
F-F 4 0.409 0.528 0.481 0.543 0.444 0.435 0.563
(6.76) (5.88) (4.52) (4.76) (4.12) (4.13) (6.91)
F-F 5 0.378 0.544 0.493 0.562 0.368 0.357 0.596
(5.99) (5.74) (4.39) (4.67) (3.32) (3.30) (6.84)
Notes: This table shows the risk-adjusted performance (alpha) of dierent portfolios of hedge funds according to
dierent performance models. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage Funds. The
Small and Big portfolios are build using the top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance. HFR
portfolios contain the equal and value weighted returns for all funds on the HFR database. See the Data section for an
accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. CAPM is constructed using the S&P500 as market
factor; 4-factors refers to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model without the 3 factors with lookback straddles; F-F
3 is the Fama-French 3-factor model; F-F 4 is the Fama-French 3-factor model plus the Carhart Momentum factor;
and F-F 5 the Fama-French 5-factor model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t statistics in parentheses. ***, ** and *
denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Next, I check whether the use of dierent performance models aects the observed het-
erogeneity in performance between large and small funds across dierent moments of the
merger wave cycle. Table 3.12 include results on the risk-adjusted performance, namely
alpha, for out-wave periods under the dierent performance models. Overall, the results
conrm the outperformance of small funds over big when the number of arbitrage oppor-
tunities in the market is low across all dierent performance models. For example, when
performance is evaluated under the CAPM model, a portfolio of equally weighted small
funds delivers a signicant risk-adjusted performance (p-value<0.1) of 0.622% monthly.
The equivalent portfolio of big funds delivers an alpha of 0.249% monthly, with no statis-
tical signicance.
Similarly, Table 3.11 contains the performance evaluation results under dierent mod-
els of the same portfolios for periods for periods of high corporate activity. Across all
19The Fama and French (2015) model extends the traditional 3-factor model with two extra factors:
protability and investment patterns.
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Table 3.11: MA funds and HFR portfolio performance under dierent performance
models. In-wave periods
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAPM 0.463 0.751 0.730 0.823 0.410 0.412 0.407
(3.95) (3.87) (3.54) (3.64) (3.60) (3.70) (1.74)
4-Factors 0.578 0.799 0.783 0.849 0.506 0.505 0.600
(no PTFS) (5.58) (3.90) (3.59) (3.52) (4.72) (4.82) (2.89)
F-F 3 0.420 0.761 0.738 0.848 0.348 0.358 0.354
(3.77) (3.92) (3.58) (3.76) (3.15) (3.35) (1.96)
F-F 4 0.422 0.720 0.678 0.795 0.393 0.395 0.183
(3.40) (3.33) (2.97) (3.17) (3.22) (3.34) (0.96)
F-F 5 0.368 0.694 0.676 0.780 0.294 0.309 0.352
(3.22) (3.38) (3.09) (3.25) (2.53) (2.77) (1.80)
Notes: This table shows the risk-adjusted performance of dierent portfolios of hedge funds according to dierent
performance models for in-wave periods. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage
Funds. The Small and Big portfolios are build using the top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance.
HFR portfolios contain the equal and value weighted returns for all funds on the HFR database. See the Data
section for an accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. CAPM is constructed using the
S&P500 as market factor; 4-factors refers to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model without the 3 factors with
lookback straddles; F-F 3 is the Fama-French 3-factor model; F-F 4 is the Fama-French 3-factor model plus the
Carhart Momentum factor; and F-F 5 the Fama-French 5-factor model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t statistics in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
models large funds exhibit a higher alpha than their smaller counterparts with high sta-
tistical signicance (p-value<0.01). For example, a portfolio of equally weighted large
funds outperforms an equivalent portfolio of small funds by 0.32% monthly (0.73% vs.
0.41%).
Taken together, these results strengthen my ndings by showing that the observed
overperformance of larger funds during merger waves does not depend on the chosen
performance evaluation model.
3.5.4 Liquidated Funds
I turn now to consider biases related to the data sample. Even though I mitigate concerns
related to fund survivorship by requiring a fund to report uninterruptedly for a minimum
of 3 years in order to be included in my sample, there are several reasons why a fund may
stop reporting. Whereas some funds withdraw from the HFR database because they are
liquidated, other may just stop reporting to HFR while remain alive. Fortunately, HFR
distinguishes between 'liquidated' and 'not reporting' cases.
For those funds under the 'not reporting' category, there is not much I can do and
probably the best choice is to leave them as they are. However, for those funds that are
classied as 'liquidated', I follow Posthuma and Van der Sluis (2003), who add a -50%
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Table 3.12: MA funds and HFR portfolio performance under dierent performance
models. Out-wave periods
Equally Value Big Big Small Small HFR
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
CAPM 0.398 0.351 0.249 0.267 0.622 0.565 0.765
(3.02) (1.78) (0.82) (0.87) (1.80) (1.73) (4.09)
4-Factors 0.373 0.316 0.196 0.216 0.629 0.569 0.70
(no PTFS) (2.81) (1.58) (0.64) (0.70) (1.75) (1.67) (4.33)
F-F 3 0.393 0.316 0.222 0.242 0.629 0.570 0.713
(2.97) (1.58) (0.72) (0.78) (1.80) (1.72) (4.33)
F-F 4 0.354 0.338 0.099 0.130 0.522 0.471 0.747
(2.64) (1.68) (0.33) (0.42) (1.48) (1.40) (4.43)
F-F 5 0.441 0.408 0.175 0.206 0.616 0.579 0.741
(2.92) (1.76) (0.49) (0.57) (1.52) (1.51) (3.87)
Notes: This table shows the risk-adjusted performance of dierent portfolios of hedge funds according to dierent
performance models for out-wave periods. The Equally and Value weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage
Funds. The Small and Big portfolios are build using the top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance.
HFR portfolios contain the equal and value weighted returns for all funds on the HFR database. See the Data
section for an accurate description of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. CAPM is constructed using the
S&P500 as market factor; 4-factors refers to the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model without the 3 factors with
lookback straddles; F-F 3 is the Fama-French 3-factor model; F-F 4 is the Fama-French 3-factor model plus the
Carhart Momentum factor; and F-F 5 the Fama-French 5-factor model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t statistics in
parentheses. ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
return to the last reporting month of the fund. While this correction can be extreme (see
Ackermann et al., 1999; Fung and Hsieh, 2006; Hodder et al., 2014) it will help in order
to correctly assess whether fund liquidation is driving the results.
Table 3.13 reproduces the performance measure (namely alpha) under the 7-factor
model of Fung and Hsieh (2004), for dierent portfolios and merger wave moments,
including a -50% return correction for those funds that are considered as 'liquidated'
by HFR. Large funds perform greatly during waves (0.736% and 0.837% for equally
and value weighted portfolios, respectively) but fail to deliver signicant performance
out-wave. Small funds, on the other hand, do not deliver signicant performance in any
period, probably as a consequence of the extreme correction on returns imposed over
liquidated funds, which are more likely to within the small category. In sum, the results
are consistent with previous ndings, discarding fund liquidation as a main driver for the
observed dierence in performance along the merger wave cycle.
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Table 3.13: Portfolio performance Merger Arbitrage funds and HFR portfolio.
Correction for liquidated funds
Equally Value Big Big Small Small
Weights Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights Eq. Weights Val. Weights
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1994-2009 0.216 0.491 0.474 0.529 0.034 0.049
(2.83) (5.39) (4.48) (4.65) (0.21) (0.30)
In-Wave periods 0.213 0.711 0.736 0.837 -0.127 0.042
(1.22) (2.90) (3.01) (3.11) (-0.35) (0.13)
Out-Wave periods 0.353 0.351 0.252 0.271 0.425 0.308
(2.67) (1.72) (0.84) (0.88) (1.09) (0.76)
Notes: This table reports the risk-adjusted performance (alpha) of dierent portfolios under the Fung and
Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model for dierent periods. Performance of liquidated funds is corrected as in Posthuma
and Van der Sluis (2003), by adding a -50% return in the last reporting month. The Equally and Value
weighted portfolios comprises all Merger Arbitrage Funds. The Small and Big portfolios are build using the
top and bottom 20% funds by AuM, with monthly rebalance. See the Data section for an accurate description
of the factors.  is the intercept of the model. Sample period is 1994-2009. t statistics in parentheses. ***,
** and * denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze the size-performance relationship for hedge funds under the merger
arbitrage investment style. Traditional literature in the mutual fund industry nds that
large funds face important decreasing returns to scale, but exist as a consequence of
investors return chasing behavior and managers' incentives for earning xed fees over
assets under management. However, hedge fund managers based an important part of
their compensation in performance fees, and are therefore not so willingly inclined to
sacrice future performance in exchange for a larger size. Therefore, larger funds must
have some benets in practice to exist. These benets should arise more prominently when
the harmful eect of size on performance is mitigated. Existing literature has linked the
severity of the scale problem to the availability of trading opportunities in the market.
Consequently, I link the performance of merger arbitrage funds to the merger wave cycle,
as mergers and acquisitions are the main source of prot for these funds.
I nd that larger merger arbitrage funds signicantly outperform their small rivals
during merger waves by around 3% annually in risk-adjusted terms when performance is
evaluated under the Fung and Hsieh (2004) 7-factor model. In turn, large funds under-
perform during out-wave periods. I confront two possible hypotheses that explain this
outperformance: managers from larger funds being more skilled, or larger funds 'purchas-
ing skill' in the form of superior resources. Whereas the former does not fully explain why
managers would choose to overreach their optimal size (beyond the collection of higher
dollar amounts in management fees), the latter establishes direct incentives for managers
to grow in size, as the acquisition of these resources requires a sizable xed investment.
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Next, I investigate the robustness of these results, as well as alternative sources of
outperformance. The overperformance exhibited by large funds does not respond to man-
agers shifting fund size along the merger wave cycle (which could point at some degree of
managerial skill), or dierences in fund characteristics such as age, ow, or fee structure.
Additionally, I show how these results remain qualitatively unchanged when performance
is evaluated under dierent performance models, including CAPM or Fama-French three,
four, and ve-factor models. Finally, I check that when fund returns are corrected for
liquidation the observed overperformance continues to exist. Overall, these results are
in line with the view of managers from larger funds benetting from superior resources
that entail an important advantage, but, in turn, suer from the harmful eect of scale
in performance when the number of arbitrage opportunities in the market is suciently
low.
With this paper I extend the literature on size and performance in the active man-
agement industry by incorporating a novel hypothesis on a funds' internal investments.
The 'purchase skill' story raises serious doubts on the traditional view of underperforming
large funds, providing an alternative channel through which managers may nd optimal
to overreach their optimal size in order to be able to access superior resources. The results
from this study are also relevant for investors chasing merger arbitrage returns, provid-
ing a better understanding of the industry and helping them to enhance their portfolio
allocation in a dynamic setting. From a regulatory perspective, this paper contributes
to a deeper understanding of the active management industry by providing a rational
explanation on why large hedge funds exist in practice.
In this paper I have focused on a specic subset within the hedge fund industry.
While this narrow scope entails an advantage in order to assess the number of trading
opportunities in the market, it may impose some restrictions to the generalization of my
results. For example, the high degree of scalability of trades in the merger arbitrage
setting may not be common to other investment stlyes. In this regard, investing in
superior technological resources may not pay o in other frameworks. How aware of the
equilibrium in this industry, as well as the extent to which the hypothesis presented here
is applicable to other investment styles are interesting and important questions for future
research.
Appendix A
Appendix for "The Hidden Cost of
Financial Derivatives: Options
Trading and the Cost of Debt"
This Appendix provides additional material to the results presented in \The Hidden Cost
of Financial Derivatives: Options Trading and the Cost of Debt". In Section A.1, we
provide denitions and sources for all variables used in this study. In Section A.2, we
discuss and report robustness tests for the baseline results reported in the paper.
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A.1 Variable denition
A.1.1. Bond variables
Variable Denition
Yield spread (in basis points) Dierence in the bond yield to maturity at-issue (re-
ported by SDC Global New Issues) and the yield of a
Treasury bond (collected from the Federal Reserve H-15
Release) with the same maturity. In cases in which there
is no maturity-equivalent Treasury, we use linear inter-
polation to calculate the yield of the risk-free bond.
Ln(Yield spread) Natural logarithm of Yield spread.
S&P Rating Bond rating by the agency Standard and Poor's (as re-
ported by SDC Global New Issues). We transform the
ordinal variable into a numerical scale in the following
way: 1-CCC-, 2-CCC, 3-CCC+, 4-B-, 5-B, 6-B+, 7-BB-,
8-BB, 9-BB+, 10-BBB-, 11-BBB, 12-BBB+, 13-A-, 14-
A, 15-A+, 16-AA-, 17-AA, 18-AA+, 19-AAA-, 20-AAA,
21-AAA+.
Public Bond Dummy Dummy variable equal 1 if the bond is public (as reported
by SDC Global New Issues) and zero otherwise.
Callable Dummy Dummy variable equal 1 if the bond is callable (as re-
ported by SDC Global New Issues) and zero otherwise.
Maturity (in years) Time to maturity (in years) as reported by SDC Global
New Issues.
Principal Principal amount of the issue (in $ millions) as reported
by SDC Global New Issues.
Junk Bond Dummy Dummy variable that equals one if the bond is rated be-
low B- by Standard and Poor's and zero otherwise.
A.1.2. Option variables
Variable Denition
Options volume (millions) Total daily trade in each option multiplied by end-of-day
quote midpoint for that option. This number is then ag-
gregated across all options for a single stock on all trading
days for a given quarter. Following Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2009). Source: Option Metrics.
Ln(Option volume) Natural logarithm of Options volume.
Open interest Quarterly average of the daily Open interest (number of
put and call contracts that remain open on a stock) pro-
vided by Option Metrics.
Ln(Open interest) Natural logarithm of Open interest.
Moneyness Quarterly average of the daily absolute deviation of the
exercise price of each traded option from the closing
price of the underlying stock. Following Roll, Schwartz,
and Subrahmanyam (2009). Source: Option Metrics and
CRSP-Compustat.
Ln(Moneyness) Natural logarithm of Moneyness.
High option volume Dummy variable that equals one if the rm's value for
Options volume is above the median for that year and
zero otherwise.
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A.1.3. Firm variables
Variable Denition
Ln(Total assets) Natural logarithm of quarterly total assets for a rm re-
ported by CRSP-Compustat.
Tobin's Q Sum of the market capitalization of a rm's common
equity (stock price times shares outstanding at the end
of the quarter), liquidation value of its preferred shares
and the book value of debt, divided by book value of
assets. Calculated for each quarter based on CRSP-
Compustat items. (Tobin's Q = (prccqcshoq + atq
- ceqq - txdb)/atq)).
ROA Return on assets. Net income over total assets (quar-
terly). Source: CRSP-Compustat.
Leverage Total debt over total assets (quarterly). Source: CRSP-
Compustat.
Firm risk Standard deviation of quarterly cash-ow from opera-
tions (income before extraordinary items plus depreci-
ation and amortization, normalized by total assets) over
the previous year. Source: CRSP-Compustat.
Ln(Firm risk) Natural logarithm of Firm risk.
Bid-ask spread Average of the daily relative bid-ask spread for a stock
and quarter. Relative Bid-ask spread = 100(Ask -
Bid)/(0.5(Ask + Bid)). Source: CRSP-Compustat.
Ln(Bid-ask spread) Natural logarithm of Bid-ask spread.
K-Z index Kaplan and Zingales (1997) Index for nancial con-
straints build under the Lamont, Polk, and Saaa-
Requejo (2001) specication: KZ =  1:001  Cash  
flowt=PPEt 1 + 0:282Qt + 3:139Debtt=Capitalt 
39:367Dividendst=PPEt 1 1:314Casht=PPEt 1.
Data from Compustat.
Firm rating Standard and Poor's rating for the rm in the year of
bond issue converted to a numerical scale where higher
values indicate better ratings. Data from Compustat.
Market Cap Market capitalization of the rm in the quarter prior to
bond issuance. Data from CRSP-Compustat.
Turnover Share turnover for the quarter prior to bond issuance.
Data from CRSP-Compustat.
CapX Capital expenditures over sales. Data from Compustat.
Dividend dummy Dummy variable equal one if the rm pays dividends.
Data from Compustat.
Stock return volatility Standard deviation of daily stock returns during the quar-
ter (or year) prior to bond issuance. Data from CRSP.
Ln(Analyst Coverage) Natural logarithm of the number of analysts covering a
stock (rm) in a given year. Data from I/B/E/S.
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A.1.3. Firm variables (continued)
Variable Denition
PINL Logistic transformation of the PIN measure
(Probability of Informed Trading) as dened by
Easley, Kiefer, O'hara, and Paperman (1996).
Data from Professor Stephen Brown website:
http://scholar.rhsmith.umd.edu/sbrown/pin-data.
ATI Anti-takeover index from Cremers and Nair (2005) and
Cremers, Nair, and Wei (2007). Data from ISS (formerly
RiskMetrics).
Institutional ownership Total shares held by institutional investors from the
Thomson Reuters 13F quarterly ling over total shares
outstanding from CRSP.
Ownership Dedicated/ Transient/ Quasi-Index Total shares held by Dedicated/ Transient/ Quasi-index
institutional investors from the Bushee (1998) classica-
tion and Thomson Reuters 13F ling over total shares
outstanding from CRSP.
Ln(Amihud Illiq) Natural logarithm of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure calculated as the ratio between absolute stock return
and turnover from CRSP over a trading quarter.
Insiders ownership Total shares held by insiders from Worldscope over total
shares outstanding.
Intangibles Measured as in Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996):
Intangibles = 1  (Cash+ 0:715Receivables+ 0:547
Inventories + 0:535  PPE)=Assets. Data from Com-
pustat.
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A.2 Additional tests
This Appendix provides additional material to the results in 'The hidden cost of nancial
derivatives: Options trading and the cost of debt'. Specically, we discuss various issues
regarding instrumental variable analysis, the monotonicity of the main eect, robustness
of the eect to dierent specications and the addition of several controls.
We begin by including information regarding the instrumental variable analysis using
an alternative instrument to Open interest, the results of which are presented in the
core of the paper. Table A2.1 contains the results from performing a 2SLS regression
of Ln(Option volume) and a set of control variables (dened in Section 1.2 of the paper
and A.1) on our two measures of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and S&P rating)
using Moneyness as an instrument. Similar to the case of Open interest (reported in
Table 1.4 in the paper), Moneyness is highly relevant for explaining Option volume. Its
coecient in the rst stage is large and highly signicant (1.157, p-value<0.01), and
the Kleibergen and Paap (2006) test rejects its irrelevancy (p-value<0.01). Moreover,
the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is not only well above the standard rule of thumb of
10, but it is also higher than the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values, which rejects the
null of a weak instrument. The coecients for instrumented Ln(Option volume) are large,
highly signicant (p-value<0.01) and in the expected direction. The economic magnitudes
of the coecients, however, are signicantly larger than those reported when using open
interest as an instrument (e.g., 0.333 vs. 0.075 with bond yield spread as the dependent
variable). Although these discrepancies can occur for a variety of reasons (from mitigating
errors-in-variables biases to dierent instruments capturing dierent correlations with the
instrumented variable), we extend our instrumental variable regression specication to
simultaneously include both instruments. These results are reported in Table A2.2. The
results reinforce the thesis of an eect of options volume on the cost of debt that is not
driven by reverse causality. The coecients for the instrumented option volume variable
are, again, highly signicant (p-value<0.01) and closer to the values achieved with open
interest as an instrument. Instrument irrelevancy and weakness are again rejected, and
the Hansen J-statistic also rejects overidentication problems. Overall, the results from
this comprehensive instrumental variable analysis indicate strong causality running from
more liquid options markets to a rm's cost of debt.
Next, we provide a set of dierent robustness tests to our baseline specication in
Eq. 1.1 in the paper. Table A2.3 analyzes the monotonicity of the eect in two dimensions.
First, columns 1 and 3 add to the regression model a squared term for option volume,
Ln(Option volume)Ln(Option Volume), for bond yield spread and rating as dependent
variables, respectively. Second, we include in columns 2 and 4 a dummy variable, High
Options Volume, that equals one if a rm's option volume is above the median in a given
year and zero otherwise, as well as its interaction with Ln(Option volume).
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Table A2.4 contains the results of the baseline regression model after the inclusion
of two additional controls, the Principal amount of the bond issued and the percentage
of Institutional ownership of the rm. Because institutional ownership data (which we
obtain from Thomson Reuters 13F ling) are not available for all rms in our sample, we
lose some observations when adding this control.
Table A2.5 considers dierent regression models when using S&P bond rating as the
dependent variable. Using the same variables as in the baseline specication, we rst
modify the ordinal measure of bond rating to the natural log of one plus the rating,
Ln(1+Rating). Second, we t ordered logit and negative binomial models to the main
rating variable.
Table A2.6 considers the case of four-digit SIC (Standard Industry Classication code)
xed eects. We extend the classic two-digit industry dummies (which we use in the
remaining analyses) to consider four-digit industry xed eects. Columns 1 and 3 include
four-digit SIC and time xed eects, while columns 2 and 4 contain industry (four-digit
SIC) by time xed eects.
Although we carefully control for time eects in our baseline regressions, to alleviate
concerns related to nancially turbulent time periods driving our results, we run our
baseline regression model for the nancial crisis of 2007. Specically, Table A2.7 contains
the baseline regression models for the crisis period (columns 1 and 3), dened as the years
2007 thorugh 2010, and outside crisis (columns 2 and 4) with bond yield spread and credit
rating as the dependent variable, respectively.
We then discuss the role of liquidity in our results in Tables A2.8 and A2.9. We begin
by replacing our primary measure of liquidity, stock bid-ask spread, for another common
measure in the literature, Amihud (2002) liquidity. We report these results in Table A2.8.
Then, we estimate the baseline regression in Eq. 1.1 for the subsamples of high and low
liquidity, dened as being below and above the median bid-ask spread. The results for
the high (low) subsample correspond to columns 1 and 3 (2 and 4) in Table A2.9.
Finally, we report the analysis of the eect of Transient owners (as dened in Bushee,
1998) on our main results. Whereas the impact of Dedicated and Quasi-index owners (re-
ported in Tables 1.16 and 1.17 of the paper) is important and aligns with our predictions,
we leave the least interesting case of transient owners to the appendix. Columns 1 and 3
in Table A2.10 contain the baseline regression model with the percentage of institutional
ownership and transient ownership as controls for bond yield spread and bond rating,
respectively. In columns 2 and 4, we also incorporate the interaction term of ownership
by transient investors and Ln(Option volume).
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Table A2.1: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Moneyness as
Instrument
First stage Second stage
Ln(Option Volume) Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Moneyness) 1.157
(0.109)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.333 -1.361
(instrumented) (0.043) (0.164)
Ln(Total Assets) 1.377 -0.697 3.119
(0.036) (0.062) (0.249)
Tobin's Q 0.871 -0.551 2.332
(0.057) (0.049) (0.183)
ROA 5.713 -6.054 26.903
(2.180) (1.098) (4.512)
Leverage -0.914 1.055 -6.823
(0.305) (0.133) (0.534)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.167 -0.027 0.173
(0.037) (0.017) (0.067)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -0.150 0.155 -0.255
(0.086) (0.043) (0.149)
Public Bond Dummy -0.293 -0.076 0.123
(0.490) (0.321) (1.160)
Ln(Maturity) -0.008 0.236 0.169
(0.031) (0.025) (0.063)
Callable Dummy 0.298 0.200
(0.157) (0.056)
Observations 4328 4328 4328
R2 0.775
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the
cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option
volume) and a set of control variables with average absolute moneyness (Moneyness)
as the instrumental variable. A detailed denition of all variables is provided in
A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All
regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The
sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.2: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Both
Instruments
First stage Second stage
Ln(Option Volume) Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Open Interest) 0.872
(0.041)
Ln(Moneyness) 0.360
(0.095)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.090 -0.462
(instrumented) (0.015) (0.065)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.591 -0.355 1.863
(0.050) (0.023) (0.106)
Tobin's Q 0.559 -0.341 1.559
(0.059) (0.026) (0.112)
ROA 4.676 -5.522 24.961
(2.131) (0.892) (3.752)
Leverage -0.802 0.874 -6.213
(0.241) (0.098) (0.422)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.075 0.023 -0.013
(0.030) (0.011) (0.044)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -0.252 0.149 -0.230
(0.076) (0.031) (0.104)
Public Bond Dummy 0.034 -0.193 0.555
(0.360) (0.202) (0.725)
Ln(Maturity) -0.030 0.231 0.188
(0.027) (0.022) (0.051)
Callable Dummy 0.119 0.287
(0.115) (0.039)
Hansen J-statistic 63.56 49.49
(p-value) (0.00) (0.00)
Observations 4328 4328 4328
R2 0.861
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the
cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option
volume) and a set of control variables with average quarterly open interest (Open
interest) and average absolute moneyness (Moneyness) as instrumental variables. A
detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are
clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-
digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,
 and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.3: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Monotonicity
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.042 0.044 -0.284 -0.257
(0.013) (0.012) (0.060) (0.055)
Ln(Option Volume)  Ln(Option Volume) -0.001 0.015
(0.002) (0.009)
High Options Volume -0.017 -0.174
(0.058) (0.299)
Ln(Option Volume)  High Options Volume -0.006 0.078
(0.015) (0.076)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.278 -0.278 1.491 1.505
(0.018) (0.018) (0.087) (0.088)
Tobin's Q -0.295 -0.294 1.346 1.353
(0.023) (0.023) (0.103) (0.104)
ROA -5.283 -5.312 23.242 23.447
(0.902) (0.897) (3.741) (3.760)
Leverage 0.828 0.828 -5.984 -6.004
(0.100) (0.100) (0.420) (0.423)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.036 0.035 -0.081 -0.077
(0.012) (0.012) (0.046) (0.047)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.150 0.150 -0.242 -0.235
(0.030) (0.030) (0.097) (0.098)
Public Bond Dummy -0.215 -0.216 0.612 0.634
(0.177) (0.176) (0.599) (0.603)
Ln(Maturity) 0.230 0.231 0.196 0.193
(0.022) (0.021) (0.050) (0.050)
Callable Dummy 0.310 0.308
(0.041) (0.042)
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330
R2 0.706 0.706 0.743 0.742
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost of debt
(bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume), its squared term,
a dummy variable for high options volume (High options volume), its interaction with Options
volume, and a set of control variables. High options volume equals one if the options volume for
rm is above the median in a given year and zero otherwise. A detailed denition of all variables
is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All
regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period
is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.4: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Additional
Controls
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.033 0.032 -0.214 -0.212
(0.010) (0.010) (0.045) (0.046)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.321 -0.318 1.605 1.526
(0.017) (0.018) (0.091) (0.094)
Tobin's Q -0.300 -0.307 1.372 1.307
(0.022) (0.023) (0.103) (0.110)
ROA -5.455 -5.757 23.910 25.875
(0.845) (0.838) (3.792) (3.905)
Leverage 0.824 0.867 -6.020 -6.229
(0.094) (0.101) (0.419) (0.424)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.028 0.030 -0.060 -0.088
(0.012) (0.012) (0.047) (0.049)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.144 0.136 -0.216 -0.199
(0.029) (0.033) (0.096) (0.101)
Public Bond Dummy -0.301 -0.549 0.837 1.124
(0.195) (0.058) (0.657) (0.519)
Ln(Maturity) 0.221 0.199 0.210 0.214
(0.021) (0.022) (0.050) (0.053)
Callable Dummy 0.291 0.309
(0.040) (0.043)
Principal 0.245 0.248 -0.486 -0.467
(0.029) (0.031) (0.128) (0.129)
Intitutional Ownership 0.067 -1.010
(0.070) (0.309)
Observations 4330 3852 4330 3852
R2 0.709 0.714 0.744 0.750
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of
the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading vol-
ume (Option volume) and a set of control variables that additionally include
the bond principal amount (Principal) and total Institutional ownership. A
detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors
are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full
set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is
1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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Table A2.5: Options Volume and Cost of Debt:
Alternative distributions for bond rating
Ln(1+Rating) S&P Rating
OLS Ordered Logit Neg.Binomial
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Option Volume) -0.019 -0.237 -0.019
(0.005) (0.051) (0.004)
Ln(Total Assets) 0.130 1.701 0.130
(0.008) (0.108) (0.008)
Tobin's Q 0.101 1.657 0.100
(0.010) (0.147) (0.009)
ROA 2.479 25.767 2.345
(0.380) (4.374) (0.365)
Leverage -0.614 -6.269 -0.611
(0.046) (0.475) (0.046)
Ln(Firm risk) -0.013 -0.049 -0.010
(0.004) (0.052) (0.004)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) -0.036 -0.159 -0.032
(0.011) (0.103) (0.011)
Public Bond Dummy 0.051 0.945 0.066
(0.060) (0.458) (0.050)
Ln(Maturity) 0.024 0.155 0.020
(0.004) (0.056) (0.004)
Observations 4330 4330 4330
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rms-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables. A detailed denition
of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at
the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of industry
and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.6: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: SIC4 Dummies
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.030 0.072 -0.203 -0.419
(0.010) (0.016) (0.042) (0.069)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.303 -0.377 1.641 1.909
(0.017) (0.028) (0.088) (0.123)
Tobin's Q -0.275 -0.328 1.068 1.104
(0.025) (0.043) (0.113) (0.198)
ROA -4.460 -3.595 21.292 20.149
(0.792) (1.418) (3.483) (6.835)
Leverage 0.753 0.932 -5.386 -6.012
(0.092) (0.172) (0.452) (0.739)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.032 0.032 -0.055 -0.046
(0.012) (0.021) (0.045) (0.085)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.140 0.131 -0.240 -0.655
(0.028) (0.039) (0.084) (0.152)
Public Bond Dummy -0.312 -0.557 0.846 1.761
(0.147) (0.128) (0.815) (0.418)
Ln(Maturity) 0.227 0.267 0.143 0.056
(0.020) (0.013) (0.043) (0.026)
Callable Dummy 0.234 0.148
(0.043) (0.048)
Fixed eects Time & Industry Industry-by-Time Time & Industry Industry-by-Time
Observations 4330 4330 4330 4330
R2 0.756 0.597 0.811 0.655
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost of debt (bond yield
spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables. A
detailed denition of all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Industry is
dened at the four-digit SIC code level. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.7: Options Volume and rm distress: Financial
crisis
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
Crisis No crisis Crisis No crisis
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.034 0.044 -0.171 -0.255
(0.014) (0.011) (0.066) (0.052)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.232 -0.303 1.514 1.564
(0.026) (0.020) (0.118) (0.102)
Tobin's Q -0.305 -0.296 1.643 1.317
(0.040) (0.027) (0.180) (0.114)
ROA -3.409 -6.153 15.918 27.561
(1.192) (1.114) (5.705) (4.471)
Leverage 0.579 0.927 -5.649 -6.220
(0.152) (0.120) (0.636) (0.496)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.034 0.028 -0.088 -0.050
(0.017) (0.014) (0.080) (0.055)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.284 0.109 -0.224 -0.206
(0.052) (0.033) (0.132) (0.114)
Public Bond Dummy 0.319 -0.400 -0.610 1.009
(0.512) (0.058) (1.930) (0.272)
Ln(Maturity) 0.069 0.284 0.163 0.205
(0.022) (0.025) (0.068) (0.060)
Callable Dummy 0.294 0.332
(0.060) (0.051)
Observations 1231 3099 1231 3099
R2 0.709 0.693 0.774 0.738
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables. The crisis period
is dened as the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010. A detailed denition of
all variables is provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the
rm level (in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC
code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. , 
and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
A.2. Additional tests 130
Table A2.8: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Amihud
Illiquidity
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.049 0.048 -0.251 -0.249
(0.012) (0.011) (0.048) (0.048)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.258 -0.249 1.447 1.442
(0.023) (0.023) (0.096) (0.096)
Tobin's Q -0.298 -0.284 1.330 1.334
(0.028) (0.027) (0.112) (0.112)
ROA -5.150 -5.553 24.825 24.223
(0.911) (0.909) (3.924) (3.899)
Leverage 0.951 0.876 -6.102 -6.128
(0.107) (0.104) (0.420) (0.417)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.041 0.043 -0.099 -0.096
(0.013) (0.013) (0.048) (0.048)
Ln(Amihud Illiq) 0.075 0.079 -0.151 -0.150
(0.024) (0.024) (0.070) (0.070)
Public Bond Dummy -0.221 0.663
(0.191) (0.639)
Ln(Maturity) 0.220 0.207
(0.022) (0.050)
Callable Dummy 0.318
(0.041)
Observations 4185 4185 4185 4185
R2 0.666 0.701 0.742 0.743
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables including Amihud
(2002) as a measure of liquidity. A detailed denition of all variables is
provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level
(in parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code
dummies and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and
 denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.9: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Liquidity
subsamples
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
High Liq. Low Liq. High Liq. Low Liq.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.036 0.049 -0.294 -0.219
(0.015) (0.011) (0.058) (0.053)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.274 -0.292 1.638 1.481
(0.024) (0.021) (0.107) (0.115)
Tobin's Q -0.248 -0.354 1.329 1.486
(0.029) (0.029) (0.124) (0.133)
ROA -4.916 -3.900 24.564 18.523
(1.343) (0.917) (5.100) (4.680)
Leverage 0.795 0.826 -5.806 -5.825
(0.175) (0.101) (0.693) (0.496)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.017 0.040 -0.015 -0.084
(0.019) (0.014) (0.064) (0.064)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.071 0.104 0.189 -0.258
(0.086) (0.029) (0.180) (0.114)
Public Bond Dummy -0.468 -0.296 1.352 0.645
(0.061) (0.077) (0.296) (0.306)
Ln(Maturity) 0.301 0.136 0.049 0.390
(0.025) (0.026) (0.046) (0.090)
Callable Dummy 0.460 0.230
(0.087) (0.045)
Observations 2146 2141 2146 2141
R2 0.653 0.711 0.706 0.735
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures
of the cost of debt (bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading
volume (Option volume) and a set of control variables by subsamples of
liquidity according to the median. A detailed denition of all variables is
provided in A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in
parentheses). All regressions include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies
and time dummies. The sample period is 1996-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table A2.10: Options Volume and Cost of Debt: Transient Owners
Ln(Yield Spread) S&P Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(Option Volume) 0.027 0.032 -0.166 -0.175
(0.011) (0.015) (0.045) (0.058)
Own. Transient 0.970 1.025 -6.159 -6.256
(0.188) (0.188) (0.870) (0.951)
Ln(Option Volume)  Own. Transient -0.032 0.057
(0.049) (0.243)
Intitutional Ownership -0.152 -0.147 0.414 0.405
(0.078) (0.078) (0.359) (0.360)
Ln(Total Assets) -0.252 -0.254 1.290 1.293
(0.019) (0.020) (0.092) (0.092)
Tobin's Q -0.287 -0.288 1.204 1.204
(0.024) (0.024) (0.109) (0.109)
ROA -6.061 -6.088 27.288 27.334
(0.877) (0.879) (3.884) (3.867)
Leverage 0.836 0.837 -5.993 -5.994
(0.105) (0.105) (0.419) (0.418)
Ln(Firm risk) 0.031 0.031 -0.076 -0.075
(0.013) (0.013) (0.049) (0.048)
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) 0.137 0.138 -0.192 -0.193
(0.032) (0.032) (0.099) (0.099)
Public Bond Dummy -0.525 -0.532 0.981 0.995
(0.057) (0.058) (0.627) (0.632)
Ln(Maturity) 0.210 0.210 0.191 0.191
(0.023) (0.023) (0.053) (0.053)
Callable Dummy 0.299 0.297
(0.043) (0.043)
Observations 3649 3649 3649 3649
R2 0.716 0.716 0.757 0.757
Notes: This table presents OLS regression estimates of rm-level measures of the cost of debt
(bond yield spread and bond rating) on options trading volume (Option volume) and a set of
control variables, as well as the interaction of Options volume with ownership by Transient
institutions as dened in Bushee (1998). A detailed denition of all variables is provided in
A.1. Robust standard errors are clustered at the rm level (in parentheses). All regressions
include a full set of two-digit SIC code dummies and time dummies. The sample period is
1996-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Appendix B
Appendix for "The Role of Option
Markets in Shareholder Activism"
This Appendix provides additional material to the results presented in \The Role of
Option Markets in Shareholder Activism". In Section B.1, we provide denitions and
sources for all variables used in this study. In Section B.2, we discuss and report robustness
tests for the baseline results reported in the paper.
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B.1 Variable denition
B.1.1. Variables
Variable Denition
Options Volume (Millions) Total daily trade in each option multiplied by end-of-day
quote midpoint for that option. This number is then ag-
gregated across all options for a single stock on all trad-
ing days for a given year. Following Roll, Schwartz, and
Subrahmanyam (2009). Source: Option Metrics.
Ln(Option Volume) Natural logarithm of Options Volume.
Open Interest Annual average of the daily Open interest (number of put
and call contracts that remain open in a stock) provided
by Option Metrics.
Ln(Open Interest) Natural logarithm of Open Interest.
Moneyness Annual average of the daily absolute deviation of the ex-
ercise price of each traded option from the closing price of
the underlying stock. Following Roll, Schwartz, and Sub-
rahmanyam (2009). Source: Option Metrics and CRSP-
Compustat.
Ln(Moneyness) Natural logarithm of Moneyness.
Proxy Contest Binary variable that equals 1 if the rm experienced a
proxy contest during year t and zero otherwise. Data
from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Shareholder Proposal Binary variable that equals 1 if the rm experienced a
shareholder proposal during year t and zero otherwise.
Data from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Abnormal Performance Firm stock return during year t minus the return of a
value-weighted market portfolio (CRSP Value-weighted)
during the same period. Data from CRSP.
Ln(MarketCap) Natural logarithm of end-of-December rm market cap-
italization (price  shares outstanding) from CRSP-
Compustat.
Tobin's Q Sum of the market capitalization of a rm's common eq-
uity (stock price times shares outstanding at the end of
the quarter), liquidation value of its preferred shares and
the book value of debt, divided by book value of as-
sets. Based on CRSP-Compustat items. (Tobin's Q =
(prccqcshoq + atq - ceqq - txdb)/atq)).
Ln(Illiquidity) Natural logarithm of the Amihud (2002) illiquidity mea-
sure calculated as the ratio between absolute stock return
and turnover from CRSP over a trading quarter.
Nasdaq Dummy variable equal one if the rm is traded on the
Nasdaq market and zero otherwise. Data from CRSP.
Ln(Sales) Natural logarithm of sales obtained from Compustat.
Dividend yield Total dividend (common and preferred) over market
value of common equity plus book value of preferred eq-
uity. Data from Compustat and CRSP.
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B.1.1. Variables (continuation)
Variable Denition
Cash Cash plus marketable securities divided by total assets.
Data from Compustat.
Volatility Standard deviation of monthly returns from CRSP dur-
ing year t.
R&D Research and development expenses over total assets.
R&D expenses are substituted by zero when missing.
Data from Compustat.
Bid-Ask Spread Average of the daily relative bid-ask spread for a stock
and quarter. Relative Bid-Ask Spread = 100(Ask -
Bid)/(0.5(Ask + Bid)). Source: CRSP-Compustat.
Ln(Bid-Ask Spread) Natural logarithm of Bid-Ask Spread.
Institutional Ownership Total shares held by institutional investors from the
Thomson Reuters 13F quarterly ling over total shares
outstanding from CRSP.
Institutional HHI Herndahl-Hirschman concentration index for Insitu-
tional investors holdings on rm i in year t. Data from
Thomson Reuters 13F llings.
Analyst Coverage Number of analyst following a stock on year t. Data from
I/B/E/S.
Avg. vote for management Shareholder votes 'for' management-sponsored proposals
over the voting base. Data from ISS (formerly RiskMet-
rics).
E-index Index measuring managerial entrenchment following Be-
bchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2009). Data from ISS (for-
merly RiskMetrics).
CEO compensation Data on CEO total compensation obtained from Execu-
comp.
Board size Number of directors in the board of a rm. Data from
ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Board shares held Number of rm shares in hands of board members. Data
from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Independent directors Ratio of independent directors over total directors in the
board of a rm. Data from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Avg. ISS recommendation Average recommendation from ISS on all issues consid-
ered for vote in a rm in a given year. Data from ISS
(formerly RiskMetrics).
Unequal voting dummy Dummy variable equal one if a rm has dierent classes
of shares with dierent voting power and zero otherwise.
Data from ISS (formerly RiskMetrics).
Condential voting dummy Dummy variable equal one if the rm's policies prevents
management from knowing how shareholders vote with
their proxy cards and zero otherwise. Data from ISS
(formerly RiskMetrics).
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B.2 Additional tables
Table B2.1: Options Volume and Activism: IV
Moneyness & Open interest
Proxy Contestt Shareholder Proposalt
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) 0.098 0.102
(instrumented) (0.036) (0.013)
Ln(OptVol)(t 2) 0.093 0.126
(instrumented) (0.041) (0.015)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 19791 18689 19791 18689
Notes: This table presents instrumental variable (IV) probit re-
gression estimates for rm-level shareholder activism events (proxy
contest and shareholder proposal) on one and two-year lagged in-
strumented options volume and a set of control variables. Annual
Options volume is instrumented through the average annual Open
interest and annual Moneyness. A detailed denition of all variables
is provided in B.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the
1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B2.2: Voting with management: 2SLS
regressions: IV Moneyness & Open interest
Average Vote for Management (%)
Directors Other All
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.200 -0.406 -0.220
(instrumented) (0.044) (0.093) (0.043)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9428 4598 9478
Notes: This table presents 2SLS regression estimates of the
average shareholder vote for management-sponsored propos-
als on instrumented one-year lagged options volume and a
set of known determinants of shareholder support to man-
agement. Column 1 contains the results for proposals on Di-
rectors, column 2 for Other proposals, and column 3 for All
proposals. Annual options volume is instrumented trhough
average annual Open interest and annual Moneyness. A
detailed denition of all variables is provided in B.1. All
regressions include year and industry (four-digit sic code)
dummies. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The
sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance
at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
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Table B2.3: Options Volume and Activism:
First-stage regressions
Ln(OptVol)(t 1)
(1) (2)
Ln(Open)(t 1) 1.011
(0.006)
Ln(Moneyness)(t 1) 1.368
(0.030)
Ln(Illiquidity)(t 1) -0.364 -0.856
(0.009) (0.013)
Ab. Performance(t 1) 0.234 -0.859
(0.244) (0.356)
Ab. Performance(t 2) 3.677 3.733
(0.193) (0.281)
Institutional HHI(t 1) -0.319 0.124
(0.136) (0.197)
Institutional Ownership(t 1) 0.246 -0.473
(0.038) (0.056)
Analyst Coverage(t 1) 0.013 0.048
(0.001) (0.002)
Volatility(t 1) 4.180 7.896
(0.147) (0.224)
Nasdaq(t 1) 0.082 -0.013
(0.018) (0.026)
Ln(Mkt Cap)(t 1) 0.165 0.286
(0.013) (0.018)
Tobin's Q(t 1) 0.134 0.147
(0.007) (0.010)
Ln(Sales)(t 1) -0.002 0.002
(0.008) (0.011)
Dividend yield(t 1) -0.435 -1.153
(0.303) (0.440)
Cash(t 1) 0.328 0.862
(0.064) (0.092)
R&D(t 1) -0.969 0.162
(0.097) (0.141)
Observations 19791 19791
Adj. R2 0.869 0.724
Notes: This table presents the results from the rst-stage
of the intrumental variable probit regression. Options vol-
ume is regressed on each of the two instruments (Open
interest and Moneyness), as well as a set of known deter-
minants of shareholder activism. All regressions include
time dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. The sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
B.2. Additional tables 139
Table B2.4: Options volume and voting: rst-stage
regressions
Ln(OptVol)
(1) (2) (3)
Ln(Open) 1.096 1.065
(0.010) (0.010)
Ln(Moneyness) 1.423 0.270
(0.043) (0.031)
Illiquidity -0.007 -0.007 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Ln(Mkt Cap) 0.485 1.376 0.512
(0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
Tobin's Q 0.182 0.084 0.184
(0.011) (0.015) (0.011)
Ab. Performance(t 1) 3.800 2.619 3.930
(0.364) (0.543) (0.360)
E-Index 0.011 -0.013 0.013
(0.009) (0.014) (0.009)
CEO compensation 0.066 0.135 0.067
($ thousands) (0.016) (0.027) (0.016)
Board size -0.001 -0.008 -0.001
(0.006) (0.008) (0.006)
Board shares held 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Independent directors(%) 0.031 -0.016 0.015
(0.092) (0.134) (0.092)
Avg. ISS Recommen. 0.023 0.004 0.030
(0.048) (0.072) (0.048)
Unequal voting dummy 0.093 0.170 0.106
(0.059) (0.094) (0.059)
Condential voting dummy -0.058 -0.002 -0.062
(0.027) (0.041) (0.027)
Institutional HHI -1.555 -4.403 -1.896
(0.566) (0.830) (0.578)
Institutional Ownership 0.945 0.946 0.965
(0.085) (0.131) (0.084)
Observations 11267 11267 11267
Adjusted R2 0.902 0.767 0.903
Notes: This table presents the results from instrumental variable
(2SLS) regression. Shareholder support to ISS is regressed on con-
temporane, as well as a set of known determinants of shareholder
voting behavior. All regressions include time and industry dummies.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The sample period is
2003-2014. ,  and  denote signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%,
respectively.
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Table B2.5: Voting with ISS: 2SLS
Average Vote with ISS(%)
(1) (2)
Ln(OptVol)t -0.433
(instrumented) (0.118)
Ln(OptVol)(t 1) -0.261
(instrumented) (0.126)
Illiquidity 0.068 0.065
(0.030) (0.029)
Ln(Mkt Cap) 1.935 1.704
(0.231) (0.247)
Tobin's Q -0.037 -0.008
(0.169) (0.189)
Ab. Performance(t 1) 23.601 25.939
(6.208) (6.955)
E-Index -0.472 -0.724
(0.148) (0.165)
CEO compensation -1.904 -1.860
($ thousands) (0.302) (0.320)
Board size 0.185 0.196
(0.084) (0.093)
Board shares held -0.006 -0.005
(0.002) (0.002)
Independent directors(%) 23.073 22.128
(1.550) (1.726)
Avg. Mgmt. Rec. 46.899 49.307
(2.024) (2.063)
Unequal voting dummy -8.492 -9.251
(1.290) (1.376)
Condential voting dummy 0.393 0.281
(0.398) (0.435)
Institutional HHI -19.688 -17.343
(6.790) (7.490)
Institutional Ownership 1.395 1.873
(1.292) (1.410)
Observations 11196 9478
Notes: This table presents instrumental variable (2SLS) re-
gression estimates of the average shareholder vote with ISS
recommendations on contemporaneous and one-year lagged
instrumented options volume and a set of known determi-
nants of shareholder voting behavior. Options volume is in-
strumented through average annual Open interest and annual
Moneyness. A detailed denition of all variables is provided
in B.1. All regressions include year and industry (four-digit
sic code) dummies. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses. The sample period is 2003-2014. ,  and  denote
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.
Bibliography
Ackermann, C., R. McEnally, and D. Ravenscraft (1999). The performance of hedge
funds: Risk, return, and incentives. The Journal of Finance, 833{874.
Admati, A. R. and P. Peiderer (1988). A theory of intraday patterns: Volume and price
variability. Review of Financial studies 1 (1), 3{40.
Admati, A. R. and P. Peiderer (2009). The \wall street walk" and shareholder activism:
Exit as a form of voice. Review of Financial Studies 22 (7), 2645{2685.
Agarwal, V., N. D. Daniel, and N. Y. Naik (2009). Role of managerial incentives and
discretion in hedge fund performance. The Journal of Finance 64 (5), 2221{2256.
Agarwal, V. and N. Y. Naik (2000). Multi-period performance persistence analysis of
hedge funds. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 327{342.
Agarwal, V. and N. Y. Naik (2005). Hedge funds. Foundations and Trends R in Fi-
nance 1 (2), 103{169.
Agarwal, V. and S. Ray (2012). Determinants and implications of fee changes in the hedge
fund industry. In AFA 2013 San Diego Meetings Paper.
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corpo-
rate bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance 23 (4), 589{609.
Amihud, Y. (2002). Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time-series eects.
Journal of Financial Markets 5 (1), 31{56.
Andrade, G., M. Mitchell, and E. Staord (2001). New evidence and perspectives on
mergers. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 103{120.
Aragon, G. O. and J. S. Martin (2012). A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage:
Safeguard or speculation? Journal of Financial Economics 105 (2), 436{456.
Arena, M. P. and S. P. Ferris (2007). When managers bypass shareholder approval of
board appointments: Evidence from the private security market. Journal of Corporate
Finance 13 (4), 485{510.
Aslan, H. and P. Kumar (2012). Strategic ownership structure and the cost of debt.
Review of Financial Studies 25 (7), 2257{2299.
Augustin, P., M. Brenner, and M. G. Subrahmanyam (2015). Informed options trading
prior to m&a announcements: Insider trading? Working Paper .
141
Bibliography 142
Avramov, D., G. Jostova, and A. Philipov (2007). Understanding changes in corporate
credit spreads. Financial Analysts Journal 63 (2), 90{105.
Back, K. (1993). Asymmetric information and options. Review of Financial Studies 6 (3),
435{472.
Baker, M. and S. Savasoglu (2002). Limited arbitrage in mergers and acquisitions. Journal
of Financial Economics 64 (1), 91{115.
Baker, M. and J. Wurgler (2007). Investor sentiment in the stock market. The Journal
of Economic Perspectives 21 (2), 129{151.
Bares, P.-A., R. Gibson, and S. Gyger (2003). Performance in the hedge funds industry:
An analysis of short-and long-term persistence. The Journal of Alternative Invest-
ments 6 (3), 25{41.
Beaver, W. H., M. L. McAnally, and C. H. Stinson (1997). The information content of
earnings and prices: A simultaneous equations approach. Journal of Accounting and
Economics 23 (1), 53{81.
Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell (2009). What matters in corporate governance?
Review of Financial studies 22 (2), 783{827.
Berger, P. G., E. Ofek, and I. Swary (1996). Investor valuation of the abandonment
option. Journal of Financial Economics 42 (2), 257{287.
Berk, J. B. and R. C. Green (2004). Mutual fund ows and performance in rational
markets. Journal of Political Economy 112 (6), 1269{1295.
Bharath, S. T., S. Jayaraman, and V. Nagar (2013). Exit as governance: An empirical
analysis. The Journal of Finance 68 (6), 2515{2547.
Bhide, A. (1993). The hidden costs of stock market liquidity. Journal of Financial
Economics 34 (1), 31{51.
Blanco, I. and S. Garca (2017). The hidden cost of nancial derivatives: Options trading
and the cost of debt. Working Paper.
Blanco, I. and D. Wehrheim (2017). The bright side of nancial derivatives: Options
trading and rm innovation. Journal of Financial Economics 125, 99{119.
Bollen, N. P. and J. A. Busse (2005). Short-term persistence in mutual fund performance.
Review of Financial Studies 18 (2), 569{597.
Bolton, P. and M. Oehmke (2011). Credit default swaps and the empty creditor problem.
The Review of Financial Studies 24 (8), 2617{2655.
Borisova, G., V. Fotak, K. Holland, and W. L. Megginson (2015). Government ownership
and the cost of debt: Evidence from government investments in publicly traded rms.
Journal of Financial Economics 118 (1), 168{191.
Brav, A. and R. D. Mathews (2011). Empty voting and the eciency of corporate gover-
nance. Journal of Financial Economics 99 (2), 289{307.
Bibliography 143
Brealey, R. A. and S. C. Myers (2003). Principles of corporate nance (mcgraw-hill higher
education, new york, ny).
Brennan, M. J. and A. Subrahmanyam (1995). Investment analysis and price formation
in securities markets. Journal of Financial Economics 38 (3), 361{381.
Brown, S. J., W. N. Goetzmann, and R. G. Ibbotson (1999). Oshore hedge funds:
Survival and performance, 1989-95*. The Journal of Business 72 (1), 91{117.
Bushee, B. J. (1998). The inuence of institutional investors on myopic r&d investment
behavior. The Accounting Review, 305{333.
Cai, J., J. L. Garner, and R. A. Walkling (2009). Electing directors. The Journal of
Finance 64 (5), 2389{2421.
Campbell, J. Y. and G. B. Taksler (2003). Equity volatility and corporate bond yields.
The Journal of Finance 58 (6), 2321{2350.
Cao, C., Z. Chen, and J. M. Grin (2005). Informational content of option volume prior
to takeovers. The Journal of Business 78 (3), 1073{1109.
Cao, H. H. (1999). The eect of derivative assets on information acquisition and price
behavior in a rational expectations equilibrium. Review of Financial Studies 12 (1),
131{163.
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistence in mutual fund performance. The Journal of
Finance 52 (1), 57{82.
Carleton, W. T., J. M. Nelson, and M. S. Weisbach (1998). The inuence of institutions
on corporate governance through private negotiations: Evidence from tiaa-cref. The
Journal of Finance 53 (4), 1335{1362.
Chakravarty, S., H. Gulen, and S. Mayhew (2004). Informed trading in stock and option
markets. The Journal of Finance 59 (3), 1235{1257.
Chan, K., L. Ge, and T.-C. Lin (2015). Informational content of options trading on
acquirer announcement return. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 50 (5),
1057{1082.
Chen, J., H. Hong, M. Huang, and J. D. Kubik (2004). Does fund size erode mutual fund
performance? the role of liquidity and organization. American Economic Review 94 (5),
1276{1302.
Chen, Q., I. Goldstein, and W. Jiang (2007). Price informativeness and investment sen-
sitivity to stock price. Review of Financial Studies 20 (3), 619{650.
Chevalier, J. and G. Ellison (1997). Risk taking by mutual funds as a response to incen-
tives. Journal of Political Economy 105 (6), 1167{1200.
Christoersen, S. E., C. C. Geczy, D. K. Musto, and A. V. Reed (2007). Vote trading
and information aggregation. The Journal of Finance 62 (6), 2897{2929.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the rm. Economica 4 (16), 386{405.
Bibliography 144
Coee, J. C. (1991). Liquidity versus control: The institutional investor as corporate
monitor. Columbia Law Review 91 (6), 1277{1368.
Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen (2006). Managerial incentives and risk-taking.
Journal of Financial Economics 79 (2), 431{468.
Collin-Dufresne, P., R. S. Goldstein, and J. S. Martin (2001). The determinants of credit
spread changes. The Journal of Finance 56 (6), 2177{2207.
Cornelli, F. and D. D. Li (2002). Risk arbitrage in takeovers. Review of Financial
Studies 15 (3), 837{868.
Cornett, M. M., B. Tanyeri, and H. Tehranian (2011). The eect of merger anticipa-
tion on bidder and target rm announcement period returns. Journal of Corporate
Finance 17 (3), 595{611.
Cremers, K. and V. B. Nair (2005). Governance mechanisms and equity prices. The
Journal of Finance 60 (6), 2859{2894.
Cremers, K. M., V. B. Nair, and C. Wei (2007). Governance mechanisms and bond prices.
Review of Financial Studies 20 (5), 1359{1388.
Cu~nat, V., M. Gine, and M. Guadalupe (2012). The vote is cast: The eect of corporate
governance on shareholder value. The Journal of Finance 67 (5), 1943{1977.
Daniel, K., M. Grinblatt, S. Titman, and R. Wermers (1997). Measuring mutual fund
performance with characteristic-based benchmarks. The Journal of Finance, 1035{1058.
Datta, S., M. Iskandar-Datta, and A. Patel (1999). Bank monitoring and the pricing of
corporate public debt. Journal of Financial Economics 51 (3), 435{449.
Del Guercio, D. and J. Hawkins (1999). The motivation and impact of pension fund
activism. Journal of Financial Economics 52 (3), 293{340.
Del Guercio, D., L. Seery, and T. Woidtke (2008). Do boards pay attention when in-
stitutional investor activists \just vote no"? Journal of Financial Economics 90 (1),
84{103.
Dow, J. and G. Gorton (1997). Stock market eciency and economic eciency: Is there
a connection? The Journal of Finance 52 (3), 1087{1129.
Duchin, R. and B. Schmidt (2013). Riding the merger wave: Uncertainty, reduced moni-
toring, and bad acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 107 (1), 69{88.
Dukes, W. P., C. J. Frohlich, and C. K. Ma (1992). Risk arbitrage in tender oers. The
Journal of Portfolio Management 18 (4), 47{55.
Easley, D., S. Hvidkjaer, and M. O'hara (2002). Is information risk a determinant of asset
returns? The Journal of Finance 57 (5), 2185{2221.
Easley, D., N. Kiefer, and M. O'Hara (1997). One day in the life of a very common stock.
Review of Financial Studies 10 (3), 805{835.
Easley, D., N. M. Kiefer, M. O'hara, and J. B. Paperman (1996). Liquidity, information,
Bibliography 145
and infrequently traded stocks. The Journal of Finance 51 (4), 1405{1436.
Easley, D., M. O'Hara, and P. Srinivas (1998). Option volume and stock prices: Evidence
on where informed traders trade. The Journal of Finance 53 (2), 431{465.
Edmans, A. (2009). Blockholder trading, market eciency, and managerial myopia. The
Journal of Finance 64 (6), 2481{2513.
Edmans, A., V. W. Fang, and E. Zur (2013). The eect of liquidity on governance. Review
of Financial Studies, hht012.
Edmans, A. and G. Manso (2011). Governance through trading and intervention: A
theory of multiple blockholders. Review of Financial Studies 24 (7), 2395{2428.
Elton, E. J., M. J. Gruber, D. Agrawal, and C. Mann (2001). Explaining the rate spread
on corporate bonds. The Journal of Finance 56 (1), 247{277.
Ericsson, J., K. Jacobs, R. Oviedo, et al. (2009). The determinants of credit default swap
premia. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (1), 109{132.
Fama, E. F. and K. R. French (2015). A ve-factor asset pricing model. Journal of
Financial Economics 116 (1), 1{22.
Fama, E. F. and J. D. MacBeth (1973). Risk, return, and equilibrium: Empirical tests.
The Journal of Political Economy, 607{636.
Faure-Grimaud, A. and D. Gromb (2004). Public trading and private incentives. Review
of Financial Studies 17 (4), 985{1014.
Favara, G., E. Schroth, and P. Valta (2012). Strategic default and equity risk across
countries. The Journal of Finance 67 (6), 2051{2095.
Feldhutter, P., E. Hotchkiss, and O. Karakas (2016). The value of creditor control in
corporate bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 121 (1), 1 { 27.
Ferreira, D., M. A. Ferreira, and C. C. Raposo (2011). Board structure and price infor-
mativeness. Journal of Financial Economics 99 (3), 523{545.
Francis, B. B., I. Hasan, K. John, and M. Waisman (2010). The eect of state antitakeover
laws on the rm's bondholders. Journal of Financial Economics 96 (1), 127{154.
Fung, W. and D. A. Hsieh (2000). Performance characteristics of hedge funds and com-
modity funds: Natural vs. spurious biases. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 35 (03), 291{307.
Fung, W. and D. A. Hsieh (2004). Hedge fund benchmarks: A risk-based approach.
Financial Analysts Journal 60 (5), 65{80.
Fung, W., D. A. Hsieh, N. Y. Naik, and T. Ramadorai (2008). Hedge funds: Performance,
risk, and capital formation. The Journal of Finance 63 (4), 1777{1803.
Fung, W. K. and D. A. Hsieh (2006). Hedge funds: An industry in its adolescence.
Economic Review-Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 91 (4), 1.
Gantchev, N. (2013). The costs of shareholder activism: Evidence from a sequential
Bibliography 146
decision model. Journal of Financial Economics 107 (3), 610{631.
Garlappi, L., T. Shu, and H. Yan (2008). Default risk, shareholder advantage, and stock
returns. Review of Financial Studies 21 (6), 2743{2778.
Ge, L., J. Hu, M. Humphery-Jenner, and T.-C. Lin (2016). Informed options trading
prior to bankruptcy lings. Working Paper .
Ge, L., T.-C. Lin, and N. D. Pearson (2016). Why does the option to stock volume ratio
predict stock returns? Journal of Financial Economics 120 (3), 601{622.
Getmansky, M. (2012). The life cycle of hedge funds: Fund ows, size, competition, and
performance. The Quarterly Journal of Finance 2 (01), 1250003.
Gillan, S. L. and L. T. Starks (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder
activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of nancial Economics 57 (2),
275{305.
Glosten, L. R. and L. E. Harris (1988). Estimating the components of the bid/ask spread.
Journal of Financial Economics 21 (1), 123{142.
Gomes, A. (2001). Takeovers, freezeouts, and risk arbitrage. Technical report.
Grinblatt, M., S. Titman, and R. Wermers (1995). Momentum investment strategies,
portfolio performance, and herding: A study of mutual fund behavior. American Eco-
nomic Review, 1088{1105.
Grossman, S. J. and O. D. Hart (1980). Takeover bids, the free-rider problem, and the
theory of the corporation. The Bell Journal of Economics, 42{64.
Gruber, M. J. (1996). Another puzzle: The growth in actively managed mutual funds.
The Journal of Finance 51 (3), 783{810.
Harford, J. (2005). What drives merger waves? Journal of Financial Economics 77 (3),
529{560.
Harrison, J. M. and D. M. Kreps (1978). Speculative investor behavior in a stock market
with heterogeneous expectations. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 92 (2), 323{336.
Hasbrouck, J. (1991). Measuring the information content of stock trades. The Journal of
Finance 46 (1), 179{207.
Hasbrouck, J. (2009). Trading costs and returns for us equities: Estimating eective costs
from daily data. The Journal of Finance 64 (3), 1445{1477.
Hodder, J. E., J. C. Jackwerth, and O. Kolokolova (2014). Recovering delisting returns
of hedge funds. Technical Report 3.
Holmstrom, B. and J. Tirole (1993). Market liquidity and performance monitoring. Jour-
nal of Political Economy, 678{709.
Hong, H., T. Lim, and J. C. Stein (2000). Bad news travels slowly: Size, analyst coverage,
and the protability of momentum strategies. The Journal of Finance 55 (1), 265{295.
Hsieh, J. and R. A. Walkling (2005). Determinants and implications of arbitrage holdings
Bibliography 147
in acquisitions. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (3), 605{648.
Hu, H. T. and B. Black (2006). The new vote buying: Empty voting and hidden (mor-
phable) ownership. Southern California Law Review 79, 811.
Hu, H. T. and B. Black (2007). Hedge funds, insiders, and the decoupling of economic
and voting ownership: Empty voting and hidden (morphable) ownership. Journal of
Corporate Finance 13 (2), 343{367.
Huang, R. D. and H. R. Stoll (1997). The components of the bid-ask spread: A general
approach. Review of Financial Studies 10 (4), 995{1034.
Iliev, P., K. V. Lins, D. P. Miller, and L. Roth (2015). Shareholder voting and corporate
governance around the world. Review of Financial Studies 28 (8), 2167{2202.
Iliev, P. and M. Lowry (2014). Are mutual funds active voters? Review of Financial
Studies 28 (2), 446{485.
Ippolito, R. A. (1992). Consumer reaction to measures of poor quality: Evidence from
the mutual fund industry. Journal of Law and Economics, 45{70.
Irwin, D. A. and M. Tervio (2002). Does trade raise income?: Evidence from the twentieth
century. Journal of International Economics 58 (1), 1{18.
Jagannathan, R., A. Malakhov, and D. Novikov (2010). Do hot hands exist among hedge
fund managers? an empirical evaluation. The Journal of Finance 65 (1), 217{255.
Jensen, M. C. (1968). The performance of mutual funds in the period 1945{1964. The
Journal of Finance 23 (2), 389{416.
Jetley, G. and X. Ji (2010). The shrinking merger arbitrage spread: Reasons and impli-
cations. Financial Analysts Journal 66 (2), 54{68.
Jindra, J. and R. A. Walkling (2004). Speculation spreads and the market pricing of
proposed acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance 10 (4), 495{526.
Johnson, T. L. and E. C. So (2012). The option to stock volume ratio and future returns.
Journal of Financial Economics 106 (2), 262{286.
Johnson, W. C., J. M. Karpo, and S. Yi (2015). The bonding hypothesis of takeover
defenses: Evidence from ipo rms. Journal of Financial Economics 117 (2), 307{332.
Kahn, C. and A. Winton (1998). Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder
intervention. The Journal of Finance 53 (1), 99{129.
Kalay, A. and S. Pant (2009). Time varying voting rights and the private benets of
control. Working Paper.
Kaplan, S. N. and L. Zingales (1997). Do investment-cash ow sensitivities provide useful
measures of nancing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 169{215.
Karpo, J. M., P. H. Malatesta, and R. A. Walkling (1996). Corporate governance and
shareholder initiatives: Empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 42 (3),
365{395.
Bibliography 148
Kleibergen, F. and R. Paap (2006). Generalized reduced rank tests using the singular
value decomposition. Journal of Econometrics 133 (1), 97{126.
Koh, F. C., T. H. Koh, and M. Teo (2003). Asian hedge funds: return persistence, style
and fund characteristics. Working Paper, School of Economics and Social Sciences,
Singapore Management University.
Koski, J. L. and J. Ponti (1999). How are derivatives used? evidence from the mutual
fund industry. The Journal of Finance 54 (2), 791{816.
Lamont, O., C. Polk, and J. Saaa-Requejo (2001). Financial constraints and stock returns.
Review of Financial Studies 14 (2), 529{554.
Larcker, D. F. and T. Lys (1987). An empirical analysis of the incentives to engage
in costly information acquisition: The case of risk arbitrage. Journal of Financial
Economics 18 (1), 111{126.
Liang, B. (1999). On the performance of hedge funds. Financial Analysts Journal 55 (4),
72{85.
Liang, B. (2000). Hedge funds: The living and the dead. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis 35 (03), 309{326.
Lim, J., B. A. Sensoy, and M. S. Weisbach (2016). Indirect incentives of hedge fund
managers. The Journal of Finance 71 (2), 871{918.
Lynch, A. W. and D. K. Musto (2003). How investors interpret past fund returns. The
Journal of Finance 58 (5), 2033{2058.
Maksimovic, V. and G. Phillips (2001). The market for corporate assets: Who engages in
mergers and asset sales and are there eciency gains? The Journal of Finance 56 (6),
2019{2065.
Malkiel, B. G. (1995). Returns from investing in equity mutual funds 1971 to 1991. The
Journal of Finance 50 (2), 549{572.
Maug, E. (1998). Large shareholders as monitors: is there a trade-o between liquidity
and control? The Journal of Finance 53 (1), 65{98.
Maxwell, W. F. and C. P. Stephens (2003). The wealth eects of repurchases on bond-
holders. The Journal of Finance 58 (2), 895{920.
Mayhew, S. and V. Mihov (2004). How do exchanges select stocks for option listing? The
Journal of Finance 59 (1), 447{471.
Miller, E. M. (1977). Risk, uncertainty, and divergence of opinion. The Journal of
Finance 32 (4), 1151{1168.
Mitchell, M. and T. Pulvino (2001). Characteristics of risk and return in risk arbitrage.
The Journal of Finance, 2135{2175.
Mitchell, M. L. and J. H. Mulherin (1996). The impact of industry shocks on takeover
and restructuring activity. Journal of Financial Economics 41 (2), 193{229.
Bibliography 149
Nagel, S. (2005). Short sales, institutional investors and the cross-section of stock returns.
Journal of Financial Economics 78 (2), 277{309.
Naiker, V., F. Navissi, and C. Truong (2013). Options trading and the cost of equity
capital. The Accounting Review 88 (1), 261{295.
Nanda, V., M. Narayanan, and V. A. Warther (2000). Liquidity, investment ability, and
mutual fund structure. Journal of Financial Economics 57 (3), 417{443.
Ni, S. X., J. Pan, and A. M. Poteshman (2008). Volatility information trading in the
option market. The Journal of Finance 63 (3), 1059{1091.
Norli, ., C. Ostergaard, and I. Schindele (2015). Liquidity and shareholder activism.
Review of Financial Studies 28 (2), 486{520.
Odders-White, E. R. and M. J. Ready (2006). Credit ratings and stock liquidity. Review
of Financial Studies 19 (1), 119{157.
Pagano, M. (1989). Trading volume and asset liquidity. The Quarterly Journal of Eco-
nomics 104 (2), 255{274.
Pan, J. and A. M. Poteshman (2006). The information in option volume for future stock
prices. Review of Financial Studies 19 (3), 871{908.
Pastor, L. and R. F. Stambaugh (2012). On the size of the active management industry.
Journal of Political Economy 120 (4), 740{781.
Pastor, L., R. F. Stambaugh, and L. A. Taylor (2015). Scale and skill in active manage-
ment. Journal of Financial Economics 116 (1), 23{45.
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in nance panel data sets: Comparing
approaches. Review of Financial Studies 22 (1), 435{480.
Posthuma, N. and P. J. Van der Sluis (2003). A reality check on hedge funds returns.
Working Paper.
Poteshman, A. M. (2006). Unusual option market activity and the terrorist attacks of
september 11, 2001. The Journal of Business 79 (4), 1703{1726.
Qi, Y., L. Roth, and J. K. Wald (2010). Political rights and the cost of debt. Journal of
Financial Economics 95 (2), 202{226.
Qiu, J. and F. Yu (2009). The market for corporate control and the cost of debt. Journal
of Financial Economics 93 (3), 505{524.
Rajan, R. G. and L. Zingales (1995). What do we know about capital structure? some
evidence from international data. The Journal of Finance 50 (5), 1421{1460.
Rhodes-Kropf, M., D. T. Robinson, and S. Viswanathan (2005). Valuation waves and
merger activity: The empirical evidence. Journal of Financial Economics 77 (3), 561{
603.
Roll, R. (1984). A simple implicit measure of the eective bid-ask spread in an ecient
market. The Journal of Finance 39 (4), 1127{1139.
Bibliography 150
Roll, R., E. Schwartz, and A. Subrahmanyam (2009). Options trading activity and rm
valuation. Journal of Financial Economics 94 (3), 345{360.
Roll, R., E. Schwartz, and A. Subrahmanyam (2010). O/s: The relative trading activity
in options and stock. Journal of Financial Economics 96 (1), 1{17.
Sadka, R. (2010). Liquidity risk and the cross-section of hedge-fund returns. Journal of
Financial Economics 98 (1), 54{71.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1986). Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal
of Political Economy 94 (3, Part 1), 461{488.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (1997). The limits of arbitrage. The Journal of Fi-
nance 52 (1), 35{55.
Shleifer, A. and R. W. Vishny (2003). Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of
Financial Economics 70 (3), 295{311.
Sirri, E. R. and P. Tufano (1998). Costly search and mutual fund ows. The Journal of
Finance, 1589{1622.
Smith, M. P. (1996). Shareholder activism by institutional investors: Evidence from
calpers. The Journal of Finance 51 (1), 227{252.
Stephen, A. R., W. W. Randolph, and F. J. Jerey (2002). Corporate nance. The
McGrew Company Inc.
Stock, J. H. and M. Yogo (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear iv regression. Iden-
tication and Inference for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothen-
berg, 80.
Stoll, H. R. (1989). Inferring the components of the bid-ask spread: theory and empirical
tests. The Journal of Finance 44 (1), 115{134.
Strickland, D., K. W. Wiles, and M. Zenner (1996). A requiem for the usa is small
shareholder monitoring eective? Journal of Financial Economics 40 (2), 319{338.
Valta, P. (2012). Competition and the cost of debt. Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 105 (3), 661 { 682.
Zheng, L. (1999). Is money smart? a study of mutual fund investors' fund selection
ability. The Journal of Finance 54 (3), 901{933.
